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o intends forthwith to enter and take it。 The finder's power to reproduce his former physical relation to the gold is rather limited； yet I believe that no one would say that his possession was at an end until the burglar； by an overt ＇238＇ act； had manifested his power and intent to exclude others from the purse。 The reason for this is the same which has been put with regard to the power to exclude at the moment of gaining possession。 The law deals； for the most part； with overt acts and facts which can be known by the senses。 So long as the burglar has not taken the purse； he has not manifested his intent； and until he breaks through the barrier which measures the present possessor's power of excluding him； he has not manifested his power。 It may be observed further； that； according to the tests adopted in this Lecture； the owner of the house has a present possession in the strictest sense； because； although he has not the power which Savigny says is necessary； he has the present intent and power to exclude others。
It is conceivable that the common law should go so far as to deal with possession in the same way as a title； and should hold that； when it has once been acquired； rights are acquired which continue to prevail against all the world but one； until something has happened sufficient to divest ownership。
The possession of rights； as it is called； has been a fighting…ground for centuries on the Continent。 It is not uncommon for German writers to go so far as to maintain that there may be a true possession of obligations； this seeming to accord with a general view that possession and right are in theory coextensive terms； that the mastery of the will over an external object in general （be that object a thing or another will）； when in accord with the general will； and consequently lawful； is called right； when merely de facto is possession。 /1/ Bearing in mind what was ＇239＇ said on the question whether possession was a fact or right； it will be seen that such an antithesis between possession and right cannot be admitted as a legal distinction。 The facts constituting possession generate rights as truly as do the facts which constitute ownership； although the rights a mere possessor are less extensive than those of an owner。
Conversely； rights spring from certain facts supposed to be true of the person entitled to such rights。 Where these facts are of such a nature that they can be made successively true of different persons； as in the case of the occupation of land； the corresponding rights may be successively enjoyed。 But when the facts are past and gone； such as the giving of a consideration and the receiving of a promise； there can be no claim to the resulting rights set up by any one except the party of whom the facts were originally truein the case supposed； the original contractee；because no one but the original contractee can fill the situation from which they spring。
It will probably be granted by English readers； that one of the essential constituent facts consists in a certain relation to a material object。 But this object may be a slave； as well as a horse； /1/ and conceptions originated in this way may be extended by a survival to free services。 It is noticeable that even Bruns； in the application of his theory； does not seem to go beyond cases of status and those where； in common language； land is bound for the services in question； as it is for rent。 Free services being ＇240＇ so far treated like servile； even by our law； that the master has a right of property in them against all the world； it is only a question of degree where the line shall be drawn。 It would be possible to hold that； as one might be in possession of a slave without title； so one might have all the rights of an owner in free services rendered without contract。 Perhaps there is something of that sort to be seen when a parent recovers for the seduction of a daughter over twenty…one； although there is no actual contract of service。 /1/ So； throughout the whole course of the canon law and in the early law of England； rents were regarded as so far a part of the realty as to be capable of possession and disseisin； and they could be recovered like land by all assize。 /2/
But the most important case of the so…called possession of rights in our law； as in the Roman； occurs with regard to easements。 An easement is capable of possession in a certain sense。 A man may use land in a certain way； with the intent to exclude all others from using it in any way inconsistent with his own use； but no further。 If this be true possession； however； it is a limited possession of land； not of a right； as others have shown。 But where an easement has been actually created； whether by deed or prescription； although it is undoubtedly true that any possessor of the dominant estate would be protected in its enjoyment； it has not been so protected in the past on the ground that the easement was in itself an object of possession； but by the survival of precedents explained in a later ＇241＇ Lecture。 Hence； to test the existence of a mere possession of this sort which the law will protect； we will take the case of a way used de facto for four years； but in which no easement has yet been acquired； and ask whether the possessor of the quasi dominant tenement would be protected in his use as against third persons。 It is conceivable that he should be； but I believe that he would not。 /2/
The chief objection to the doctrine seems to be； that there is almost a contradiction between the assertions that one man has a general power and intent to exclude the world from dealing with the land； and that another has the power to use it in a particular way； and to exclude the from interfering with that。 The reconciliation of the two needs somewhat artificial reasoning。 However； it should be borne in mind that the question in every case is not what was the actual power of the parties concerned； but what was their manifested power。 If the latter stood thus balanced； the law might recognize a kind of split possession。 But if it does not recognize it until a right is acquired； then the protection of a disseisor in the use of an easement must still be explained by a reference to the facts mentioned in the Lecture referred to。
The consequences attached to possession are substantially those attached to ownership； subject to the question the continuance of possessory rights which I have touched upon above。 Even a wrongful possessor of a ＇242＇ chattel may have full damages for its conversion by a stranger to the title； or a return of the specific thing。 /1/
It has been supposed； to be sure； that a 〃special property〃 was necessary in order to maintain replevin /2/ or trover。 /3/ But modern cases establish that possession is sufficient； and an examination of the sources of our law proves that special property did not mean anything more。 It has been shown that the procedure for the recovery of chattels lost against one's will； described by Bracton； like its predecessor on the Continent； was based upon possession。 Yet Bracton； in the very passage in which he expressly makes that statement； uses a phrase which； but for the explanation； would seem to import ownership；〃Poterit rem suam petere。〃 /4/ The writs of later days used the same language； and when it was objected； as it frequently was； to a suit by a bailee for a taking of bona et catalla sua； that it should have been for bona in custodia sua existentia； it was always answered that those in the Chancery would not frame a writ in that form。 /5/
The substance of the matter was； that goods in a man's possession were his （sua）； within the meaning of the writ。 But it was very natural to attempt a formal reconciliation between that formal word and the fact by saying that； although the plaintiff had not the general property in the ＇243＇ chattels； yet he had a property as against strangers； /1/ or a special property。 This took place； and； curiously enough； two of the earliest instances in which I have found the latter phrase used are cases of a depositary； /2/ and a borrower。 /3/ Brooke says that a wrongful taker 〃has title against all but the true owner。〃 /4/ In this sense the special property was better described as a 〃possessory property；〃 as it was； in deciding that； in an indictment for larceny； the property could be laid in the bailee who suffered the trespass。 /5/
I have explained the inversion by which a bailee's right of action against third persons was supposed to stand on his responsibility over； although in truth it was the foundation of that responsibility； and arose simply from his possession。 The step was short； from saying that bailees could sue because they were answerable over； /6/ to saying that they had the property as against strangers； or a special property； because they were answerable over； /7/ and that they could sue because they had a special property and were answerable over。 /8/ And thus the notion that special property meant something more than possession； and was a requisite to maintaining an action； got into the law。
The error was made easier by a different use of the phrase in a different connection。 A bailee was in general liable for goods stolen from his custody； whether he had a lien or not。 But the