按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
disposition of things rather than by his own nature considered solely 
in itself。
Such are the matters which I engaged to prove in IV:xviii。; whereby it 
is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather 
on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason。 The rational 
quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of 
associating ourselves with our fellow men; but … not with beasts; or things; 
whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect 
to them as they have in respect to us。 Nay; as everyone's right is defined 
by his virtue; or power; men have far greater rights over beasts than 
beasts have over men。 Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is; 
that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please; 
treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like 
ours; and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions 
(III:Ivii。Note)。 It remains for me to explain what I mean by; just and 
unjust; sin and merit。 On these points see the following note。
Note II。… In the Appendix to Part I。 I undertook to explain praise and 
blame; merit and sin; justice and injustice。
Concerning praise and blame I have spoken in III:xxix。Note: the time 
has now come to treat of the remaining terms。 But I must first say a few 
words concerning man in the state of nature and in society。
Every man exists by sovereign natural right; and; consequently; by 
sovereign natural right performs those actions which follow from the 
necessity of his own nature; therefore by sovereign natural right every man 
judges what is good and what is bad; takes care of his own advantage 
according to his own disposition (IV:xix。 and IV:xx。); avenges the wrongs 
done to him (III:xl。Coroll。 ii。); and endeavours to preserve that which he 
loves and to destroy … that which he hates (III:xxviii。)。 Now; if men lived 
under the guidance of reason; everyone would remain in possession of this 
his right; without any injury being done to his neighbour V:xxxv。Coroll。i。)。 
But seeing that they are a prey to their emotions; which far surpass human 
power or virtue (IV:vi。); they are often drawn in different directions; and 
being at variance one with another (IV:xxxiii。; xxxiv。); stand in need of 
mutual help (IV:xxxv。Note)。 Wherefore; in order that men may live together 
in harmony; and may aid one another; it is necessary that they should 
forego their natural right; and; for the sake of security; refrain from 
all actions which can injure their fellow…men。 The way in which this end 
can be obtained; so that men who are necessarily a prey to their emotions 
(IV:iv。Coroll。); inconstant; and diverse; should be able to render each 
other mutually secure; and feel mutual trust; is evident from IV:vii。 and 
III:xxxix。 It is there shown; that an emotion can only be restrained by an 
emotion stronger than; and contrary to itself; and that men avoid inflicting 
injury through fear of incurring a greater injury themselves。
On this law society can be established; so long as it keeps in its own 
hand the right; possessed by everyone; of avenging injury; and pronouncing 
on good and evil; and provided it also possesses the power to lay down a 
general rule of conduct; and to pass laws sanctioned; not by reason; which 
is powerless in restraining emotion; but by threats (IV:xvii。Note)。 Such a 
society established with laws and the power of preserving itself is called 
a State; while those who live under its protection are called citizens。 We 
may readily understand that there is in the state of nature nothing; which 
by universal consent is pronounced good or bad; for in the state of nature 
everyone thinks solely of his own advantage; and according to his 
disposition; with reference only to his individual advantage; decides 
what is good or bad; being bound by no law to anyone besides himself。
In the state of nature; therefore; sin is inconceivable; it can only 
exist in a state; where good and evil are pronounced on by common consent; 
and where everyone is bound to obey the State authority。 Sin; then; 
is nothing else but disobedience; which is therefore punished by the right 
of the State only。 Obedience; on the other hand; is set down as merit; 
inasmuch as a man is thought worthy of merit; if he takes delight in the 
advantages which a State provides。
Again; in the state of nature; no one is by common consent master of 
anything; nor is there anything in nature; which can be said to belong to 
one man rather than another: all things are common to all。 Hence; in the 
state of nature; we can conceive no wish to render to every man his own; 
or to deprive a man of that which belongs to him; in other words; there is 
nothing in the state of nature answering to justice and injustice。 Such 
ideas are only possible in a social state; when it is decreed by common 
consent what belongs to one man and what to another。
From all these considerations it is evident; that justice and 
injustice; sin and merit; are extrinsic ideas; and not attributes which 
display the nature of the mind。 But I have said enough。
Prop。 XXXVIII。 Whatsoever disposes the human 
body; so as to render it capable of being 
affected in an increased number of ways; or 
of affecting external bodies in an increased 
number of ways; is useful to man ; and is so; 
in proportion as the body is thereby rendered 
more capable of being affected or affecting 
other bodies in an increased number of ways; 
contrariwise; whatsoever renders the body less 
capable in this respect is hurtful to man。
Proof。… Whatsoever thus increases the capabilities of the body increases 
also the mind's capability of perception (II:xiv。); therefore; whatsoever 
thus disposes the body and thus renders it capable; is necessarily good or 
useful (IV:xxvi。; IV:xxvii。); and is so in proportion to the extent to 
which it can render the body capable; contrariwise (II:xiv。; IV:xxvi。; 
IV:xxvii。); it is hurtful; if it renders the body in this respect less 
capable。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXXIX。 Whatsoever brings about 
the preservation of the proportion of 
motion and rest; which the parts of 
the human body mutually possess; is 
good; contrariwise; whatsoever causes 
a change in such proportion is bad。
Proof。… The human body needs many other bodies for its preservation 
(II:Post。iv。)。 But that which constitutes the specific reality (forma) 
of a human body is; that its parts communicate their several motions 
one to another in a certain fixed proportion (Def。 before Lemma iv。 after 
II:xiii。)。 Therefore; whatsoever brings about the preservation of the 
proportion between motion and rest; which the parts of the human body 
mutually possess; preserves the specific reality of the human body; and 
consequently renders the human body capable of being affected in many ways 
and of affecting external bodies in many ways; consequently it is good 
(by the last Prop。)。 Again; whatsoever brings about a change in the 
aforesaid proportion causes the human body to assume another specific 
character; in other words (see Preface to this Part towards the end; 
though the point is indeed self…evident); to be destroyed; and 
consequently totally incapable of being affected in an increased 
numbers of ways; therefore it is bad。 Q。E。D。
Note。… The extent to which such causes can injure or be of service to the 
mind will be explained in the Fifth Part。 But I would here remark that I 
consider that a body undergoes death; when the proportion of motion and 
rest which obtained mutually among its several parts is changed。 For I do 
not venture to deny that a human body; while keeping the circulation of 
the blood and other properties; wherein the life of a body is thought to 
consist; may none the less be changed into another nature totally different 
from its own。 There is no reason; which compels me to maintain that a body 
does not die; unless it becomes a corpse; nay; experience would seem to 
point to the opposite conclusion。 It sometimes happens; that a man 
undergoes such changes; that I should hardly call him the same。 As I have 
heard tell of a certain Spanish poet; who had been seized with sickness; 
and though he recovered therefrom yet remained so oblivious of his past 
life; that he would not believe the plays and tragedies he had 
written to be his own: indeed; he might have been taken for a grown…up 
child; if he had also forgotten his native tongue。 If this instance seems 
incredible; what shall we say of infants? A man of ripe age deem