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a common…wealth the members of it are distinct persons still in reference to one another； and as such as governed by the laws of the society； yet in reference to the rest of mankind； they make one body； which is； as every member of it before was； still in the state of nature with the rest of mankind。 Hence it is； that the controversies that happen between any man of the society with those that are out of it； are managed by the public； and an injury done to a member of their body； engages the whole in the reparation of it。 So that under this consideration； the whole community is one body in the state of nature； in respect of all other states or persons out of its community。 Sec。 146。 This therefore contains the power of war and peace； leagues and alliances； and all the transactions； with all persons and communities without the common…wealth； and may be called federative； if any one pleases。 So the thing be understood； I am indifferent as to the name。 Sec。 147。 These two powers； executive and federative；
though they be really distinct in themselves； yet one comprehending the execution of the municipal laws of the society within its self； upon all that are parts of it； the other the management of the security and interest of the public without； with all those that it may receive benefit or damage from； yet they are always almost united。 And though this federative power in the well or ill management of it be of great moment to the common…wealth； yet it is much less capable to be directed by antecedent； standing； positive laws； than the executive； and so must necessarily be left to the prudence and wisdom of those； whose hands it is in； to be managed for the public good： for the laws that concern subjects one amongst another； being to direct their actions； may well enough precede them。 But what is to be done in reference to foreigners； depending much upon their actions； and the variation of designs and interests； must be left in great part to the prudence of those； who have this power committed to them； to be managed by the best of their skill； for the advantage of the common…wealth。 Sec。 148。 Though； as I said； the executive and federative power of every community be really distinct in themselves； yet they are hardly to be separated； and placed at the same time； in the hands of distinct persons： for both of them requiring the force of the society for their exercise； it is almost impracticable to place the force of the common…wealth in distinct； and not subordinate hands； or that the executive and federative power should be placed in persons； that might act separately； whereby the force of the public would be under different commands： which would be apt some time or other to cause disorder and ruin。
C H A P。 X I I I。
Of the Subordination of the Powers of the Common…wealth。
Sec。 149。 THOUGH in a constituted common…wealth； standing upon its own basis； and acting according to its own nature； that is； acting for the preservation of the community； there can be but one supreme power； which is the legislative； to which all the rest are and must be subordinate； yet the legislative being only a fiduciary power to act for certain ends； there remains still in the people a supreme power to remove or alter the legislative； when they find the legislative act contrary to the trust reposed in them： for all power given with trust for the attaining an end； being limited by that end； whenever that end is manifestly neglected； or opposed； the trust must necessarily be forfeited； and the power devolve into the hands of those that gave it； who may place it anew where they shall think best for their safety and security。 And thus the community perpetually retains a supreme power of saving themselves from the attempts and designs of any body； even of their legislators； whenever they shall be so foolish； or so wicked； as to lay and carry on designs against the liberties and properties of the subject： for no man or society of men； having a power to deliver up their preservation； or consequently the means of it； to the absolute will and arbitrary dominion of another； when ever any one shall go about to bring them into such a slavish condition； they will always have a right to preserve； what they have not a power to part with； and to rid themselves of those； who invade this fundamental； sacred； and unalterable law of self…preservation； for which they entered into society。 And thus the community may be said in this respect to be always the supreme power； but not as considered under any form of government； because this power of the people can never take place till the government be dissolved。
Sec。 150。 In all cases； whilst the government subsists； the legislative is the supreme power： for what can give laws to another； must needs be superior to him； and since the legislative is no otherwise legislative of the society； but by the right it has to make laws for all the parts； and for every member of the society； prescribing rules to their actions； and giving power of execution； where they are transgressed； the legislative must needs be the supreme； and all other powers； in any members or parts of the society； derived from and subordinate to it。 Sec。 151。 In some commonwealths； where the legislative is not always in being； and the executive is vested in a single person； who has also a share in the legislative； there that single person in a very tolerable sense may also be called supreme： not that he has in himself all the supreme power； which is that of law…making； but because he has in him the supreme execution； from whom all inferior magistrates derive all their several subordinate powers； or at least the greatest part of them： having also no legislative superior to him； there being no law to be made without his consent； which cannot be expected should ever subject him to the other part of the legislative； he is properly enough in this sense supreme。 But yet it is to be observed； that tho' oaths of allegiance and fealty are taken to him； it is not to him as supreme legislator； but as supreme executor of the law； made by a joint power of him with others； allegiance being nothing but an obedience according to law； which when he violates； he has no right to obedience； nor can claim it otherwise than as the public person vested with the power of the law； and so is to be considered as the image； phantom； or representative of the common…wealth； acted by the will of the society； declared in its laws； and thus he has no will； no power； but that of the law。 But when he quits this representation； this public will； and acts by his own private will； he degrades himself； and is but a single private person without power； and without will； that has any right to obedience； the members owing no obedience but to the public will of the society。 Sec。 152。 The executive power； placed any where but in a person that has also a share in the legislative； is visibly subordinate and accountable to it； and may be at pleasure changed and displaced； so that it is not the supreme executive power； that is exempt from subordination； but the supreme executive power vested in one； who having a share in the legislative； has no distinct superior legislative to be subordinate and accountable to； farther than he himself shall join and consent； so that he is no more subordinate than he himself shall think fit； which one may certainly conclude will be but very little。 Of other ministerial and subordinate powers in a commonwealth； we need not speak； they being so multiplied with infinite variety； in the different customs and constitutions of distinct commonwealths； that it is impossible to give a particular account of them all。 Only thus much； which is necessary to our present purpose； we may take notice of concerning them； that they have no manner of authority； any of them； beyond what is by positive grant and commission delegated to them； and are all of them accountable to some other power in the common…wealth。 Sec。 153。 It is not necessary； no； nor so much as convenient； that the legislative should be always in being； but absolutely necessary that the executive power should； because there is not always need of new laws to be made； but always need of execution of the laws that are made。 When the legislative hath put the execution of the laws； they make； into other hands； they have a power still to resume it out of those hands； when they find cause； and to punish for any maladministration against the laws。 The same holds also in regard of the federative power； that and the executive being both ministerial and subordinate to the legislative； which； as has been shewed； in a constituted common…wealth is the supreme。 The legislative also in this case
being supposed to consist of several persons； （for if it be a single person； it cannot but be always in being； and so will； as supreme； naturally have the supreme executive power； together with the legislative） may assemble； and exercise their legislature； at the times that either their original constitu