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smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation。 We
may find out that the will is free； but this knowledge only relates to
the intelligible cause of our volition。 As regards the phenomena or
expressions of this will； that is； our actions； we are bound； in
obedience to an inviolable maxim； without which reason cannot be
employed in the sphere of experience； to explain these in the same way
as we explain all the other phenomena of nature； that is to say；
according to its unchangeable laws。 We may have discovered the
spirituality and immortality of the soul； but we cannot employ this
knowledge to explain the phenomena of this life； nor the peculiar
nature of the future； because our conception of an incorporeal
nature is purely negative and does not add anything to our
knowledge； and the only inferences to be drawn from it are purely
fictitious。 If； again； we prove the existence of a supreme
intelligence； we should be able from it to make the conformity to aims
existing in the arrangement of the world comprehensible； but we should
not be justified in deducing from it any particular arrangement or
disposition； or inferring any where it is not perceived。 For it is a
necessary rule of the speculative use of reason that we must not
overlook natural causes； or refuse to listen to the teaching of
experience； for the sake of deducing what we know and perceive from
something that transcends all our knowledge。 In one word； these
three propositions are； for the speculative reason； always
transcendent； and cannot be employed as immanent principles in
relation to the objects of experience； they are； consequently； of no
use to us in this sphere； being but the valueless results of the
severe but unprofitable efforts of reason。
If； then； the actual cognition of these three cardinal
propositions is perfectly useless； while Reason uses her utmost
endeavours to induce us to admit them； it is plain that their real
value and importance relate to our practical； and not to our
speculative interest。
I term all that is possible through free will； practical。 But if the
conditions of the exercise of free volition are empirical； reason
can have only a regulative； and not a constitutive； influence upon it；
and is serviceable merely for the introduction of unity into its
empirical laws。 In the moral philosophy of prudence； for example；
the sole business of reason is to bring about a union of all the ends；
which are aimed at by our inclinations； into one ultimate end… that of
happiness… and to show the agreement which should exist among the
means of attaining that end。 In this sphere； accordingly； reason
cannot present to us any other than pragmatical laws of free action；
for our guidance towards the aims set up by the senses； and is
incompetent to give us laws which are pure and determined completely a
priori。 On the other hand； pure practical laws； the ends of which have
been given by reason entirely a priori； and which are not
empirically conditioned； but are； on the contrary； absolutely
imperative in their nature； would be products of pure reason。 Such are
the moral laws； and these alone belong to the sphere of the
practical exercise of reason； and admit of a canon。
All the powers of reason； in the sphere of what may be termed pure
philosophy； are； in fact； directed to the three above…mentioned
problems alone。 These again have a still higher end… the answer to the
question； what we ought to do； if the will is free； if there is a
God and a future world。 Now； as this problem relates to our in
reference to the highest aim of humanity； it is evident that the
ultimate intention of nature； in the constitution of our reason； has
been directed to the moral alone。
We must take care； however； in turning our attention to an object
which is foreign* to the sphere of transcendental philosophy； not to
injure the unity of our system by digressions； nor； on the other hand；
to fail in clearness； by saying too little on the new subject of
discussion。 I hope to avoid both extremes； by keeping as close as
possible to the transcendental； and excluding all psychological；
that is； empirical； elements。
*All practical conceptions relate to objects of pleasure and pain；
and consequently… in an indirect manner； at least… to objects of
feeling。 But as feeling is not a faculty of representation； but lies
out of the sphere of our powers of cognition； the elements of our
judgements； in so far as they relate to pleasure or pain； that is； the
elements of our practical judgements； do not belong to
transcendental philosophy； which has to do with pure a priori
cognitions alone。
I have to remark； in the first place； that at present I treat of the
conception of freedom in the practical sense only； and set aside the
corresponding transcendental conception； which cannot be employed as a
ground of explanation in the phenomenal world； but is itself a problem
for pure reason。 A will is purely animal （arbitrium brutum） when it is
determined by sensuous impulses or instincts only； that is； when it is
determined in a pathological manner。 A will； which can be determined
independently of sensuous impulses； consequently by motives
presented by reason alone； is called a free will （arbitrium
liberum）； and everything which is connected with this free will；
either as principle or consequence； is termed practical。 The existence
of practical freedom can be proved from experience alone。 For the
human will is not determined by that alone which immediately affects
the senses； on the contrary； we have the power； by calling up the
notion of what is useful or hurtful in a more distant relation； of
overcoming the immediate impressions on our sensuous faculty of
desire。 But these considerations of what is desirable in relation to
our whole state； that is； is in the end good and useful； are based
entirely upon reason。 This faculty； accordingly； enounces laws；
which are imperative or objective laws of freedom and which tell us
what ought to take place； thus distinguishing themselves from the laws
of nature； which relate to that which does take place。 The laws of
freedom or of free will are hence termed practical laws。
Whether reason is not itself； in the actual delivery of these
laws； determined in its turn by other influences； and whether the
action which； in relation to sensuous impulses； we call free； may not；
in relation to higher and more remote operative causes； really form
a part of nature… these are questions which do not here concern us。
They are purely speculative questions； and all we have to do； in the
practical sphere； is to inquire into the rule of conduct which
reason has to present。 Experience demonstrates to us the existence
of practical freedom as one of the causes which exist in nature；
that is； it shows the causal power of reason in the determination of
the will。 The idea of transcendental freedom； on the contrary；
requires that reason… in relation to its causal power of commencing
a series of phenomena… should be independent of all sensuous
determining causes； and thus it seems to be in opposition to the law
of nature and to all possible experience。 It therefore remains a
problem for the human mind。 But this problem does not concern reason
in its practical use； and we have； therefore； in a canon of pure
reason； to do with only two questions； which relate to the practical
interest of pure reason： Is there a God？ and； Is there a future
life？ The question of transcendental freedom is purely speculative；
and we may therefore set it entirely aside when we come to treat of
practical reason。 Besides； we have already discussed this subject in
the antinomy of pure reason。
SECTION II。 Of the Ideal of the Summum Bonum as a Determining
Ground of the Ultimate End of Pure Reason。
Reason conducted us； in its speculative use； through the field of
experience and； as it can never find complete satisfaction in that
sphere； from thence to speculative ideas… which； however； in the end
brought us back again to experience； and thus fulfilled the purpose of
reason； in a manner which； though useful； was not at all in accordance
with our expectations。 It now remains for us to consider whether
pure reason can be employed in a practical sphere； and whether it will
here conduct us to those ideas which attain the highest ends of pure
reason； as we have just stated them。 We shall thus ascertain
whether； from the point of view of its practical interest； reason
may not be able to supply us with that which； on the speculative side；
it wholly denies us。
The whole interest of reason； speculative as well as practical； is
centred in the three following questions：
1。 WHAT CAN I KNOW？
2。 WHAT OUGHT I TO DO？
3。 WHAT MAY I HOPE？
The first question is purely speculative。 We have； as I flatter
myself； exhausted all the replie