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The King has no voice； directly or indirectly； in the choice of
judges； public prosecutors； bishops； curés； collectors and assessors
of the taxes； commissaries of police； district and departmental
administrators； mayors； and municipal officers。 At most； should an
administrator violate a law； he may annul his acts and suspend him；
but the Assembly； the superior power； has the right to cancel this
suspension。 … As to the armed force； of which he is supposed to be
the commander…in…chief； this escapes from him entirely： the National
Guard is not to receive orders from him； the gendarmerie and the
troops are bound to respond to the requisitions of the municipal
authorities； whom the King can neither select nor displace： in
short； local action of any kind … that is to say； all effective
action … is denied to him。 … The executive instrument is purposely
destroyed。 The connection which existed between the wheels of the
extremities and the central shaft is broken； and henceforth；
incapable of distributing its energy； this shaft； in the hands of
the monarch； stands still or else turns to no purpose。 The King；
〃supreme head of the general administration； of the army； and of the
navy； guardian of public peace and order； hereditary representative
of the nation；〃 is without the means； in spite of his lofty titles；
of directly applying his pretended powers； of causing a schedule of
assessments to be drawn up in a refractory commune； of compelling
payment by a delinquent tax…payer； of enforcing the free circulation
of a convoy of grain； of executing the judgment of a court； of
suppressing an outbreak； or of securing protection to persons and
property。 For he can bring no constraint to bear on the agents who
are declared to be subordinate to him； he has no resources but those
of warning and persuasion。 He sends to each Departmental Assembly
the decrees which he has sanctioned； requesting it to transmit them
and cause them to be carried out； he receives its correspondence and
bestows his censure or approval … and that is all。 He is merely a
powerless medium of communication； a herald or public advertiser； a
sort of central echo； sonorous and empty； to which news is brought；
and from which laws depart； to spread abroad like a common rumor。
Such as he is； and thus diminished； he is still considered to be too
strong。 He is deprived of the right of pardon； 〃which severs the
last artery of monarchical government。〃＇6＇ All sorts of precautions
are taken against him。 He cannot declare war without a decree of
the Assembly； he is obliged to bring war to an end on the decree of
the Assembly； he cannot make a treaty of peace； an alliance； or a
commercial treaty； without the ratification of these by the
Assembly。 It is expressly declared that he is to nominate but two…
thirds of the rear…admirals； one…half of the lieutenant…generals；
field…marshals； captains of Vessels and colonels of the gendarmerie；
one…third of the colonels and lieutenant…colonels of the line； and a
sixth of the naval lieutenants。 He must not allow troops to stay or
pass within 30；000 yards of the Assembly。 His guard must not
consist of more than 1；800 men； duly verified； and protected against
his seductions by the civil oath。 The heir…presumptive must not
leave the country without the Assembly's assent。 It is the Assembly
which is to regulate by law the education of his son during
minority。 … All these precautions are accompanied with threats。
There are against him five possible causes of dethronement； against
his responsible Ministers； eight causes for condemnation to from
twelve to twenty years of constraint； and eight grounds for
condemnations to death。＇7＇ Everywhere between the lines of the
Constitution； we read the constant disposition to assume an attitude
of defense； the secret dread of treachery； the conviction that
executive power； of whatever kind； is in its nature inimical to the
public welfare。 … For withholding the nomination of judges； the
reason alleged is that 〃the Court and the Ministers are the most
contemptible portion of the nation。〃＇8＇ If the nomination of
Ministers is conceded； it is on the ground that〃 Ministers appointed
by the people would necessarily be too highly esteemed。〃 The
principle is that 〃the legislative body alone must possess the
confidence of the people；〃 that royal authority corrupts its
depository； and that executive power is always tempted to commit
abuses and to engage in conspiracies。 If it is provided for in the
Constitution it is with regret； through the necessity of the case；
and on the condition of its being trammeled by impediments； it will
prove so much the less baneful in proportion as it is restrained；
guarded； threatened； and denounced。 … A position of this kind is
manifestly intolerable； and only a man as passive as Louis XVI。
could have put up with it。 Do what he will； however； he cannot make
it a tenable one。 In vain does he scrupulously adhere to the
Constitution； and fulfill it to the letter。 Because he is powerless
the Assembly regards him as lukewarm； and imputes to him the
friction of the machine which is not under his control。 If he
presumes once to exercise his veto it is rebellion； and the
rebellion of an official against his superior； which is the
Assembly； the rebellion of a subject against his Sovereign； which is
the people。 In this case dethronement is proper； and the Assembly
has only to pass the decree； the people have simply to execute the
act； and the Constitution ends in a Revolution。 … A piece of
machinery of this stamp breaks down through its own movement。 In
conformity with the philosophic theory the two wheels of government
must be separated； and to do this they have to be disconnected and
isolated one from the other。 In conformity with the popular creed；
the driving…wheel must be subordinated and its influence
neutralized： to do this it is necessary to reduce its energy to a
minimum； break up its connections； and raise it up in the air to
turn round like a top； or to remain there as an obstacle to
something else。 It is certain that； after much ill…usage as a
plaything； it will finally be removed as a hindrance。
II。 THE CREATION OF POPULAR DEMOCRACY。
Administrative powers。 … The Assembly on the hierarchy。 … Grades
abolished。 … Collective powers。 … Election introduced； and the
influence of subordinates in all branches of the service。 …
Certainty of disorganization。 … Power in the hands of municipal
bodies。
Let us leave the center of government and go to the extremities； and
observe the various administrations in working operation。＇9＇
For any service to work well and with precision； there must be a
single and unique chief who can appoint； pay； punish and dismiss his
subordinates。 … For； on the one hand； he stands alone and feels his
responsibility； he brings to bear on the management of affairs a
degree of attention and consistency； a tact and a power of
initiation of which a committee is incapable； corporate follies or
defects do not involve any one in particular； and authority is
effective only when it is in one hand。 … On the other hand； being
master； he can rely on the subalterns whom he has himself selected；
whom he controls through their hopes or fears； and whom he
discharges if they do not perform their duties； otherwise he has no
hold on them and they are not instruments to be depended on。 Only
on these conditions can a railway manager be sure that his pointsmen
are on the job。 Only on these conditions can the foreman of a
foundry engage to execute work by a given day。 In every public or
private enterprise； direct； immediate authority is the only known；
the only human and possible way to ensure the obedience and
punctuality of agents。 … Administration is thus carried on in all
countries； by one or several series of functionaries； each under
some central manager who holds the reins in his single grasp。＇10＇
This is all reversed in the new Constitution。 In the eyes of our
legislators obedience must be spontaneous and never compulsory； and；
in the suppression of despotism； they suppress government。 The
general rule in the hierarchy which they establish is that the
subordinates should be independent of their superior； for he must
neither appoint nor displace them： the only right he has is to give
them advice and remonstrate with them。＇11＇ At best； in certain
cases； he can annul their acts and inflict on them a provisional
suspension of their functions； which can be contested and is
revocable。＇12＇ We see； thus； that none of the local powers are
delegated by the central power； the latter is simply like a man
without either hands or arms； seated in a gilt chair。 The Minister
of the Finances cannot appoint or dismiss either an assessor or a
collector； the Minister of the Interior； not one of the
departmental； district； or communal administrators； the Minister of