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adopted in refutations on side issues。
28
Also； those refutations that bring one to their conclusion through
the consequent you should show up in the course of the argument
itself。 The mode in which consequences follow is twofold。 For the
argument either is that as the universal follows on its
particular…as （e。g。） 'animal' follows from 'man'…so does the
particular on its universal： for the claim is made that if A is always
found with B； then B also is always found with A。 Or else it
proceeds by way of the opposites of the terms involved： for if A
follows B； it is claimed that A's opposite will follow B's opposite。
On this latter claim the argument of Melissus also depends： for he
claims that because that which has come to be has a beginning； that
which has not come to be has none； so that if the heaven has not
come to be； it is also eternal。 But that is not so； for the sequence
is vice versa。
29
In the case of any refutations whose reasoning depends on some
addition； look and see if upon its subtraction the absurdity follows
none the less： and then if so； the answerer should point this out； and
say that he granted the addition not because he really thought it； but
for the sake of the argument； whereas the questioner has not used it
for the purpose of his argument at all。
30
To meet those refutations which make several questions into one； one
should draw a distinction between them straight away at the start。 For
a question must be single to which there is a single answer； so that
one must not affirm or deny several things of one thing； nor one thing
of many； but one of one。 But just as in the case of ambiguous terms；
an attribute belongs to a term sometimes in both its senses； and
sometimes in neither； so that a simple answer does one； as it happens；
no harm despite the fact that the question is not simple； so it is
in these cases of double questions too。 Whenever； then； the several
attributes belong to the one subject； or the one to the many； the
man who gives a simple answer encounters no obstacle even though he
has committed this mistake： but whenever an attribute belongs to one
subject but not to the other； or there is a question of a number of
attributes belonging to a number of subjects and in one sense both
belong to both； while in another sense； again； they do not； then there
is trouble； so that one must beware of this。 Thus （e。g。） in the
following arguments： Supposing to be good and B evil； you will； if you
give a single answer about both； be compelled to say that it is true
to call these good； and that it is true to call them evil and likewise
to call them neither good nor evil （for each of them has not each
character）； so that the same thing will be both good and evil and
neither good nor evil。 Also； since everything is the same as itself
and different from anything else； inasmuch as the man who answers
double questions simply can be made to say that several things are
'the same' not as other things but 'as themselves'； and also that they
are different from themselves； it follows that the same things must be
both the same as and different from themselves。 Moreover； if what is
good becomes evil while what is evil is good； then they must both
become two。 So of two unequal things each being equal to itself； it
will follow that they are both equal and unequal to themselves。
Now these refutations fall into the province of other solutions as
well： for 'both' and 'all' have more than one meaning； so that the
resulting affirmation and denial of the same thing does not occur；
except verbally： and this is not what we meant by a refutation。 But it
is clear that if there be not put a single question on a number of
points； but the answerer has affirmed or denied one attribute only
of one subject only； the absurdity will not come to pass。
31
With regard to those who draw one into repeating the same thing a
number of times； it is clear that one must not grant that predications
of relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves；
e。g。 that 'double' is a significant term apart from the whole phrase
'double of half' merely on the ground that it figures in it。 For ten
figures in 'ten minus one' and in 'not do'； and generally the
affirmation in the negation； but for all that； suppose any one were to
say； 'This is not white'； he does not say that it is white。 The bare
word 'double'； one may perhaps say； has not even any meaning at all；
any more than has 'the' in 'the half'： and even if it has a meaning；
yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination。 Nor is
'knowledge' the same thing in a specific branch of it （suppose it；
e。g。 to be 'medical knowledge'） as it is in general： for in general it
was the 'knowledge of the knowable'。 In the case of terms that are
predicated of the terms through which they are defined； you should say
the same thing； that the term defined is not the same in abstraction
as it is in the whole phrase。 For 'concave' has a general meaning
which is the same in the case of a snub nose； and of a bandy leg；
but when added to either substantive nothing prevents it from
differentiating its meaning； in fact it bears one sense as applied
to the nose； and another as applied to the leg： for in the former
connexion it means 'snub' and in the latter 'bandyshaped'； i。e。 it
makes no difference whether you say 'a snub nose' or 'a concave nose'。
Moreover； the expression must not be granted in the nominative case：
for it is a falsehood。 For snubness is not a concave nose but
something （e。g。 an affection） belonging to a nose： hence； there is
no absurdity in supposing that the snub nose is a nose possessing
the concavity that belongs to a nose。
32
With regard to solecisms； we have previously said what it is that
appears to bring them about； the method of their solution will be
clear in the course of the arguments themselves。 Solecism is the
result aimed at in all arguments of the following kind： 'Is a thing
truly that which you truly call it？' 'Yes'。 'But； speaking of a stone；
you call him real： therefore of a stone it follows that 〃him is
real〃。' No： rather； talking of a stone means not saying which' but
'whom'； and not 'that' but 'him'。 If； then； any one were to ask； 'Is a
stone him whom you truly call him？' he would be generally thought
not to be speaking good Greek； any more than if he were to ask； 'Is he
what you call her？' Speak in this way of a 'stick' or any neuter word；
and the difference does not break out。 For this reason； also； no
solecism is incurred； suppose any one asks； 'Is a thing what you say
it to be？' 'Yes'。 'But； speaking of a stick； you call it real：
therefore； of a stick it follows that it is real。' 'Stone'； however；
and 'he' have masculine designations。 Now suppose some one were to
ask； 'Can 〃he〃 be a she〃 （a female）？'； and then again； 'Well； but is
not he Coriscus？' and then were to say； 'Then he is a 〃she〃；' he has
not proved the solecism； even if the name 'Coriscus' does signify a
'she'； if； on the other hand； the answerer does not grant this： this
point must be put as an additional question： while if neither is it
the fact nor does he grant it； then the sophist has not proved his
case either in fact or as against the person he has been
questioning。 In like manner； then； in the above instance as well it
must be definitely put that 'he' means the stone。 If； however； this
neither is so nor is granted； the conclusion must not be stated：
though it follows apparently； because the case （the accusative）；
that is really unlike； appears to be like the nominative。 'Is it
true to say that this object is what you call it by name？' 'Yes'。 'But
you call it by the name of a shield： this object therefore is 〃of a
shield〃。' No： not necessarily； because the meaning of 'this object' is
not 'of a shield' but 'a shield'： 'of a shield' would be the meaning
of 'this object's'。 Nor again if 'He is what you call him by name'；
while 'the name you call him by is Cleon's'； is he therefore
'Cleon's'： for he is not 'Cleon's'； for what was said was that 'He；
not his； is what I call him by name'。 For the question； if put in
the latter way； would not even be Greek。 'Do you know this？' 'Yes。'
'But this is he： therefore you know he'。 No： rather 'this' has not the
same meaning in 'Do you know this？' as in 'This is a stone'； in the
first it stands for an accusative； in the second for a nominative
case。 'When you have understanding of anything； do you understand it？