representative government-第38章

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k　of　those　whom　any　probable　Reform　Bill　would　add　to　the　number；　are　the　middle　class；　and　have　as　much　a　class　interest；　distinct　from　the　working　classes；　as　landlords　or　great　manufacturers。　Were　the　suffrage　extended　to　all　skilled　labourers；　even　these　would；　or　might；　still　have　a　class　interest　distinct　from　the　unskilled。　Suppose　it　extended　to　all　men…　suppose　that　what　was　formerly　called　by　the　misapplied　name　of　universal　suffrage；　and　now　by　the　silly　title　of　manhood　suffrage；　became　the　law；　the　voters　would　still　have　a　class　interest；　as　distinguished　from　women。　Suppose　that　there　were　a　question　before　the　Legislature　specially　affecting　women；　as　whether　women　should　be　allowed　to　graduate　at　Universities；　whether　the　mild　penalties　inflicted　on　ruffians　who　beat　their　wives　daily　almost　to　death's　door　should　be　exchanged　for　something　more　effectual；　or　suppose　that　any　one　should　propose　in　the　British　Parliament；　what　one　State　after　another　in　America　is　enacting；　not　by　a　mere　law；　but　by　a　provision　of　their　revised　Constitutions…　that　married　women　should　have　a　right　to　their　own　property。　Are　not　a　man's　wife　and　daughters　entitled　to　know　whether　he　votes　for　or　against　a　candidate　who　will　support　these　propositions？　　　〃It　will　of　course　be　objected　that　these　arguments'　derive　all　their　weight　from　the　supposition　of　an　unjust　state　of　the　suffrage：　That　if　the　opinion　of　the　non…electors　is　likely　to　make　the　elector　vote　more　honestly；　or　more　beneficially；　than　he　would　vote　if　left　to　himself；　they　are　more　fit　to　be　electors　than　he　is；　and　ought　to　have　the　franchise：　That　whoever　is　fit　to　influence　electors　is　fit　to　be　an　elector：　That　those　to　whom　voters　ought　to　be　responsible　should　be　themselves　voters；　and　being　such；　should　have　the　safeguard　of　the　ballot　to　shield　them　from　the　undue　influence　of　powerful　individuals　or　classes　to　whom　they　ought　not　to　be　responsible。　　　〃This　argument　is　specious；　and　I　once　thought　it　conclusive。　It　now　appears　to　me　fallacious。　All　who　are　fit　to　influence　electors　are　not；　for　that　reason；　fit　to　be　themselves　electors。　This　last　is　a　much　greater　power　than　the　former；　and　those　may　be　ripe　for　the　minor　political　function　who　could　not　as　yet　be　safely　trusted　with　the　superior。　The　opinions　and　wishes　of　the　poorest　and　rudest　class　of　labourers　may　be　very　useful　as　one　influence　among　others　on　the　minds　of　the　voters；　as　well　as　on　those　of　the　Legislature；　and　yet　it　might　be　highly　mischievous　to　give　them　the　preponderant　influence　by　admitting　them；　in　their　present　state　of　morals　and　intelligence；　to　the　full　exercise　of　the　suffrage。　It　is　precisely　this　indirect　influence　of　those　who　have　not　the　suffrage　over　those　who　have　which；　by　its　progressive　growth；　softens　the　transition　to　every　fresh　extension　of　the　franchise；　and　is　the　means　by　which；　when　the　time　is　ripe；　the　extension　is　peacefully　brought　about。　But　there　is　another　and　a　still　deeper　consideration；　which　should　never　be　left　out　of　the　account　in　political　speculations。　The　notion　is　itself　unfounded；　that　publicity；　and　the　sense　of　being　answerable　to　the　public；　are　of　no　use　unless　the　public　are　qualified　to　form　a　sound　judgment。　It　is　a　very　superficial　view　of　the　utility　of　public　opinion　to　suppose　that　it　does　good　only　when　it　succeeds　in　enforcing　a　servile　conformity　to　itself。　To　be　under　the　eyes　of　others…　to　have　to　defend　oneself　to　others…　is　never　more　important　than　to　those　who　act　in　opposition　to　the　opinion　of　others；　for　it　obliges　them　to　have　sure　ground　of　their　own。　Nothing　has　so　steadying　an　influence　as　working　against　pressure。　Unless　when　under　the　temporary　sway　of　passionate　excitement；　no　one　will　do　that　which　he　expects　to　be　greatly　blamed　for；　unless　from　a　preconceived　and　fixed　purpose　of　his　own；　which　is　always　evidence　of　a　thoughtful　and　deliberate　character；　and；　except　in　radically　bad　men；　generally　proceeds　from　sincere　and　strong　personal　convictions。　Even　the　bare　fact　of　having　to　give　an　account　of　their　conduct　is　a　powerful　inducement　to　adhere　to　conduct　of　which　at　least　some　decent　account　can　be　given。　If　any　one　thinks　that　the　mere　obligation　of　preserving　decency　is　not　a　very　considerable　check　on　the　abuse　of　power；　he　has　never　had　his　attention　called　to　the　conduct　of　those　who　do　not　feel　under　the　necessity　of　observing　that　restraint。　Publicity　is　inappreciable；　even　when　it　does　no　more　than　prevent　that　which　can　by　no　possibility　be　plausibly　defended…　than　compel　deliberation；　and　force　every　one　to　determine；　before　he　acts；　what　he　shall　say　if　called　to　account　for　his　actions。　　　〃But；　if　not　now　（it　may　be　said）；　at　least　hereafter；　when　all　are　fit　to　have　votes；　and　when　all　men　and　women　are　admitted　to　vote　in　virtue　of　their　fitness；　then　there　can　no　longer　be　danger　of　class　legislation；　then　the　electors；　being　the　nation；　can　have　no　interest　apart　from　the　general　interest：　even　if　individuals　still　vote　according　to　private　or　class　inducements；　the　majority　will　have　no　such　inducement；　and　as　there　will　then　be　no　non…electors　to　whom　they　ought　to　be　responsible；　the　effect　of　the　ballot；　excluding　none　but　the　sinister　influences；　will　be　wholly　beneficial。　　　〃Even　in　this　I　do　not　agree。　I　cannot　think　that　even　if　the　people　were　fit　for；　and　had　obtained；　universal　suffrage；　the　ballot　would　be　desirable。　First；　because　it　could　not；　in　such　circumstances　be　supposed　to　be　needful。　Let　us　only　conceive　the　state　of　things　which　the　hypothesis　implies；　a　people　universally　educated；　and　every　grown…up　human　being　possessed　of　a　vote。　If；　even　when　only　a　small　proportion　are　electors；　and　the　majority　of　the　population　almost　uneducated；　public　opinion　is　already；　as　every　one　now　sees　that　it　is；　the　ruling　power　in　the　last　resort；　it　is　a　chimera　to　suppose　that　over　a　community　who　all　read；　and　who　all　have　votes；　any　power　could　be　exercised　by　landlords　and　rich　people　against　their　own　inclination　which　it　would　be　at　all　difficult　for　them　to　throw　off。　But　though　the　protection　of　secrecy　would　then　be　needless；　the　control　of　publicity　would　be　as　needful　as　ever。　The　universal　observation　of　mankind　has　been　very　fallacious　if　the　mere　fact　of　being　one　of　the　community；　and　not　being　in　a　position　of　pronounced　contrariety　of　interest　to　the　public　at　large；　is　enough　to　ensure　the　performance　of　a　public　duty；　without　either　the　stimulus　or　the　restraint　derived　from　the　opinion　of　our　fellow　creatures。　A　man's　own　particular　share　of　the　public　interest；　even　though　he　may　have　no　private　interest　drawing　him　in　the　opposite　direction；　is　not；　as　a　general　rule；　found　sufficient　to　make　him　do　his　duty　to　the　public　without　other　external　inducements。　Neither　can　it　be　admitted　that　even　if　all　had　votes　they　would　give　their　votes　as　honestly　in　secret　as　in　public。　　　〃The　proposition　that　the　electors　when　they　compose　the　whole　of　the　community　cannot　have　an　interest　in　voting　against　the　interest　of　the　community　will　be　found　on　examination　to　have　more　sound　than　meaning　in　it。　Though　the　community　as　a　whole　can　have　（as　the　terms　imply）　no　other　interest　than　its　collective　interest；　any　or　every　individual　in　it　may。　A　man's　interest　consists　of　whatever　he　takes　an　interest　in。　Everybody　has　as　many　different　interests　as　he　has　feelings；　likings　or　dislikings；　either　of　a　selfish　or　of　a　better　kind。　It　cannot　be　said　that　any　of　these；　taken　by　itself；　constitutes　'his　interest'；　he　is　a　good　man　or　a　bad　according　as　he　prefers　one　class　of　his　interests　or　another。　A　man　who　is　a　tyrant　at　home　will　be　apt　to　sympathise　with　tyranny　（when　not　exercised　over　himself）：　he　will　be　almost　certain　not　to　sympathise　with　resistance　to　tyranny。　An　envious　man　will　vote　against　Aristides　because　he　is　called　the　just。　A　selfish　man　will　prefer　even　a　trifling　individual　benefit　to　his　share　of　the　advantage　which　his　country　would　derive　from　a　good　law；　because　interests　peculiar　to　himself　are　those　which　the　habits　of　his　mind　both　dispose　him　to　dwell　on；　and　make　him　best　able　to　estimate。　A　great　number　of　the　electors　will　have　two　sets　of　preferences…　those　on　private　and　those　on　public　grounds。　The　last　are　the　only　ones　which　the　elector　would　like　to　avow。　The　best　side　of　their　character　is　that　which　people　are　anxious　to　show；　even　to　those　who　are　no　better　than　themselves。　People　will　give　dishonest　or　mean　votes　from　lucre；　from　malice；　from　pique；　from　personal　rivalry；　even　from　the　interests　or　prejudices　of　class　or　sect；　more　readily　in　secret　than　in　public。　And　cases　exist…　they　may　come　to　be　more　frequent…　in　which　almost　the　only　restraint　upon　a　majority　of　knaves　consists　in　their　involuntary　respect　for　the　opinion　of　an　honest　minority。　In　such　a　case　as　that　of　the　repudiating　States　of　North　America；　is　there　not　some　check　to　the　unprincipled　voter　in　the　shame　of　looking　an　honest　man　in　the　face？　Since　all　this　good　would　be　sacrificed　by　the　ballot；　even　in　the　circumstances　most　favourable　to　it；　a　much　stronger　case　is　requisite　than　can　now　be　made　out　for　its　necessity　（and　the　case　is　continually　becoming