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side； if it be possible。 For the requirement of security shows that the party requiring it was not content to rely on the simple promise of the other side； which he would be compelled to do if he had to perform before the security was given； and thus the very object of requiring it would be defeated。 /1/
This last case suggests what is very forcibly impressed on any one who studies the cases；that； after all； the most of decision is not any technical； or even any general principle of contracts； but a consideration of the nature of the particular transaction as a practical matter。 A promises B to do a day's work for two dollars； and B promises A to pay two dollars for a day's work。 There the two promises cannot be performed at the same time。 The work will take all day； the payment half a minute。 How are you to decide which is to be done first； that is to say； which promise is dependent upon performance on the other side？ It is only by reference to the habits of the community and to convenience。 It is not enough to say that on the principle of equivalency a man is not presumed to intend to pay for a thing until he has it。 The work is payment for the money； as much as the ＇338＇ money for the work； and one must be paid in advance。 The question is； why； if one man is not presumed to intend to pay money until he has money's worth； the other is presumed to intend to give money's worth before he has money。 An answer cannot be obtained from any general theory。 The fact that employers； as a class； can be trusted for wages more safely than the employed for their labor； that the employers have had the power and have been the law… makers； or other considerations； it matters not what； have determined that the work is to be done first。 But the grounds of decision are purely practical； and can never be elicited from grammar or from logic。
A reference to practical considerations will be found to run all through the subject。 Take another instance。 The plaintiff declared on a mutual agreement between himself and the defendant that he would sell； and the defendant would buy； certain Donskoy wool； to be shipped by the plaintiff at Odessa； and delivered in England。 Among the stipulations of the contract was one； that the names of the vessels should be declared as soon as the wools were shipped。 The defence was； that the wool was bought； with the knowledge of both parties； for the purpose of reselling it in the course of the defendant's business； that it was an article of fluctuating value； and not salable until the names of the vessels in which it was shipped should have been declared according to the contract； but that the plaintiff did not declare the names of the vessels as agreed。 The decision of the court was given by one of the greatest technical lawyers that ever lived； Baron Parke； yet he did not dream of giving any technical or merely logical reason for the decision； but； after stating in the above words the facts which were deemed material to the question ＇339＇ whether declaring the names of the vessels was a condition to the duty to accept； stated the ground of decision thus： 〃Looking at the nature of the contract； and the great importance of it to the object with which the contract was entered into with the knowledge of both parties； we think it was a condition precedent。〃 /1/
＇340＇ LECTURE X。
SUCCESSIONS AFTER DEATH。
In the Lecture on Possession； I tried to show that the notion of possessing a right as such was intrinsically absurd。 All rights are consequences attached to filling some situation of fact。 A right which may be acquired by possession differs from others simply in being attached to a situation of such a nature that it may be filled successively by different persons； or by any one without regard to the lawfulness of his doing so； as is the case where the situation consists in having a tangible object within one's power。
When a right of this sort is recognized by the law； there is no difficulty in transferring it； or； more accurately； there is no difficulty in different persons successively enjoying similar rights in respect of the subject…matter。 If A； being the possessor of a horse or a field； gives up the possession to B； the rights which B acquires stand on the same ground as A's did before。 The facts from which A's rights sprang have ceased to be true of A； and are now true of B。 The consequences attached by the law to those facts now exist for B； as they did for A before。 The situation of fact from which the rights spring is continuing one； and any one who occupies it； no matter how； has the rights attached to it。 But there is no possession possible of a contract。 The ＇341＇ fact that a consideration was given yesterday by A to B； and a promise received in return； cannot be laid hold of by X； and transferred from A to himself。 The only thing can be transferred is the benefit or burden of the promise； and how can they be separated from the facts which gave rise to them？ How； in short； can a man sue or be sued on a promise in which he had no part？
Hitherto it has been assumed； in dealing with any special right or obligation； that the facts from which it sprung were true of the individual entitled or bound。 But it often happens； especially in modern law； that a person acquires and is allowed to enforce a special right； although that facts which give rise to it are not true of him； or are true of him only in part。 One of the chief problems of the law is to explain the machinery by which this result has been brought to pass。
It will be observed that the problem is not coextensive with the whole field of rights。 Some rights cannot be transferred by any device or contrivance； for instance； a man's right a to bodily safety or reputation。 Others again are incident to possession； and within the limits of that conception no other is necessary。 As Savigny said； 〃Succession does not apply to possession by itself。〃 /1/
But the notion of possession will carry us but a very little way in our understanding of the modern theory of transfer。 That theory depends very largely upon the notion of succession； to use the word just quoted from Savigny； and accordingly successions will be the subject of this and the following Lecture。 I shall begin by explaining the theory of succession to persons deceased； and after that is done shall pass to the theory of transfer between living ＇342＇ people； and shall consider whether any relation can be established between the two。
The former is easily shown to be founded upon a fictitious identification between the deceased and his successor。 And as a first step to the further discussion； as well as for its own sake； I shall briefly state the evidence touching the executor； the heir； and the devisee。 In order to understand the theory of our law with regard to the first of these； at least； scholars are agreed that it is necessary to consider the structure and position of the Roman family as it was in the infancy of Roman society。
Continental jurists have long been collecting the evidence that； in the earlier periods of Roman and German law alike； the unit of society was the family。 The Twelve Tables of Rome still recognize the interest of the inferior members of the family in the family property。 Heirs are called sui heredes； that is； heirs of themselves or of their own property； as is explained by Gaius。 /1/ Paulus says that they are regarded as owners in a certain sense； even in the lifetime of their father； and that after his death they do not so much receive an inheritance as obtain the full power of dealing with their property。 /2/
Starting from this point it is easy to understand the ＇343＇ succession of heirs to a deceased paterfamilias in the Roman system。 If the family was the owner of the property administered by a paterfamilias； its rights remained unaffected by the death of its temporary head。 The family continued； although the head died。 And when； probably by a gradual change； /1/ the paterfamilias came to be regarded as owner； instead of a simple manager of the family rights； the nature and continuity of those rights did not change with the title to them。 The familia continued to the heirs as it was left by the ancestor。 The heir succeeded not to the ownership of this or that thing separately； but to the total hereditas or headship of the family with certain rights of property as incident； /2/ and of course he took this headship； or right of representing the family interests； subject to the modifications effected by the last manager。
The aggregate of the ancestor's rights and duties； or； to use the technical phrase； the total persona sustained by him； was easily separated from his natural personality。 For this persona was but the aggregate of what had formerly been family rights and duties； and was originally sustained by any individual only as the family head。 Hence it was said to be continued by the inheritance； /3/ and when the heir assumed it he had his action in respect of injuries previously committed。 /4/
Thus the Roman heir came to be treated as identified with his ancestor for the purposes of the law。 And thus it is clear how the impossible transfers which I seek to explain were accomplished in that instance。 Rights to which B ＇344＇ as B could show no title； h