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hold it fast； though I may not be in a position to give a
speculative account of it。
But mere doctrinal belief is； to some extent； wanting in
stability。 We often quit our hold of it； in consequence of the
difficulties which occur in speculation； though in the end we
inevitably return to it again。
It is quite otherwise with moral belief。 For in this sphere action
is absolutely necessary； that is； I must act in obedience to the moral
law in all points。 The end is here incontrovertibly established； and
there is only one condition possible； according to the best of my
perception； under which this end can harmonize with all other ends；
and so have practical validity… namely； the existence of a God and
of a future world。 I know also； to a certainty； that no one can be
acquainted with any other conditions which conduct to the same unity
of ends under the moral law。 But since the moral precept is； at the
same time； my maxim （as reason requires that it should be）； I am
irresistibly constrained to believe in the existence of God and in a
future life； and I am sure that nothing can make me waver in this
belief； since I should thereby overthrow my moral maxims； the
renunciation of which would render me hateful in my own eyes。
Thus； while all the ambitious attempts of reason to penetrate beyond
the limits of experience end in disappointment； there is still
enough left to satisfy us in a practical point of view。 No one； it
is true； will be able to boast that he knows that there is a God and a
future life； for； if he knows this； be is just the man whom I have
long wished to find。 All knowledge； regarding an object of mere
reason； can be municated； and I should thus be enabled to hope that
my own knowledge would receive this wonderful extension； through the
instrumentality of his instruction。 No； my conviction is not
logical； but moral certainty； and since it rests on subjective grounds
（of the moral sentiment）； I must not even say： It is morally certain
that there is a God； etc。； but： I am morally certain； that is； my
belief in God and in another world is so interwoven with my moral
nature that I am under as little apprehension of having the former
torn from me as of losing the latter。
The only point in this argument that may appear open to suspicion is
that this rational belief presupposes the existence of moral
sentiments。 If we give up this assumption； and take a man who is
entirely indifferent with regard to moral laws； the question which
reason proposes； bees then merely a problem for speculation and
may； indeed； be supported by strong grounds from analogy； but not by
such as will pel the most obstinate scepticism to give way。* But in
these questions no man is free from all interest。 For though the
want of good sentiments may place him beyond the influence of moral
interests； still even in this case enough may be left to make him fear
the existence of God and a future life。 For he cannot pretend to any
certainty of the non…existence of God and of a future life； unless…
since it could only be proved by mere reason； and therefore
apodeictically… he is prepared to establish the impossibility of both；
which certainly no reasonable man would undertake to do。 This would be
a negative belief； which could not； indeed； produce morality and
good sentiments； but still could produce an analogon of these； by
operating as a powerful restraint on the outbreak of evil
dispositions。
*The human mind （as； I believe； every rational being must of
necessity do） takes a natural interest in morality； although this
interest is not undivided； and may not be practically in
preponderance。 If you strengthen and increase it； you will find the
reason bee docile； more enlightened； and more capable of uniting
the speculative interest with the practical。 But if you do not take
care at the outset； or at least midway； to make men good； you will
never force them into an honest belief。
But； it will be said； is this all that pure reason can effect； in
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience？ Nothing more
than two articles of belief？ mon sense could have done as much as
this； without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter！
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason…
even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only
negative… for on this point something more will be said in the next
section。 But； I ask； do you require that that knowledge which concerns
all men； should transcend the mon understanding； and should only be
revealed to you by philosophers？ The very circumstance which has
called forth your censure； is the best confirmation of the correctness
of our previous assertions； since it discloses； what could not have
been foreseen； that Nature is not chargeable with any partial
distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men
without distinction and that； in respect to the essential ends of
human nature； we cannot advance further with the help of the highest
philosophy； than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the
meanest understanding。
CHAPTER III。 The Architectonic of Pure Reason。
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system。
Without systematic unity； our knowledge cannot bee science； it will
be an aggregate； and not a system。 Thus architectonic is the
doctrine of the scientific in cognition； and therefore necessarily
forms part of our methodology。
Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
rhapsodistic state； but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
constitute a system。 It is thus alone that they can advance the ends
of reason。 By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under
one idea。 This idea is the conception… given by reason… of the form of
a whole； in so far as the conception determines a priori not only
the limits of its content； but the place which each of its parts is to
occupy。 The scientific idea contains； therefore； the end and the
form of the whole which is in accordance with that end。 The unity of
the end； to which all the parts of the system relate； and through
which all have a relation to each other； municates unity to the
whole system； so that the absence of any part can be immediately
detected from our knowledge of the rest； and it determines a priori
the limits of the system； thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary
additions。 The whole is thus an organism （articulatio）； and not an
aggregate （coacervatio）； it may grow from within （per
intussusceptionem）； but it cannot increase by external additions
（per appositionem）。 It is； thus； like an animal body； the growth of
which does not add any limb； but； without changing their
proportions； makes each in its sphere stronger and more active。
We require； for the execution of the idea of a system； a schema；
that is； a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori
by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes。 A schema
which is not projected in accordance with an idea； that is； from the
standpoint of the highest aim of reason； but merely empirically； in
accordance with accidental aims and purposes （the number of which
cannot be predetermined）； can give us nothing more than technical
unity。 But the schema which is originated from an idea （in which
case reason presents us with aims a priori； and does not look for them
to experience）； forms the basis of architectonical unity。 A science；
in the proper acceptation of that term。 cannot be formed
technically； that is； from observation of the similarity existing
between different objects； and the purely contingent use we make of
our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary
external aims； its constitution must be framed on architectonical
principles； that is； its parts must be shown to possess an essential
affinity； and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and
internal aim or end； which forms the condition of the possibility of
the scientific whole。 The schema of a science must give a priori the
plan of it （monogramma）； and the division of the whole into parts；
in conformity with the idea of the science； and it must also
distinguish this whole from all others； according to certain
understood principles。
No one will attempt to construct a science； unless he have some idea
to rest on as a proper basis。 But； in the elaboration of the
science； he finds that the schema； nay； even the definition which he
at first gave of the science； rarely corresponds with his idea； for
this idea lies； like a germ； in our reason； its parts undeveloped
and hid even from microscopical observation。 For this reason； we ought
to explain and define sciences； not according to the description which
the originator gives of them； but according to the idea which we
find based in reason itself； and which is suggested by the natural
unity of the parts of the science already accumulated。 For it will
of ten be found that the originator of a science and even his latest
successors remain attached to an erroneous idea； which they cannot
render clear to themselves； and that they th