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is； and must be； uniform。 With regard to the second sort of truth； which
may be called truth upon sufferance； or truth by courtesy； it is not fixed；
but variable。 However； whilst these opinions and prejudices on which it
is founded continue； they operate as truth； and the art； whose office it is to
please the mind； as well as instruct it； must direct itself according to
opinion； or it will not attain its end。
In proportion as these prejudices are known to be generally diffused；
or long received； the taste which conforms to them approaches nearer to
certainty； and to a sort of resemblance to real science； even where opinions
are found to be no better than prejudices。 And since they deserve； on
account of their duration and extent； to be considered as really true； they
become capable of no small decree of stability and determination by their
permanent and uniform nature。
As these prejudices become more narrow； more local； more transitory；
this secondary taste becomes more and more fantastical； recedes from real
science； is less to be approved by reason； and less followed in practice；
though in no case perhaps to be wholly neglected； where it does not stand；
as it sometimes does； in direct defiance of the most respectable opinions
received amongst mankind。
Having laid down these positions； I shall proceed with less method；
because less will serve； to explain and apply them。
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We will take it for granted that reason is something invariable and
fixed in the nature of things； and without endeavouring to go back to an
account of first principles； which for ever will elude our search； we will
conclude that whatever goes under the name of taste； which we can fairly
bring under the dominion of reason； must be considered as equally exempt
from change。 If therefore； in the course of this inquiry； we can show that
there are rules for the conduct of the artist which are fixed and invariable；
it implies； of course； that the art of the connoisseur； or； in other words；
taste； has likewise invariable principles。
Of the judgment which we make on the works of art； and the
preference that we give to one class of art over another； if a reason be
demanded； the question is perhaps evaded by answering； 〃I judge from my
taste〃； but it does not follow that a better answer cannot be given； though
for common gazers this may be sufficient。 Every man is not obliged to
investigate the causes of his approbation or dislike。
The arts would lie open for ever to caprice and casualty； if those who
are to judge of their excellences had no settled principles by which they
are to regulate their decisions； and the merit or defect of performances
were to be determined by unguided fancy。 And indeed we may venture
to assert that whatever speculative knowledge is necessary to the artist； is
equally and indispensably necessary to the connoisseur。
The first idea that occurs in the consideration of what is fixed in art； or
in taste； is that presiding principle of which I have so frequently spoken in
former discourses； the general idea of nature。 The beginning； the middle；
and the end of everything that is valuable in taste； is comprised in the
knowledge of what is truly nature； for whatever ideas are not conformable
to those of nature； or universal opinion； must be considered as more or less
capricious。
The idea of nature comprehending not only the forms which nature
produces； but also the nature and internal fabric and organisation； as I may
call it； of the human mind and imagination： general ideas； beauty； or
nature； are but different ways of expressing the same thing； whether we
apply these terms to statues； poetry； or picture。 Deformity is not nature；
but an accidental deviation from her accustomed practice。 This general
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idea therefore ought to be called nature； and nothing else； correctly
speaking； has a right to that name。 But we are so far from speaking； in
common conversation； with any such accuracy； that； on the contrary； when
we criticise Rembrandt and other Dutch painters； who introduced into
their historical pictures exact representations of individual objects with all
their imperfections； we say； though it is not in a good taste； yet it is nature。
This misapplication of terms must be very often perplexing to the
young student。 Is not； he may say； art an imitation of nature？ Must he not；
therefore； who imitates her with the greatest fidelity be the best artist？
By this mode of reasoning Rembrandt has a higher place than Raffaelle。
But a very little reflection will serve to show us that these particularities
cannot be nature： for how can that be the nature of man； in which no two
individuals are the same？
It plainly appears that as a work is conducted under the influence of
general ideas or partial it is principally to be considered as the effect of a
good or a bad taste。
As beauty therefore does not consist in taking what lies immediately
before you； so neither； in our pursuit of taste； are those opinions which we
first received and adopted the best choice； or the most natural to the mind
and imagination。
In the infancy of our knowledge we seize with greediness the good
that is within our reach； it is by after…consideration； and in consequence of
discipline； that we refuse the present for a greater good at a distance。 The
nobility or elevation of all arts； like the excellence of virtue itself； consists
in adopting this enlarged and comprehensive idea； and all criticism built
upon the more confined view of what is natural； may properly be called
shallow criticism； rather than false； its defect is that the truth is not
sufficiently extensive。
It has sometimes happened that some of the greatest men in our art
have been betrayed into errors by this confined mode of reasoning。
Poussin； who； upon the whole； may be produced as an instance of
attention to the most enlarged and extensive ideas of nature； from not
having settled principles on this point； has in one instance at least； I think；
deserted truth for prejudice。 He is said to have vindicated the conduct of
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Julio Romano； for his inattention to the masses of light and shade； or
grouping the figures； in the battle of Constantine； as if designedly
neglected； the better to correspond with the hurry and confusion of a battle。
Poussin's own conduct in his representations of Bacchanalian triumphs
and sacrifices； makes us more easily give credit to this report； since in
such subjects； as well indeed as in many others； it was too much his own
practice。 The best apology we can make for this conduct is what
proceeds from the association of our ideas； the prejudice we have in
favour of antiquity。 Poussin's works； as I have formerly observed； have
very much the air of the ancient manner of painting； in which there are not
the least traces to make us think that what we call the keeping； the
composition of light and shade； or distribution of the work into masses；
claimed any part of their attention。 But surely whatever apology we may
find out for this neglect； it ought to be ranked among the defects of
Poussin； as well as of the antique paintings； and the moderns have a right
to that praise which is their due； for having given so pleasing an addition
to the splendour of the art。
Perhaps no apology ought to be received for offences committed
against the vehicle （whether it be the organ of seeing or of hearing） by
which our pleasures are conveyed to the mind。