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The extra strain put upon it by the transport of troops and the maintenance
of the armies exposed its weakness； and with each succeeding week of war；
although in 19l6 and 1917 Russia did receive 775 locomotives from
abroad； Russian transport went from bad to worse； making inevitable a
creeping paralysis of Russian economic life； during the latter already acute
stages of which the revolutionaries succeeded to the disease that had
crippled their precursors。
In 1914 Russia had in all 20；057 locomotives； of which 15；047 burnt
coal； 4；072 burnt oil and 938 wood。 But that figure of twenty thousand
was more impressive for a Government official； who had his own reasons
for desiring to be impressed； than for a practical railway engineer； since of
that number over five thousand engines were more than twenty years old；
over two thousand were more than thirty years old； fifteen hundred were
more than forty years old； and 147 patriarchs had passed their fiftieth
birthday。 Of the whole twenty thousand only 7；108 were under ten years
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THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA
of age。 That was six years ago。 In the meantime Russia has been able
to make in quantities decreasing during the last five years by 40 and 50 per
cent。 annually； 2；990 new locomotives。 In 1914 of the locomotives then
in Russia about 17；000 were in working condition。 In 1915 there were；
in spite of 800 new ones； only 16；500。 In 1916 the number of healthy
locomotives was slightly higher； owing partly to the manufacture of 903 at
home in the preceding year and partly to the arrival of 400 from abroad。
In 1917 in
spite of the arrival of a further small contingent the number sank to
between 15；000 and 16；000。 Early in 1918 the Germans in the Ukraine
and elsewhere captured 3；000。 Others were lost in the early stages of the
civil war。 The number of locomotives fell from 14；519 in January to 8；457
in April； after which the artificially instigated revolt of the Czecho…
Slovaks made possible the fostering of civil war on a large scale； and the
number fell swiftly to 4；679 in December。 In 1919 the numbers varied
less markedly； but the decline continued； and in December last year
4；141 engines were in working order。 In January this year the number
was 3；969； rising slightly in February； when the number was 4；019。 A
calculation was made before the war that in the best possible conditions
the maximum Russian output of engines could be not more than1；800
annually。 At this rate in ten years the Russians could restore their
collection of engines to something like adequate numbers。 Today； thirty
years would be an inadequate estimate； for some factories； like the
Votkinsky； have been purposely ruined by the Whites； in others the lathes
and other machinery for building and repairing locomotives are worn out；
many of the skilled engineers were killed in the war with Germany； many
others in defending the revolution； and it will be long before it will be
possible to restore to the workmen or to the factories the favorable
material conditions of 1912…13。 Thus the main fact in the present crisis is
that Russia possesses one…fifth of the number of locomotives which in
1914 was just sufficient to maintain her railway system in a state of
efficiency which to English observers at that time was a joke。 For six
years she has been unable to import the necessary machinery for making
engines or repairing them。 Further； coal and oil have been； until recently；
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THE CRISIS IN RUSSIA
cut off by the civil war。 The coal mines are left； after the civil war； in
such a condition that no considerable output may be expected from them
in the near future。 Thus； even those engines which exist have had their
efficiency lessened by being adapted in a rough and ready manner for
burning wood fuel instead of that for which they were designed。
Let us now examine the combined effect of ruined transport and the
six years' blockade on Russian life in town and country。 First of all
was cut off the import of manufactured
goods from abroad。 That has had a cumulative effect completed； as it
were； and rounded off by the breakdown of transport。 By making it
impossible to bring food； fuel and raw material to the factories； the wreck
of transport makes it impossible for Russian industry to produce even that
modicum which it contributed to the general supply of manufactured
goods which the Russian peasant was accustomed to receive in exchange
for his production of food。 On the whole the peasant himself eats rather
more than he did before the war。 But he has no matches； no salt； no
clothes； no boots； no tools。 The Communists are trying to put an end to
illiteracy in Russia； and in the villages the most frequent excuse for
keeping children from school is a request to come and see them； when
they will be found； as I have seen them myself； playing naked about the
stove； without boots or anything but a shirt； if that； in which to go and
learn to read and write。 Clothes and such things as matches are； however；
of less vital importance than tools； the lack of which is steadily reducing
Russia's actual power of food production。 Before the war Russia needed
from abroad huge quantities of agricultural implements； not only machines；
but simple things like axes； sickles； scythes。 In 1915 her own production
of these things had fallen to 15。1 per cent。 of her already inadequate
peacetime output。 In 1917 it had fallen to 2。1 per cent。 The Soviet
Government is making efforts to raise it； and is planning new factories
exclusively for the making of these things。 But； with transport in such a
condition； a new factory means merely a new demand for material and
fuel which there are neither engines nor wagons to bring。 Meanwhile； all
over Russia； spades are worn out； men are plowing with burnt staves
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instead of with plowshares； scratching the surface of the ground； and
instead of harrowing with a steel…spiked harrow of some weight； are
brushing the ground with light constructions of wooden spikes bound
together with wattles。
The actual agricultural productive powers of Russia are consequently
sinking。 But things are no better if we turn from the rye and corn lands
to the forests。 Saws are worn out。 Axes are worn out。 Even apart
from that； the shortage of transport affects the production of wood fuel；
lack of which reacts on transport and on the factories and so on in a circle
from which nothing but a large import of engines and wagons will provide
an outlet。 Timber can be floated down
the rivers。 Yes； but it must be brought to the rivers。 Surely horses
can do that。 Yes； but； horses must be fed； and oats do not grow in the
forests。 For example； this spring （1920） the best organized timber
production was in Perm Government。 There sixteen thousand horses
have been mobilized for the work； but further development is impossible
for lack of forage。 A telegram bitterly reports； 〃Two trains of oats from
Ekaterinburg are expected day by day。 If the oats arrive in time a
considerable success will be possible。〃 And if the oats do not arrive in
time？ Besides； not horses alone require to be fed。 The men who cut the
wood cannot do it on empty stomachs。 And again rises a cry for trains；
that do not a