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also tart；； and so on； in other words； the thing is the 〃also〃； the general medium； wherein the many
properties subsist externally to one another； without touching or affecting one another； and without
canceling one another； and； so taken； the thing is taken as what it truly is。
Now； on this mode of perception arising； consciousness is at the same time aware that it reflects
itself also into itself； and that； in perceiving； the opposite moment to the 〃also〃 crops up。 This
moment； however； is the unity of the thing with itself； a unity which excludes distinction from itself。
It is consequently this unity which consciousness has to take upon itself ； for the thing as such is the
subsistence of many different and independent properties。 Thus we say of the thing； 〃it is white；
and also cubical； and also tart〃； and so on。 But so far as it is white it is not cubical； and so far as it
is cubical and also white it is not tart； and so on。 Putting these properties into a 〃one〃 belongs
solely to consciousness； which； therefore； has to avoid letting them coincide and be one （i。e。 one
and the same property） in the thing。 For that purpose it introduces the idea of 〃in…so…far〃 to meet
the difficulty； and by this means it keeps the qualities apart； and preserves the thing in the sense of
the 〃also〃。 Quite rightly consciousness at first makes itself responsible for the oneness〃 in such a
way that what was called a property is represented as being 〃free matter〃 （materia libera）。 （3） In
this way the thing is raised to the level of a true also' since it …thus becomes a collection of
component elements （materials or matters）； and instead of being a one〃 becomes a mere
enclosure； a circumscribing。
If we look back on what consciousness formerly took upon itself； and now takes upon itself； what
it previously ascribed to the thing； and now ascribes to it； we see that consciousness alternately
makes itself； as well as the thing； into both a pure atomic many…less 〃one〃； and an 〃also〃 resolved
into independent constituent elements （materials or matters）。 Consciousness thus finds through this
comparison that not only its way of taking the truth contains the diverse moments of apprehension
and return upon itself； but that the truth itself； the thing； manifests itself in this twofold manner。 Here
we find； as a result of experience； that the thing exhibits itself； in a determinate and specific
manner； to the consciousness apprehending it； but at the same time is reflected back into itself out
of that manner of presenting itself to consciousness； in other words； the thing contains within it
opposite aspects of truth； a truth whose elements are in antithesis to one another。
Consciousness； then； gets away also from this second form of perceptual procedure； that； namely；
which takes the thing as the true selfsame； and itself as the reverse； as the factor that leaves
sameness behind and goes back into self。 Its object is now the entire process which was
previously shared between the object and consciousness。 The thing is a 〃one〃； reflected into self； it
is for itself； but it is also for an other； and； further； it is an other for itself as it is for another。 The
thing is； hence； for itself and also for another； a being that has difference of a twofold kind。 But it is
also 〃one〃。 Its being 〃one〃； however； contradicts the diversity it has。 Consciousness would；
consequently； have again to make itself answerable for putting the diversity into the 〃one〃； and
would have to keep this apart from the thing。 It would thus be compelled to say that the thing
〃in…so…far as〃 it is for itself is not for another。 But the oneness belongs to the thing itself； too； as
consciousness has found out； the thing is essentially reflected into self The 〃also〃； the distinction of
elements indifferent to one another； falls doubtless within the thing as well as the 〃oneness〃； but
since both are different； they do not fall within the same thing； but in different things。 The
contradiction which is found in the case of the objective content as a whole is assigned to and
shared by two objects。 The thing is； thus； doubtless as it stands （an und für sich） selfsame； but
this unity with itself is disturbed by other things。 In this way the unity of the thing is preserved； and；
at the same time； the otherness is preserved outside the thing； as well as outside consciousness。
Now； although the contradiction in the object is in this way allotted to different things； yet the
isolated individual thing will still be affected with distinction。 The different things have a subsistence
on their own account （für sich）； and the conflict between them takes place on both sides in such a
way that each is not different from itself； but only from the other。 Each； however； is thereby
characterized as a something distinctive； and contains in it essential distinction from the others； but
at the same time not in such a way that this is an opposition within its being； on the contrary； it is
by itself a simple determinate characteristic which constitutes its essential character； distinguishing it
from others。 As a matter of fact； since the diversity lies in it； this diversity does indeed necessarily
assume the form of a real distinction of manifold qualities within it。 But because the determinate
characteristic gives the essence of the thing； by which it is distinguished from others； and has a
being all its own； this further manifold constitution is something indifferent。 The thing thus no doubt
contains in its unity the qualifying 〃in…so…far〃 in two ways； which have； however； unequal
significance； and by that qualification this oppositeness becomes not a real opposition on the part
of the thing itself； but…so far as the thing comes into a condition of opposition through its absolute
distinction — this opposition belongs to the thing with reference to an other thing lying outside it。
The further manifoldness is doubtless necessarily in the thing too； and cannot be left out； but it is
unessential to the thing。
This determinate characteristic； which constitutes the essential character of the thing and
distinguishes it from all others； is now so defined that thereby the thing； stands in opposition to
others； but must therein preserve itself for itself （für sich）。 It is； however； a thing； a self…existent
〃one〃； only so far as it does not stand in relation to others。 For in this relation； the connection with
another is rather the point emphasized； and connection with another means giving up
self…existence； means ceasing to have a being on its own account。 It is precisely through the
absolute character and its opposition that the thing relates itself to others； and is essentially this
process of relation； and only this。 The relation； however； is the negation of its independence； and
the thing collapses through its own essential property。
The necessity of the experience which consciousness has to go through in finding that the thing is
destroyed just by the very characteristic which constitutes its essential nature and its distinctive
existence on its own account； may； as regards the bare principle it implies； be shortly stated thus。
The thing is set up as having a being of its own； as existing for itself； or as an absolute negation of
all otherness； hence it is absolute negation merely relating itself to itself。 But this kind of negation is
the cancelling and superseding of itself； or means that it has its essential reality in an other。
In point of fact the determination of the object； as it （the object） has turned out； contains nothing
else。 It aims at having an essential property； constituting its bare existence for itself； but with this
bare self…existence it means also to embrace and contain diversity； which is to be necessary； but is
at the same time not to constitute its essential characteristic。 But this is a distinction that only exists
in words； the nonessential； which has all the same to be necessary； cancels its own meaning； or is
what we have just called the negoation of itself。
With this the last qualifying 〃in…so…far〃； which separated self…existence and existence for another；
drops away altogether。 The object is really in one and the same respect the opposite of itself…for
itself 〃so far as〃 it is for another； and for another 〃so far as〃 it is for itself。 It is for itself； reflected
into self； one； but all this is asserted along with its opposite； with its being for another； and for that
reason is asserted merely to be superseded。 In other words； this existence for itself is as much
unessential as that which alone was meant to be unessential； viz。 the relation to another。
3。 The Transition to Unconditioned Universality and the sphere of Understanding
By this process the object in its pure characteristics； in those features which were to constitute its
essential nature； is superseded； just as the object in its sensible mode of existence became
transcended。 From being sensible it passed into being a universal； but this universal； because
derived from sense； is essentially conditioned by it； and hence is； in general； not a genuine
self…identical universality； but one affected with an opposition。 For that r