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conditions of thought； and not the objective cognition； or it may
happen that both propositions contradict each other only under a
subjective condition； which is incorrectly considered to be objective；
and； as the condition is itself false； both propositions may be false；
and it will； consequently； be impossible to conclude the truth of
the one from the falseness of the other。
In mathematics such subreptions are impossible； and it is in this
science； accordingly； that the indirect mode of proof has its true
place。 In the science of nature； where all assertion is based upon
empirical intuition； such subreptions may be guarded against by the
repeated comparison of observations； but this mode of proof is of
little value in this sphere of knowledge。 But the transcendental
efforts of pure reason are all made in the sphere of the subjective；
which is the real medium of all dialectical illusion； and thus
reason endeavours； in its premisses； to impose upon us subjective
representations for objective cognitions。 In the transcendental sphere
of pure reason； then； and in the case of synthetical propositions；
it is inadmissible to support a statement by disproving the
counter…statement。 For only two cases are possible； either； the
counter…statement is nothing but the enouncement of the
inconsistency of the opposite opinion with the subjective conditions
of reason； which does not affect the real case （for example； we cannot
comprehend the unconditioned necessity of the existence of a being；
and hence every speculative proof of the existence of such a being
must be opposed on subjective grounds； while the possibility of this
being in itself cannot with justice be denied）； or； both propositions；
being dialectical in their nature； are based upon an impossible
conception。 In this latter case the rule applies： non entis nulla sunt
predicata； that is to say； what we affirm and what we deny； respecting
such an object； are equally untrue； and the apagogic mode of
arriving at the truth is in this case impossible。 If； for example；
we presuppose that the world of sense is given in itself in its
totality； it is false； either that it is infinite； or that it is
finite and limited in space。 Both are false； because the hypothesis is
false。 For the notion of phenomena （as mere representations） which are
given in themselves （as objects） is self…contradictory； and the
infinitude of this imaginary whole would； indeed； be unconditioned；
but would be inconsistent （as everything in the phenomenal world is
conditioned） with the unconditioned determination and finitude of
quantities which is presupposed in our conception。
The apagogic mode of proof is the true source of those illusions
which have always had so strong an attraction for the admirers of
dogmatical philosophy。 It may be compared to a champion who
maintains the honour and claims of the party he has adopted by
offering battle to all who doubt the validity of these claims and
the purity of that honour； while nothing can be proved in this way；
except the respective strength of the combatants； and the advantage；
in this respect； is always on the side of the attacking party。
Spectators； observing that each party is alternately conqueror and
conquered； are led to regard the subject of dispute as beyond the
power of man to decide upon。 But such an opinion cannot be
justified； and it is sufficient to apply to these reasoners the
remark：
Non defensoribus istis
Tempus eget。
Each must try to establish his assertions by a transcendental
deduction of the grounds of proof employed in his argument； and thus
enable us to see in what way the claims of reason may be supported。 If
an opponent bases his assertions upon subjective grounds； he may be
refuted with ease； not； however to the advantage of the dogmatist； who
likewise depends upon subjective sources of cognition and is in like
manner driven into a corner by his opponent。 But； if parties employ
the direct method of procedure； they will soon discover the
difficulty； nay； the impossibility of proving their assertions； and
will be forced to appeal to prescription and precedence； or they will；
by the help of criticism； discover with ease the dogmatical
illusions by which they had been mocked； and compel reason to renounce
its exaggerated pretensions to speculative insight and to confine
itself within the limits of its proper sphere… that of practical
principles。
CHAPTER II。 The Canon of Pure Reason。
It is a humiliating consideration for human reason that it is
incompetent to discover truth by means of pure speculation； but； on
the contrary； stands in need of discipline to check its deviations
from the straight path and to expose the illusions which it
originates。 But； on the other hand； this consideration ought to
elevate and to give it confidence； for this discipline is exercised by
itself alone； and it is subject to the censure of no other power。
The bounds； moreover； which it is forced to set to its speculative
exercise； form likewise a check upon the fallacious pretensions of
opponents； and thus what remains of its possessions； after these
exaggerated claims have been disallowed； is secure from attack or
usurpation。 The greatest； and perhaps the only； use of all
philosophy of pure reason is； accordingly； of a purely negative
character。 It is not an organon for the extension； but a discipline
for the determination； of the limits of its exercise； and without
laying claim to the discovery of new truth； it has the modest merit of
guarding against error。
At the same time； there must be some source of positive cognitions
which belong to the domain of pure reason and which become the
causes of error only from our mistaking their true character； while
they form the goal towards which reason continually strives。 How
else can we account for the inextinguishable desire in the human
mind to find a firm footing in some region beyond the limits of the
world of experience？ It hopes to attain to the possession of a
knowledge in which it has the deepest interest。 It enters upon the
path of pure speculation； but in vain。 We have some reason； however；
to expect that； in the only other way that lies open to it… the path
of practical reason… it may meet with better success。
I understand by a canon a list of the a priori principles of the
proper employment of certain faculties of cognition。 Thus general
logic； in its analytical department； is a formal canon for the
faculties of understanding and reason。 In the same way； Transcendental
Analytic was seen to be a canon of the pure understanding； for it
alone is competent to enounce true a priori synthetical cognitions。
But； when no proper employment of a faculty of cognition is
possible； no canon can exist。 But the synthetical cognition of pure
speculative reason is； as has been shown； completely impossible。 There
cannot； therefore； exist any canon for the speculative exercise of
this faculty… for its speculative exercise is entirely dialectical；
and； consequently； transcendental logic； in this respect； is merely
a discipline； and not a canon。 If； then； there is any proper mode of
employing the faculty of pure reason… in which case there must be a
canon for this faculty… this canon will relate； not to the
speculative； but to the practical use of reason。 This canon we now
proceed to investigate。
SECTION I。 Of the Ultimate End of the Pure Use of Reason。
There exists in the faculty of reason a natural desire to venture
beyond the field of experience； to attempt to reach the utmost
bounds of all cognition by the help of ideas alone； and not to rest
satisfied until it has fulfilled its course and raised the sum of
its cognitions into a self…subsistent systematic whole。 Is the
motive for this endeavour to be found in its speculative； or in its
practical interests alone？
Setting aside； at present； the results of the labours of pure reason
in its speculative exercise； I shall merely inquire regarding the
problems the solution of which forms its ultimate aim； whether reached
or not； and in relation to which all other aims are but partial and
intermediate。 These highest aims must； from the nature of reason；
possess complete unity； otherwise the highest interest of humanity
could not be successfully promoted。
The transcendental speculation of reason relates to three things：
the freedom of the will； the immortality of the soul； and the
existence of God。 The speculative interest which reason has in those
questions is very small； and； for its sake alone； we should not
undertake the labour of transcendental investigation… a labour full of
toil and ceaseless struggle。 We should be loth to undertake this
labour； because the discoveries we might make would not be of the
smallest use in the sphere of concrete or physical investigation。 We
may find out that the will is free； but t