按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
case。 'When you have understanding of anything； do you understand it？'
'Yes。' 'But you have understanding of a stone： therefore you
understand of a stone。' No： the one phrase is in the genitive； 'of a
stone'； while the other is in the accusative； 'a stone'： and what
was granted was that 'you understand that； not of that； of which you
have understanding'； so that you understand not 'of a stone'； but 'the
stone'。
Thus that arguments of this kind do not prove solecism but merely
appear to do so； and both why they so appear and how you should meet
them； is clear from what has been said。
33
We must also observe that of all the arguments aforesaid it is
easier with some to see why and where the reasoning leads the hearer
astray； while with others it is more difficult； though often they
are the same arguments as the former。 For we must call an argument the
same if it depends upon the same point； but the same argument is apt
to be thought by some to depend on diction； by others on accident； and
by others on something else； because each of them； when worked with
different terms； is not so clear as it was。 Accordingly； just as in
fallacies that depend on ambiguity； which are generally thought to
be the silliest form of fallacy； some are clear even to the man in the
street （for humorous phrases nearly all depend on diction； e。g。 'The
man got the cart down from the stand'； and 'Where are you bound？'
'To the yard arm'； and 'Which cow will calve afore？' 'Neither； but
both behind；' and 'Is the North wind clear？' 'No； indeed； for it has
murdered the beggar and the merchant。〃 Is he a Good enough…King？' 'No；
indeed； a Rob…son'： and so with the great majority of the rest as
well）； while others appear to elude the most expert （and it is a
symptom of this that they often fight about their terms； e。g。
whether the meaning of 'Being' and 'One' is the same in all their
applications or different； for some think that 'Being' and 'One'
mean the same； while others solve the argument of Zeno and
Parmenides by asserting that 'One' and 'Being' are used in a number of
senses）； likewise also as regards fallacies of Accident and each of
the other types； some of the arguments will be easier to see while
others are more difficult； also to grasp to which class a fallacy
belongs； and whether it is a refutation or not a refutation； is not
equally easy in all cases。
An incisive argument is one which produces the greatest
perplexity： for this is the one with the sharpest fang。 Now perplexity
is twofold； one which occurs in reasoned arguments； respecting which
of the propositions asked one is to demolish； and the other in
contentious arguments； respecting the manner in which one is to assent
to what is propounded。 Therefore it is in syllogistic arguments that
the more incisive ones produce the keenest heart…searching。 Now a
syllogistic argument is most incisive if from premisses that are as
generally accepted as possible it demolishes a conclusion that is
accepted as generally as possible。 For the one argument； if the
contradictory is changed about； makes all the resulting syllogisms
alike in character： for always from premisses that are generally
accepted it will prove a conclusion； negative or positive as the
case may be； that is just as generally accepted； and therefore one
is bound to feel perplexed。 An argument； then； of this kind is the
most incisive； viz。 the one that puts its conclusion on all fours with
the propositions asked； and second comes the one that argues from
premisses； all of which are equally convincing： for this will
produce an equal perplexity as to what kind of premiss； of those
asked； one should demolish。 Herein is a difficulty： for one must
demolish something； but what one must demolish is uncertain。 Of
contentious arguments； on the other hand； the most incisive is the one
which； in the first place； is characterized by an initial
uncertainty whether it has been properly reasoned or not； and also
whether the solution depends on a false premiss or on the drawing of a
distinction； while； of the rest； the second place is held by that
whose solution clearly depends upon a distinction or a demolition； and
yet it does not reveal clearly which it is of the premisses asked；
whose demolition； or the drawing of a distinction within it； will
bring the solution about； but even leaves it vague whether it is on
the conclusion or on one of the premisses that the deception depends。
Now sometimes an argument which has not been properly reasoned is
silly； supposing the assumptions required to be extremely contrary
to the general view or false； but sometimes it ought not to be held in
contempt。 For whenever some question is left out； of the kind that
concerns both the subject and the nerve of the argument； the reasoning
that has both failed to secure this as well； and also failed to reason
properly； is silly； but when what is omitted is some extraneous
question； then it is by no means to be lightly despised； but the
argument is quite respectable； though the questioner has not put his
questions well。
Just as it is possible to bring a solution sometimes against the
argument； at others against the questioner and his mode of
questioning； and at others against neither of these； likewise also
it is possible to marshal one's questions and reasoning both against
the thesis； and against the answerer and against the time； whenever
the solution requires a longer time to examine than the period
available。
34
As to the number； then； and kind of sources whence fallacies arise
in discussion； and how we are to show that our opponent is
committing a fallacy and make him utter paradoxes； moreover； by the
use of what materials solescism is brought about； and how to
question and what is the way to arrange the questions； moreover； as to
the question what use is served by all arguments of this kind； and
concerning the answerer's part； both as a whole in general； and in
particular how to solve arguments and solecisms…on all these things
let the foregoing discussion suffice。 It remains to recall our
original proposal and to bring our discussion to a close with a few
words upon it。
Our programme was； then； to discover some faculty of reasoning about
any theme put before us from the most generally accepted premisses
that there are。 For that is the essential task of the art of
discussion （dialectic） and of examination （peirastic）。 Inasmuch；
however； as it is annexed to it； on account of the near presence of
the art of sophistry （sophistic）； not only to be able to conduct an
examination dialectically but also with a show of knowledge； we
therefore proposed for our treatise not only the aforesaid aim of
being able to exact an account of any view； but also the aim of
ensuring that in standing up to an argument we shall defend our thesis
in the same manner by means of views as generally held as possible。
The reason of this we have explained； for this； too； was why
Socrates used to ask questions and not to answer them； for he used
to confess that he did not know。 We have made clear； in the course
of what precedes； the number both of the points with reference to
which； and of the materials from which； this will be accomplished； and
also from what sources we can become well supplied with these： we have
shown； moreover； how to question or arrange the questioning as a
whole； and the problems concerning the answers and solutions to be
used against the reasonings of the questioner。 We have also cleared up
the problems concerning all other matters that belong to the same
inquiry into arguments。 In addition to this we have been through the
subject of Fallacies； as we have already stated above。
That our programme； then； has been adequately completed is clear。
But we must not omit to notice what has happened in regard to this
inquiry。 For in the case of all discoveries the results of previous
labours that have been handed down from others have been advanced
bit by bit by those who have taken them on； whereas the original
discoveries generally make advance that is small at first though
much more useful than the development which later springs out of them。
For it may be that in everything； as the saying is； 'the first start
is the main part'： and for this reason also it is the most
difficult； for in proportion as it is most potent in its influence； so
it is smallest in its compass and therefore most difficult to see：
whereas when this is once discovered； it is easier to add and
develop the remainder in connexion with it。 This is in fact what has
happened in