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military events on internal affairs。 In the first place； no one who has not
actually crossed the Russian front during the period of active operations
can well realize how different are the revolutionary wars from that which
ended in 1918。 Advance on a broad front no longer means that a belt of
men in touch with each other has moved definitely forward。 It means that
there have been a series of forward movements at widely separated； and
with the very haziest of mutual； connections。 There will be violent
fighting for a village or a railway station or the passage of a river。 Small
hostile groups will engage in mortal combat to decide the possession of a
desirable hut in which to sleep； but； except at these rare points of actual
contact； the number of prisoners is far in excess of the number of
casualties。 Parties on each side will be perfectly ignorant of events to
right or left of them； ignorant even of their gains and losses。 Last year I
ran into Whites in a village which the Reds had assured me was
strongly held by themselves； and these same Whites refused to believe
that the village where I had spent the preceding night was in the
possession of the Reds。 It is largely an affair of scouting parties； of
patrols dodging each other through the forest tracks； of swift raids； of
sudden conviction （often entirely erroneous） on the part of one side or the
other； that it or the enemy has been 〃encircled。〃 The actual number of
combatants to a mile of front is infinitely less than during the German war。
Further； since an immense proportion of these combatants on both sides
have no wish to fight at all； being without patriotic or political convictions
and very badly fed and clothed； and since it is more profitable to desert
than to be taken prisoner； desertion in bulk is not uncommon； and the
deserters； hurriedly enrolled to fight on the other side； indignantly re…
desert when opportunity offers。 In this way the armies of Denikin and
Yudenitch swelled like mushrooms and decayed with similar rapidity。
Military events of this kind； however spectacular they may seem abroad；
do not have the political effect that might be expected。 I was in Moscow
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at the worst moment of the crisis in 1919 when practically everybody
outside the Government believed that Petrograd had already fallen； and I
could not but realize that the Government was stronger then than it had
been in February of the same year； when it had a series of victories and
peace with the Allies seemed for a moment to be in sight。 A sort of fate
seems to impel the Whites to neutralize with extraordinary rapidity any
good will for themelves which they may find among the population。
This is true of both sides； but seems to affect the Whites especially。
Although General Baron Wrangel does indeed seem to have striven more
successfully than his predecessors not to set the population against him
and to preserve the loyalty of his army； it may be said with absolute
certainty that any large success on his part would bring crowding to his
banner the same crowd of stupid reactionary officers who brought to
nothing any mild desire for moderation that may have been felt by General
Denikin。 If the area he controls increases； his power of control over his
subordinates will decrease； and the forces that led to Denikin's collapse
will be set in motion in his case also。* ＇（*）On the day on which I send this
book to the printers news comes of Wrangel's collapse and flight。 I leave
standing what I have written concerning him； since it
will apply to any successor he may have。 Each general who has
stepped into Kolchak's shoes has eventually had to run away in them； and
always for the same reasons。 It may be taken almost as an axiom that the
history of great country is that of its centre； not of its periphery。 The
main course of English history throughout the troubled seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was never deflected from London。 French history
did not desert Paris； to make a new start at Toulon or at Quiberon Bay。
And only a fanatic could suppose that Russian history would run away
from Moscow； to begin again in a semi…Tartar peninsula in the Black Sea。
Moscow changes continually； and may so change as to make easy the
return of the 〃refugees。〃 Some have already returned。 But the refugees
will not return as conquerors。 Should a Russian Napoleon （an unlikely
figure； even in spite of our efforts） appear； he will not throw away the
invaluable asset of a revolutionary war…cry。 He will have to fight some
one； or he will not be a Napoleon。 And whom will he fight but the very
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people who； by keeping up the friction； have rubbed Aladdin's ring so hard
and so long that a Djinn； by no means kindly disposed towards them；
bursts forth at last to avenge the breaking of his sleep？＇
And； of course； should hostilities flare up again on the Polish frontier；
should the lions and lambs and jackals and eagles of Kossack； Russian；
Ukrainian and Polish nationalists temporarily join forces； no miracles of
diplomacy will keep them from coming to blows。 For all these reasons a
military collapse of the Soviet Government at the present time； even a
concerted military advance of its enemies； is unlikely。
It is undoubtedly true that the food situation in the towns is likely to
be worse this winter than it has yet been。 Forcible attempts to get food
from the peasantry will increase the existing hostility between town and
country。 There has been a very bad harvest in Russia。 The bringing of
food from Siberia or the Kuban （if military activities do not make that
impossible） will impose an almost intolerable strain on the inadequate
transport。 Yet I think internal collapse unlikely。 It may be said almost
with certainty that Governments do not collapse until there is no one left
to defend them。 That moment had arrived in the case of the
Tsar。 It had arrived in the case of Kerensky。 It has not arrived in the
case of the Soviet Government for certain obvious reasons。 For one
thing； a collapse of the Soviet Government at the present time would be
disconcerting； if not disastrous； to its more respectable enemies。 It would；
of course； open the way to a practically unopposed military advance； but at
the same time it would present its enemies with enormous territory； which
would overwhelm the organizing powers which they have shown again
and again to be quite inadequate to much smaller tasks。 Nor would
collapse of the present Government turn a bad harvest into a good one。
Such a collapse would mean the breakdown of all existing organizations；
and would intensify the horrors of famine for every town dweller。
Consequently； though the desperation of hunger and resentment against
inevitable requisitions may breed riots and revolts here and there
throughout the country； the men who； in other circumstances； might
coordinate such events； will refrain from doing anything of the sort。 I do
not say that collapse is impossible。 I do say that it would be extremely
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undesirable from the point of view of almost everybody in Russia。
Collapse of th