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ON SOPHISTICAL REFUTATIONS
by Aristotle
translated by W。 A。 Pickard…Cambridge
Book I
1
LET us now discuss sophistic refutations； i。e。 what appear to be
refutations but are really fallacies instead。 We will begin in the
natural order with the first。
That some reasonings are genuine； while others seem to be so but are
not； is evident。 This happens with arguments； as also elsewhere；
through a certain likeness between the genuine and the sham。 For
physically some people are in a vigorous condition； while others
merely seem to be so by blowing and rigging themselves out as the
tribesmen do their victims for sacrifice； and some people are
beautiful thanks to their beauty； while others seem to be so； by
dint of embellishing themselves。 So it is； too； with inanimate things；
for of these； too； some are really silver and others gold； while
others are not and merely seem to be such to our sense； e。g。 things
made of litharge and tin seem to be of silver； while those made of
yellow metal look golden。 In the same way both reasoning and
refutation are sometimes genuine； sometimes not； though inexperience
may make them appear so： for inexperienced people obtain only； as it
were； a distant view of these things。 For reasoning rests on certain
statements such that they involve necessarily the assertion of
something other than what has been stated； through what has been
stated： refutation is reasoning involving the contradictory of the
given conclusion。 Now some of them do not really achieve this；
though they seem to do so for a number of reasons； and of these the
most prolific and usual domain is the argument that turns upon names
only。 It is impossible in a discussion to bring in the actual things
discussed： we use their names as symbols instead of them； and
therefore we suppose that what follows in the names； follows in the
things as well； just as people who calculate suppose in regard to
their counters。 But the two cases （names and things） are not alike。
For names are finite and so is the sum…total of formulae； while things
are infinite in number。 Inevitably； then； the same formulae； and a
single name； have a number of meanings。 Accordingly just as； in
counting； those who are not clever in manipulating their counters
are taken in by the experts； in the same way in arguments too those
who are not well acquainted with the force of names misreason both
in their own discussions and when they listen to others。 For this
reason； then； and for others to be mentioned later； there exists
both reasoning and refutation that is apparent but not real。 Now for
some people it is better worth while to seem to be wise； than to be
wise without seeming to be （for the art of the sophist is the
semblance of wisdom without the reality； and the sophist is one who
makes money from an apparent but unreal wisdom）； for them； then； it is
clearly essential also to seem to accomplish the task of a wise man
rather than to accomplish it without seeming to do so。 To reduce it to
a single point of contrast it is the business of one who knows a
thing； himself to avoid fallacies in the subjects which he knows and
to be able to show up the man who makes them； and of these
accomplishments the one depends on the faculty to render an answer；
and the other upon the securing of one。 Those； then； who would be
sophists are bound to study the class of arguments aforesaid： for it
is worth their while： for a faculty of this kind will make a man
seem to be wise； and this is the purpose they happen to have in view。
Clearly； then； there exists a class of arguments of this kind； and
it is at this kind of ability that those aim whom we call sophists。
Let us now go on to discuss how many kinds there are of sophistical
arguments； and how many in number are the elements of which this
faculty is composed； and how many branches there happen to be of
this inquiry； and the other factors that contribute to this art。
2
Of arguments in dialogue form there are four classes：
Didactic； Dialectical； Examination…arguments； and Contentious
arguments。 Didactic arguments are those that reason from the
principles appropriate to each subject and not from the opinions
held by the answerer （for the learner should take things on trust）：
dialectical arguments are those that reason from premisses generally
accepted； to the contradictory of a given thesis：
examination…arguments are those that reason from premisses which are
accepted by the answerer and which any one who pretends to possess
knowledge of the subject is bound to know…in what manner； has been
defined in another treatise： contentious arguments are those that
reason or appear to reason to a conclusion from premisses that
appear to be generally accepted but are not so。 The subject； then；
of demonstrative arguments has been discussed in the Analytics；
while that of dialectic arguments and examination…arguments has been
discussed elsewhere： let us now proceed to speak of the arguments used
in competitions and contests。
3
First we must grasp the number of aims entertained by those who
argue as competitors and rivals to the death。 These are five in
number； refutation； fallacy； paradox； solecism； and fifthly to
reduce the opponent in the discussion to babbling…i。e。 to constrain
him to repeat himself a number of times： or it is to produce the
appearance of each of these things without the reality。 For they
choose if possible plainly to refute the other party； or as the second
best to show that he is committing some fallacy； or as a third best to
lead him into paradox； or fourthly to reduce him to solecism； i。e。
to make the answerer； in consequence of the argument； to use an
ungrammatical expression； or； as a last resort； to make him repeat
himself。
4
There are two styles of refutation： for some depend on the
language used； while some are independent of language。 Those ways of
producing the false appearance of an argument which depend on language
are six in number： they are ambiguity； amphiboly； combination；
division of words； accent； form of expression。 Of this we may assure
ourselves both by induction； and by syllogistic proof based on
this…and it may be on other assumptions as well…that this is the
number of ways in which we might fall to mean the same thing by the
same names or expressions。 Arguments such as the following depend upon
ambiguity。 'Those learn who know： for it is those who know their
letters who learn the letters dictated to them'。 For to 'learn' is
ambiguous； it signifies both 'to understand' by the use of
knowledge； and also 'to acquire knowledge'。 Again； 'Evils are good：
for what needs to be is good； and evils must needs be'。 For 'what
needs to be' has a double meaning： it means what is inevitable； as
often is the case with evils； too （for evil of some kind is
inevitable）； while on the other hand we say of good things as well
that they 'need to be'。 Moreover； 'The same man is both seated and
standing and he is both sick and in health： for it is he who stood
up who is standing； and he who is recovering who is in health： but
it is the seated man who stood up； and the sick man who was
recovering'。 For 'The sick man does so and so'； or 'has so and so done
to him' is not single in meaning： sometimes it means 'the man who is
sick or is seated now'； sometimes 'the man who was sick formerly'。
Of course； the man who was recovering was the sick man； who really was
sick at the time： but the man who is in health is not sick at the same
time： he is 'the sick man' in the sense not that he is sick now； but
that he was sick formerly。 Examples such as the following depend
upon amphiboly： 'I wish that you the enemy may capture'。 Also the
thesis； 'There must be knowledge of what one knows'： for it is
possible by this phrase to mean that knowledge belongs to both the
knower and the known。 Also； 'There must be sight of what one sees： one
sees the pillar： ergo the pillar has sight'。 Also； 'What you profess
to…be； that you profess to…be： you profess a stone to…be： ergo you
profess…to…be a stone'。 Also； 'Speaking of the silent is possible'：
for 'speaking of the silent' also has a double meaning： it may mean
that the speaker is silent or that the things of which he speaks are
so。 There are three varieties of these ambiguities and amphibolies：
（1） When either the expression or the name has strictly more t