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（1） When either the expression or the name has strictly more than
one meaning； e。g。 aetos and the 'dog'； （2） when by custom we use
them so； （3） when words that have a simple sense taken alone have more
than one meaning in combination； e。g。 'knowing letters'。 For each
word； both 'knowing' and 'letters'； possibly has a single meaning： but
both together have more than one…either that the letters themselves
have knowledge or that someone else has it of them。
Amphiboly and ambiguity； then； depend on these modes of speech。 Upon
the combination of words there depend instances such as the following：
'A man can walk while sitting； and can write while not writing'。 For
the meaning is not the same if one divides the words and if one
combines them in saying that 'it is possible to walk…while…sitting'
and write while not writing＇。 The same applies to the latter phrase；
too； if one combines the words 'to write…while…not…writing'： for
then it means that he has the power to write and not to write at once；
whereas if one does not combine them； it means that when he is not
writing he has the power to write。 Also； 'He now if he has learnt
his letters'。 Moreover； there is the saying that 'One single thing
if you can carry a crowd you can carry too'。
Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3； and odd；
and that the greater is equal： for it is that amount and more besides。
For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same
meaning when divided and when combined； e。g。 'I made thee a slave once
a free man'； and 'God…like Achilles left fifty a hundred men'。
An argument depending upon accent it is not easy to construct in
unwritten discussion； in written discussions and in poetry it is
easier。 Thus （e。g。） some people emend Homer against those who
criticize as unnatural his expression to men ou kataputhetai
ombro。 For they solve the difficulty by a change of accent；
pronouncing the ou with an acuter accent。 Also； in the passage
about Agamemnon's dream； they say that Zeus did not himself say 'We
grant him the fulfilment of his prayer'； but that he bade the dream
grant it。 Instances such as these； then； turn upon the accentuation。
Others come about owing to the form of expression used； when what is
really different is expressed in the same form； e。g。 a masculine thing
by a feminine termination； or a feminine thing by a masculine； or a
neuter by either a masculine or a feminine； or； again； when a
quality is expressed by a termination proper to quantity or vice
versa； or what is active by a passive word； or a state by an active
word； and so forth with the other divisions previously' laid down。 For
it is possible to use an expression to denote what does not belong
to the class of actions at all as though it did so belong。 Thus （e。g。）
'flourishing' is a word which in the form of its expression is like
'cutting' or 'building'： yet the one denotes a certain quality…i。e。
a certain condition…while the other denotes a certain action。 In the
same manner also in the other instances。
Refutations； then； that depend upon language are drawn from these
common…place rules。 Of fallacies； on the other hand； that are
independent of language there are seven kinds：
（1） that which depends upon Accident：
（2） the use of an expression absolutely or not absolutely but with
some qualification of respect or place； or time； or relation：
（3） that which depends upon ignorance of what 'refutation' is：
（4） that which depends upon the consequent：
（5） that which depends upon assuming the original conclusion：
（6） stating as cause what is not the cause：
（7） the making of more than one question into one。
5
Fallacies； then； that depend on Accident occur whenever any
attribute is claimed to belong in like manner to a thing and to its
accident。 For since the same thing has many accidents there is no
necessity that all the same attributes should belong to all of a
thing's predicates and to their subject as well。 Thus （e。g。）； 'If
Coriscus be different from 〃man〃； he is different from himself： for he
is a man'： or 'If he be different from Socrates； and Socrates be a
man； then'； they say； 'he has admitted that Coriscus is different from
a man； because it so happens （accidit） that the person from whom he
said that he （Coriscus） is different is a man'。
Those that depend on whether an expression is used absolutely or
in a certain respect and not strictly； occur whenever an expression
used in a particular sense is taken as though it were used absolutely；
e。g。 in the argument 'If what is not is the object of an opinion； then
what is not is'： for it is not the same thing 'to be x' and 'to be'
absolutely。 Or again； 'What is； is not； if it is not a particular kind
of being； e。g。 if it is not a man。' For it is not the same thing
'not to be x' and 'not to be' at all： it looks as if it were；
because of the closeness of the expression； i。e。 because 'to be x'
is but little different from 'to be'； and 'not to be x' from 'not to
be'。 Likewise also with any argument that turns upon the point whether
an expression is used in a certain respect or used absolutely。 Thus
e。g。 'Suppose an Indian to be black all over； but white in respect
of his teeth； then he is both white and not white。' Or if both
characters belong in a particular respect； then； they say； 'contrary
attributes belong at the same time'。 This kind of thing is in some
cases easily seen by any one； e。g。 suppose a man were to secure the
statement that the Ethiopian is black； and were then to ask whether he
is white in respect of his teeth； and then； if he be white in that
respect； were to suppose at the conclusion of his questions that
therefore he had proved dialectically that he was both white and not
white。 But in some cases it often passes undetected； viz。 in all cases
where； whenever a statement is made of something in a certain respect；
it would be generally thought that the absolute statement follows as
well； and also in all cases where it is not easy to see which of the
attributes ought to be rendered strictly。 A situation of this kind
arises； where both the opposite attributes belong alike： for then
there is general support for the view that one must agree absolutely
to the assertion of both； or of neither： e。g。 if a thing is half white
and half black； is it white or black？
Other fallacies occur because the terms 'proof' or 'refutation' have
not been defined； and because something is left out in their
definition。 For to refute is to contradict one and the same
attribute…not merely the name； but the reality…and a name that is
not merely synonymous but the same name…and to confute it from the
propositions granted； necessarily； without including in the
reckoning the original point to be proved； in the same respect and
relation and manner and time in which it was asserted。 A 'false
assertion' about anything has to be defined in the same way。 Some
people； however； omit some one of the said conditions and give a
merely apparent refutation； showing （e。g。） that the same thing is both
double and not double： for two is double of one； but not double of
three。 Or； it may be； they show that it is both double and not
double of the same thing； but not that it is so in the same respect：
for it is double in length but not double in breadth。 Or； it may be；
they show it to be both double and not double of the same thing and in
the same respect and manner； but not that it is so at the same time：
and therefore their refutation is merely apparent。 One might； with
some violence； bring this fallacy into the group of fallacies
dependent on language as well。
Those that depend on the assumption of the original point to be
proved； occur in the same way； and in as many ways； as it is
possible to beg the original point； they appear to refute because
men lack the power to keep their eyes at once upon what is the same
and what is different。
The refutation which depends upon the consequent arises because
people suppose that the relation of consequence is convertible。 For
whenever； suppose A is； B necessarily is； they then suppose also
that if B is； A necessarily is。 This is also the source of the
deceptions that attend opinions based on sense…perception。 For
people often suppose bile to be honey because honey is attended by a
yellow colour： also； since after rain the ground is wet in
consequence； we suppose that if the ground is wet； it has been
raining； whereas that does not necessarily follow。 In rhetoric
proofs from signs are based on consequences。 For when rhetoricians
wish to show that a man is an adulterer； they take hold of some