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useful to them all。 Hence； men who are governed by reason … that is； who
seek what is useful to them in accordance with reason； desire for
themselves nothing； which they do not also desire for the rest of mankind；
and； consequently； are just； faithful； and honourable in their conduct。
Such are the dictates of reason； which I purposed thus briefly to
indicate； before beginning to prove them in greater detail。 I have taken
this course； in order； if possible； to gain the attention of those who
believe； that the principle that every man is bound to seek what is useful
for himself is the foundation of impiety； rather than of piety and virtue。
Therefore； after briefly showing that the contrary is the case； I go
on to prove it by； the same method； as that whereby I have hitherto
proceeded。
Prop。 XIX。 Every man； by the laws of his
nature； necessarily desires or shrinks
from that which he deems to be good or bad。
Proof。… The knowledge of good and evil is （IV：viii。） the emotion of
pleasure or pain； in so far as we are conscious thereof； therefore；
every man necessarily desires what he thinks good； and shrinks from
what he thinks bad。 Now this appetite is nothing else but man's nature
or essence （Cf。 the Definition of Appetite； III。ix。note； and Def。 of
the Emotions； i。）。 Therefore； every man； solely by the laws of his
nature； desires the one； and shrinks from the other； &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XX。 The more every man endeavours；
and is able to seek what is useful to him …
in other words； to preserve his own being …
the more is he endowed with virtue； on the
contrary； in proportion as a man neglects
to seek what is useful to him； that is； to
preserve his own being； he is wanting in power。
Proof。… Virtue is human power； which is defined solely by man's essence
（IV：Def。viii。）； that is； which is defined solely by the endeavour made by
man to persist in his own being。 Wherefore； the more a man endeavours；
and is able to preserve his own being； the more is he endowed with virtue；
and； consequently （III：iv。&；vi。）； in so far as a man neglects to
preserve his own being； he is wanting in power。 Q。E。D。
Note。… No one； therefore； neglects seeking his own good； or preserving his
own being； unless he be overcome by causes external and foreign to his
nature。 No one； I say； from the necessity of his own nature； or otherwise
than under compulsion from external causes； shrinks from food； or kills
himself： which latter may be done in a variety of ways。 A man； for
instance； kills himself under the compulsion of another man； who twists
round his right hand； wherewith he happened to have taken up a sword； and
forces him to turn the blade against his own heart； or； again； he may be
compelled； like Seneca； by a tyrant's command； to open his own veins …
that is； to escape a greater evil by incurring； a lesser； or； lastly；
latent external causes may so disorder his imagination； and so affect his
body； that it may assume a nature contrary to its former one； and whereof
the idea cannot exist in the mind （III：x。） But that a man； from the
necessity of his own nature； should endeavour to become non…existent； is
as impossible as that something should be made out of nothing； as everyone
will see for himself； after a little reflection。
Prop。 XXI。 No one can desire to be blessed；
to act rightly； and to live rightly； without
at the same time wishing to be； act； and to
live … in other words； to actually exist。
Proof。… The proof of this proposition； or rather the proposition itself；
is self…evident； and is also plain from the definition of desire。 For the
desire of living； acting； &C。； blessedly or rightly； is （Def。 of the
Emotions； i。） the essence of man … that is （III：vii。）； the endeavour
made by everyone to preserve his own being。 Therefore； no one can
desire； &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXII。 No virtue can be conceived
as prior to this endeavour to preserve
one's own being。
Proof。… The effort for self…preservation is the essence of a thing
（III：vii。）； therefore； if any virtue could be conceived as prior
thereto； the essence of a thing would have to be conceived as
prior to itself； which is obviously absurd。 Therefore no virtue； &c。
Q。E。D。
Corollary。… The effort for self…preservation is the first and only
foundation of virtue。 For prior to this principle nothing can be
conceived； and without it no virtue can be conceived。
Prop。 XXIII。 Man； in so far as he is
determined to a particular action
because he has inadequate ideas；
cannot be absolutely said to act in
obedience to virtue； he can only be
so described； in so far as he is
determined for the action because
he understands。
Proof。… In so far as a man is determined to an action through having
inadequate ideas； he is passive （III：i。）； that is （III：Def。i。； &iii。）；
he does something； which cannot be perceived solely through his essence；
that is （by IV：Def。viii。）； which does not follow from his virtue。 But；
in so far as he is determined for an action because he understands； he
is active； that is； he does something； which is perceived through his
essence alone； or which adequately follows from his virtue。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXIV。 To act absolutely in obedience
to virtue is in us the same thing as to act；
to live； or to preserve one's being （these
three terms are identical in meaning） in
accordance with the dictates of reason on the
basis of seeking what is useful to one's self。
Proof。… To act absolutely in obedience to virtue is nothing else but
to act according to the laws of one's own nature。 But we only act； in
so far as we understand （III：iii。） ： therefore to act in obedience to
virtue is in us nothing else but to act； to live； or to preserve one's
being in obedience to reason； and that on the basis of seeking what is
useful for us （IV：xxii。Coroll。）。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXV。 No one wishes to preserve his
being for the sake of anything else。
Proof。… The endeavour； wherewith everything endeavours to persist in its
being； is defined solely by the essence of the thing itself （III：vii。）；
from this alone； and not from the essence of anything else； it necessarily
follows （III：vi。） that everyone endeavours to preserve his being。
Moreover； this proposition is plain from IV：xxii。Coroll。； for if a man
should endeavour to preserve his being for the sake of anything else； the
last…named thing would obviously be the basis of virtue； which； by the
foregoing corollary； is absurd。 Therefore no one； &c。 Q。E。D。
Prop。 XXVI。 Whatsoever we endeavour in
obedience to reason is nothing further
than to understand； neither does the mind；
in so far as it makes use of reason； judge
anything to be useful to it； save such
things as are conducive to understanding。
Proof。… The effort for self…preservation is nothing else but the essence
of the thing in question （III：vii。）； which； in so far as it exists such
as it is； is conceived to have force for continuing in existence （III：vi。）
and doing such things as necessarily follow from its given nature （see the
Def。 of Appetite； II：ix。Note）。 But the essence of reason is nought else but
our mind； in so far as it clearly and distinctly understands （see the
definition in II：xl。Note：ii。） ； therefore （III：xl。） whatsoever we endeavour
in obedience to reason is nothing else but to understand。 Again； since this
effort of the mind wherewith the mind endeavours； in so far as it reasons；
to preserve its own being is nothing else but understanding； this effort
at understanding is （IV：xxii。Coroll。） the first and single basis of virtue；
nor shall we endeavour to understand things for the sake of any ulterior
object （IV：xxv。）； on the other hand； the mind； in so far as it reasons；
will not be able to conceive any good for itself； save such things as are
conducive to understanding。
Prop。 XXVII。 We know nothing to be certainly
good or evil； save such things as really
conduce to understanding； or such as are
able to hinder us from understanding。
Proof。… The mind； in so far as it reasons； desires nothing beyond
understanding； and judges nothing to be useful to itself； save such
things as conduce to understanding （by the foregoing Prop。）。 But the
mind （II：xli。&Note） cannot possess certainty concerning anything；
except in so far as it has adequate ideas； or （what by II：xl。Note；
is the same thing） in so far as it reasons。 Therefore we know