按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
〃and an entrepreneurial zeal to do whatever it takes to please big retailers such
as Wal…Mart Stores； Target； Best Buy and J。C。 Penney。〃
Critics of China's business practices say that its size and economic power mean that
it will soon be setting the global floor not only for low wages but also for lax labor
laws and workplace standards。 This is known in the business as 〃the China price。〃
But what is really scary is that China is not attracting so much global investment
by simply racing everyone to the bottom。 That is just a short…term strategy。 The
biggest mistake any business can make when it comes to China is thinking that it is
only winning on wages and not improving quality and productivity。 In the private；
non…state…owned sector of Chinese industry； productivity increased 17 percent
annually…I repeat； 17 percent annually…between 1995 and 2002； according to a study
by the U。S。 Conference Board。 This is due to China's absorption of both new
technologies and modern business practices； starting from a very low base。
Incidentally； the Conference Board study noted； China lost 15 million manufacturing
jobs during this period； compared with 2 million in the United States。 〃As its
manufacturing productivity accelerates； China is losing jobs in manufacturing…many
more than the United States is…and gaining them in services； a pattern that has been
playing out in the developed world for many years；〃 the study said。
China's real long…term strategy is to outrace America and the E。U。 countries to the
top； and the Chinese are off to a good start。 China's leaders are much more focused
than many of their Western counterparts on how to train their young people in the
math； science； and computer skills required for success in the flat world； how to
build a physical and telecom infrastructure that will allow Chinese people to plug
and play faster
119
and easier than others； and how to create incentives that will attract global
investors。 What China's leaders really want is the next generation of underwear or
airplane wings to be designed in China as well。 That is where things are heading in
another decade。 So in thirty years we will have gone from 〃sold in China〃 to 〃made
in China〃to 〃designed in China〃 to 〃dreamed upin China〃…or from China as collaborator
with the worldwide manufacturers on nothing to China as a low…cost； high…quality；
hyperefficient collaborator with worldwide manufacturers on everything。 This should
allow China to maintain its role as a major flattening force； provided that political
instability does not disrupt the process。 Indeed； while researching this chapter；
I came across an online Silicon Valley newsletter called the Inquirer； which follows
the semiconductor industry。 What caught my eye was its November 5； 2001； article
headlined； 〃China to Become Center of Everything。〃 It quoted a China People's Daily
article that claimed that four hundred out of the Forbes 500 companies have invested
in more than two thousand projects in mainland China。 And that was four years ago。
Japan； being right next door to China； has taken a very aggressive approach to
internalizing the China challenge。 Osamu Watanabe； chairman of the Japan External
Trade Organization （JETRO）； Japan's official organ for promoting exports； told me
in Tokyo； 〃China is developing very rapidly and making the shift from low…grade
products to high…grade； high…tech ones。〃 As a result； added Watanabe； Japanese
companies； to remain globally competitive； have had to shift some production and a
lot of assembly of middle…range products to China； while shifting at home to making
〃even higher value…added products。〃 So China and Japan 〃are becoming part of the same
supply chain。〃 After a prolonged recession； Japan's economy started to bounce back
in 2003； due to the sale of thousands of tons of machinery； assembly robots； and other
critical components in China。 In 2003； China replaced the United States as the biggest
importer of Japanese products。 Still； the Japanese government is urging its companies
to be careful not to overinvest in China。 It encourages them to practice what Watanabe
called a 〃China plus one〃 strategy： to keep one production leg in China but the other
in
a different Asian country…just in case political turmoil unflattens China one day。
This China flattener has been wrenching for certain manufacturing workers around the
world； but a godsend for all consumers。 Fortune magazine （October 4； 2004） quoted
a study by Morgan Stanley estimating that since the mid…1990s alone； cheap imports
from China have saved U。S。 consumers roughly 600 billion and have saved U。S。
manufacturers untold billions in cheaper parts for their products。 This savings； in
turn； Fortune noted； has helped the Federal Reserve to hold down interest rates longer；
giving more Americans a chance to buy homes or refinance the ones they have； and giving
businesses more capital to invest in new innovations。
In an effort to better understand how offshoring to China works； I sat down in Beijing
with Jack Perkowski of ASIMCO； a pioneer in this form of collaboration。 If they ever
have a category in the Olympics called 〃extreme capitalism；〃 bet on Perkowski to win
the gold。 In 1988 he stepped down as a top investment banker at Paine Webber and went
to a leverage buyout firm； but two years later； at age forty…two； decided it was time
for a new challenge。 With some partners； he raised 150 million to buy companies in
China and headed off for the adventure of his life。 Since then he has lost and remade
millions of dollars； learned every lesson the hard way； but survived to become a
powerful example of what offshoring to China is all about and what a powerful
collaborative tool it can become。
〃When I first startedback in1992…1993； everyone thoughtthe hard part was toactually
find and gain access to opportunities in China；〃 recalled Perkowski。 It turned out
that there were opportunities aplenty but a critical shortage of Chinese managers
who understood how to run an auto parts factory along capitalist lines； with an
emphasis on exports and making world…class products for the Chinese market。 As
Perkowski put it； the easy part was setting up shop in China。 The hard part was getting
the right local managers who could run the store。 So when he initially started buying
majority ownership in Chinese auto parts companies； Perkowski began by importing
managers from abroad。 Bad idea。 It was too expensive； and operating in China was just
too foreign for foreigners。 Scratch plan A。
121
〃So we sent all the expats home； which gave me problems with my investor base； and
went to plan B；〃 he said。 〃We then tried to convert the 'Old China' managers who
typically came along with the plants we bought； but that didn't work either。 They
were simply too used to working in a planned economy where they never had to deal
with the marketplace； just deliver their quotas。 Those managers who did have an
entrepreneurial flair got drunk on their first sip of capitalism and were ready to
try anything。
〃The Chinese are very entrepreneurial；〃 said Perkowski； 〃but back then； before China
joined the WTO； there was no rule of law and no bond or stock market to restrain this
entrepreneurialism。 Your only choices were managers from the state…owned sector； who
were very bureaucratic； or managers from the first wave of private companies； who
were practicing cowboy capitalism。 Neither is where you want to be。 If your managers
are too bureaucratic； you can't get anything done…they just give excuses about how
China is different…and if they are too entrepreneurial； you can't sleep at night；
because you have no idea what they are going to do。〃 Perkowski had a lot of sleepless
nights。
One of his first purchases in China was an interest in a company making rubber parts。
When he subsequently reached an agreement with his Chinese partner to purchase his
shares in the company； the Chinese partner signed a noncompete clause as part of the
transaction。 As soon as the deal closed； however； the Chinese partner went out and
opened a new factory。 〃Noncompete〃 did not quite translate into Mandarin。 Scratch
plan B。
Meanwhile； Perkowski's partnership was hemorrhaging money… Perkowski's tuition for
learning how to do business in China…and he found himself owning a string of Chinese
auto parts factories。 〃Around 1997 was the low point；〃 he said。 〃Our company as a
whole was shrinking and we were not profitable。 While some of our companies were doing
okay； we were generally in tough shape。 Although we had majority ownership and could
theoretically put anyone on the field that we wanted； I looked at my ＇managerial＇
bench and I had no one to put in the game。〃 Time for plan C。
〃We essentially concluded that； while we liked China； we wanted no
122
part of'Old China；' and instead wanted to place our bets on 'New China' managers；〃
said Perkowski。 〃We began looking for a new breed of Chinese managers who were
open…minded and had gotten some form of management training。 We were looking for
individuals who were experienced at operating in