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mere result： its own movement and reality are not yet set forth； it is here in its immediacy as
something purely and simply implicit。 Negativity； however； which is the same as what appears as
movement and process； is inherent in this implicit state as a determinate quality； and being； i。e。 the
simple implicit state； comes to be a determinate compass or range of being。 Individuality confronts
us； therefore； as an original determinate nature： original； in virtue of its being implicit： originally
determinate； in virtue of the negative moment lying in that implicitness； which negative element is
thereby a quality。 This limitation cannot； however； limit the action of consciousness； for this
consists at the present stage in thorough and complete relation of itself to itself： relation to what is
other than itself； which its limitation would involve； is now overcome。 The character inherent
originally by nature is thus merely an undefined （simple） principle； a transparent universal element
in which individuality finds itself free and at one with itself； as well as unfolds its diversity without
restraint； and in realizing itself is simply in reciprocal relation with itself。 We have here something
similar to what we find in the case of indeterminate animal life： this breathes the breath of life； let us
say； into water as its element； or air or earth； and within these again into still more determinate
conditions： every aspect of its life is affected by the specific element； and yet animal life still keeps
these aspects within its power and itself a unity in spite of the limitations of the element； and
remains qua the given particular organization animal life throughout； the same general fact of animal
life。
This determinate original nature of consciousness； in which it finds itself freely and wholly； appears
as the immediate and only proper content of the purpose of the individual。 That content is indeed a
definite content； but is only content so far as we take the implicit nature in isolation。 In truth；
however； it is reality （Realit？t） permeated by individuality： actuality （Wirklichkeit） in the way
consciousness qua individual contains this within itself； and is to begin with taken as existing； but
not yet as acting。 So far as action is concerned； however； that determinateness is； in one respect；
not a limitation it wants to overcome； for； looked at as an existent quality； that determinateness is
simply the colour of the element where it moves： in another respect； however； the negativity is
determinateness merely in the case of what 〃exists〃。 But acting is nothing else than negativity。
Hence when individuality acts； its specific determinateness is dissipated into the general process of
negation； into the sum and substance of all determinateness。
The simple 〃original nature〃 now breaks up； in action and the consciousness of action； into the
distinction which action implies。 To begin with； action is here an object； an object； too； still
belonging to consciousness； it is present as a purpose； and thus opposed to a given reality。 The
other moment is the process of this statically presented purpose； the process of actualization of the
purpose； bringing the purpose to bear on the entirely formal reality； and hence is the idea of the
transition itself。 In other words； this second moment is the 〃means〃。 The third moment is； finally；
the object； no longer as immediately and subjectively presented purpose； but as brought to light
and established as something other than and external to the acting subject。
These various aspects must be viewed in the light of the general principle of this sphere of
consciousness。 The content throughout remains the same； without any difference； whether between
individuality and existence in general； or between purpose as against individuality in the sense of an
〃original nature〃； or between purpose and the given reality： or between the means and that reality
as absolute purpose： or finally between the reality moulded by the agent as against the purpose；
the 〃original nature〃； of the means。
At the outset； then； the nature of individuality in its original determinate form； its immediate
essence； is not yet affirmed as active； and in this shape is called special capacity； talent； character；
and so on。 This peculiar colouring of mind must be looked at as the only content of its purpose；
and as the sole and only reality。 If we thought of consciousness as going beyond that； as seeking to
bring into reality another content； then we should think of it as a nothing working away towards
nothing。
This original nature is； moreover； not merely the substance of its purpose； but implicitly the reality
as well； which otherwise assumes the appearance of being a given material on which to act； of
being found ready at hand for action to work up into some determinate form。 That is to say； acting
is simply transferring from a state not yet explicitly expressed to one fully expressed； the inherent
being of that reality opposed to consciousness has sunk to the level of a mere empty appearance；
a mere seeming。 This mode of consciousness； by determining itself to act； thereby refuses to be led
astray by the semblance of reality on the part of what is presented to it； and has likewise to
abandon its dealings with idle thoughts and purposes； and keep its hold on the original content of
its own nature。 No doubt this content first exists as a fact for consciousness； when it has made that
content actual； but the distinction between something which while for consciousness is only inside
itself； and a reality outside consciousness existing in itself； has broken down。 Consciousness must
act solely that what it inherently and implicitly is； may be for it explicitly； or； acting is just the
process of mind coming to be qua consciousness。 What it is implicitly； therefore； it knows from its
actual reality。 Hence it is that an individual cannot know what he is till he has made himself real by
action。
Consciousness； however； seems on this view to be unable to determine the purpose of its action
before action has taken place； but before action occurs it must； in virtue of being consciousness；
have the act in front of itself as entirely its own； i。e。 as a purpose。 The individual； therefore； who is
going to act seems to find himself in a circle； where each moment already presupposes the others；
and hence seems unable to find a beginning； because it only gets to know its own original nature；
the nature which is to be its purpose by first acting； while in order to act it must have that purpose
beforehand。 But just for that reason it has to start straight away and； whatever the circumstances
are； without troubling further about beginning； means； or end； proceed to action at once。 For its
essential and implicit （ansichseyende） nature is beginning； means； and end all in one。 As
beginning； it is found in the circumstances of the action； and the interest which the individual finds
in。 something is just the answer to the question； 〃whether he should act and what is to be done in a
given case〃。 For what seems to be a reality confronting him is implicitly his own original
fundamental nature； which has merely the appearance of an objective being — an appearance
which lies in the notion of action involving as this does self…diremption； but which expressly shows
itself to be his own original nature by the interest the individual finds therein。 Similarly the how； the
means； is determined as it stands （an und für sich）。 Talent is likewise nothing but individuality
with a definite original constitution looked at as the subjective internal means； or transition of
purpose into actuality。 The actual means； however and the real transition are the unity of talent with
the nature of the fact as present in the interest felt。 The former ＇talent＇ expresses that aspect of the
means which concerns action； the latter ＇the fact found of interest＇ that which concerns content：
both are individuality itself； as a fused whole of acting and existing。 What we find； then； is first
circumstances given ready to hand； which are implicitly the original nature of the individual； next
the interest which affirms them as its own or as its purpose； and finally the connexion and
sublation of these opposite elements in the means。 This connexion itself still falls within
consciousness； and the whole just considered is one side of an opposition。 This appearance of
opposition which still remains is removed by the transition； i。e。 by the means。 For the means is a
unity of inner and outer； the antithesis of the determinate character it has qua inner means （viz。
talent）： it therefore abolishes this character； and makes itself — this unity of action and existence —
equally an outer； viz。： the actually realized individuality； i。e。 individuality which is established for
individuality itself as the objectively existent。 The entire act in this way does not go beyond itself；
either as circumstances； or as purpose； or means； or as work performed。
In this notion of work； however； the distinction which lay within the original nature seems to enter。
The work done is something determinate； like the original nature it expr