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the origins of contemporary france-2-第57章

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Constitution of the clergy。〃  Cf。  sitting of January 2; 1791;

speech by the Bishop of Clermont。



'75' Duvergier; law of May 7; 1791; to maintain the right of

nonjuring priests to perform mass in national or private edifices。

(Demanded by Talleyrand and Sieyès。)



'76' 〃Archives Nationales;〃 F7; 3235。  Letter of M。  de Chateau…

Randon; deputy of la Lozère; May 28; 1791。  After the decree of May

23rd; all the functionaries of the department handed in their

resignations。



'77' Duvergier; law of May 21…29; 1791。



'78' Sauzay; I。  366; 538 to 593; 750。   Archives Nationales;〃 F7;

3235; Letter of M。  de Chanteau…Randon; May 10; 1791。   Mercure;

April 23rd; and April 16; 1701。  Articles of Mallet du Pan; letter

from Bordeaux; March 20; 1791。



'79' Buchez and Roux; XII; 77。  Report of Gallois and Gensonné sent

to La Vendée and the Deux Sévres (July 25; 1791)。   〃 Archives

Nationales;〃 F7; 3253; letter of the Directory of the Bas…Rhin

(letter of January 7; 1792)。   〃 Le District de Machecoul de 1788

à 1793;〃 by Lallier。  〃 Histoire de Joseph Lebon;〃 by Paris。  

Sauzay; vol。  I。  and II。  in full。



'80' Mercure; January 15th; April 23rd; May 16th and 30th; June 1st;

November 23rd; 1791。   〃Le District de Machecoul;〃 by Lallier;

173。   Sauzay; I。  295。   Lavirotte; 〃Annales d'Arnay…le…Duc

(February 5; 1792)。   〃Archives Nationales;〃 F7; 3223。  Petition

of a number of the inhabitants of Montpellier; November 17; 1791。



'81' Duvergier; decree of November 29; 1791。   Mercure; November

30; 1791 (article by Mallet du Pan)。









CHAPTER III。  THE CONSTRUCTIONS … THE CONSTITUTION OF 1791。。



That which is called a Government is a concert of powers; each with

a distinct function; and all working towards a final and complete

end。  The merit of a Government consists in the attainment of this

end; the worth of a machine depends upon the work it accomplishes。

The important thing is not to produce a good mechanical design on

paper; but to see that the machine works well when set up on the

ground。  In vain might its founders allege the beauty of their plan

and the logical connection of their theorems; they are not required

to furnish either plan or theorems; but an instrument。



Two conditions are requisite to render this instrument serviceable

and effective。  In the first place; the public powers must harmonize

with each other; if not; one will neutralize the other; in the

second place they must be obeyed; or they are null。



The Constituent Assembly made no provision for securing this harmony

or this obedience。  In the machine which it constructed the motions

all counteract each other; the impulse is not transmitted; the

gearing is not complete between the center and the extremities; the

large central and upper wheels turn to no purpose; the innumerable

small wheels near the ground break or get out of order: the machine;

by virtue of its own mechanism; remains useless; over…heated; under

clouds of waste steam; creaking and thumping in such a matter as to

show clearly that it must explode。





I。



Powers of the Central Government。 … The Assembly on the partition of

power。 … Rupture of every tie between the Legislature and the King。

… The Assembly on the subordination of the executive power。 … How

this is nullified。 … Certainty of a conflict。 … The deposition of

the King is inevitable。



Let us first consider the two central powers; the Assembly and the

King。 … Ordinarily when distinct powers of different origin are

established by a Constitution; it makes; in the case of conflict

between them; a provision for an arbiter in the institution of an

Upper Chamber。  Each of these powers; at least; has a hold on the

other。  The Assembly must have one on the King: which is the right

to refuse taxation。  The King must have one on the Assembly: which

is the right of dissolving it。  Otherwise; one of the two being

disarmed; the other becomes omnipotent; and; consequently; insane。

The peril here is as great for an omnipotent Assembly as it is for

an absolute King。  If the former is desirous of remaining in its

right mind; it needs repression and control as much as the latter。

If it is proper for the Assembly to restrain the King by refusing

him subsidies; it is proper for him to be able to defend himself by

appealing to the electors。 … But; besides these extreme measures;

which are dangerous and rarely resorted to; there is another which

is ordinarily employed and is safe; that is; the right for the King

to take his ministers from the Chamber。  Generally; the leaders of

the majority form the ministry; their nomination being the means of

restoring harmony between the King and Assembly; they are at once

men belonging to the Assembly and men belonging to the King。

Through this expedient not only is the confidence of the Assembly

assured; since the Government remains in the hands of its leaders;

but also it is under restraint because these become simultaneously

both powerful and responsible。  Placed at the head of all branches

of the service; they are; before proposing it or accepting it; in a

position to judge whether a law is useful and practicable。  Nothing

is so healthy for a majority as a ministry composed of its own

chiefs; nothing is so effective in repressing rashness or

intemperance。  A railway conductor is not willing that his

locomotive should be deprived of coal; nor to have the rails he is

about to run on broken up。 … This arrangement; with all its

drawbacks and inconveniences; is the best one yet arrived at by

human experience for the security of societies against despotism and

anarchy。  For the absolute power which establishes or saves them may

also oppress or exhaust them; there is a gradual substitution of

differentiated powers; held together through the mediation of a

third umpire; caused by reciprocal dependence and an which is common

to both。



Experience; however; is unimportant to the members of the

Constituent Assembly; under the banner of principles they sunder one

after another all the ties which keep the two powers together

harmoniously。 … There must not be an Upper Chamber; because this

would be an asylum or a nursery for aristocrats。  Moreover; 〃the

nation being of one mind;〃 it is averse to 〃the creation of

different organs。〃 So; applying ready…made formulas and metaphors;

they continue to produce ideological definitions and distinctions。



The King must not have a hold on the legislative body: the executive

is an arm; whose business it is to obey; it is absurd for the arm to

constrain or direct the head。  Scarcely is the monarch allowed a

delaying veto。  Sieyès here enters with his protest declaring that

this is a 〃lettre de cachet'1' launched against the universal will;〃

and there is excluded from the action of the veto the articles of

the Constitution; all money…bills; and some other laws。 … …Neither

the monarch nor the electors of the Assembly are to convoke the

Assembly; he has no voice in or oversight of the details of its

formation; the electors are to meet together and vote without his

summons or supervision。  Once the Assembly is elected he can neither

adjourn nor dissolve it。  He cannot even propose a law;'2' per…

mission is only granted to him 〃to invite it to take a subject into

consideration。〃 He is limited to his executive duties; and still

more; a sort of wall is built up between him and the Assembly; and

the opening in it; by which each could take the other's hand; is

carefully closed up。  The deputies are forbidden to become ministers

throughout the term of their service and for two years afterwards。

This is because fears are entertained that they might be corrupted

through contact with the Court; and; again; whoever the ministers

might be; there is no disposition to accept their ascendancy。'3'  If

one of them is admitted into the Assembly it is not for the purpose

of giving advice; but to furnish information; reply to

interrogatories; and make protestations of his zeal in humble terms

and in a dubious position。'4'  By virtue of being a royal agent he

is under suspicion like the King himself; and he is sequestered in

his bureau as the King is sequestered in his palace。… Such is the

spirit of the Constitution: by force of the theory; and the better

to secure a separation of the powers;'5' a common understanding

between them is for ever rendered impossible; and to make up for

this impossibility there remains nothing but to make one the master

and the other the clerk。



This they did not fail to do; and for greater security; the latter

is made an honorary clerk; The executive power is conferred on him

nominally and in appearance; he does not possess it in fact; care

having been taken to place it in other hands。 … In effect; all

executive agents and all secondary and local powers are elective。

The King has no voice; directly or indirectly; in the choice of

judge
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