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23。 Book i； pref。
24。 Livy； iii。 20。
25。 Ibid。； 32。
26。 About a hundred years after。
27。 See xi； 12。
28。 See Dio； xxxviii； Cicero in Plutarch； Cicero to Atticus； iv。 10； 15。 Asconius on Cicero； De Divinatione。
29。 As when a petty sovereign supports himself between two great powers by means of their mutual jealousy； but then he has only a precarious existence。
30。 See M。 Le Clerc； the History of the United Provinces。
31。 〃It is the cudgel that governs China；〃 says Father Du Halde； Disc。 de la Chine； ii； p。 134。
32。 Among others； De Lange's account。
33。 Of the Family of Sourniama； Edifying Letters； coll。 xviii。
34。 See in Father Du Halde how the missionaries availed themselves of the authority of Canhi to silence the mandarins； who constantly declared that by the laws of the country no foreign worship could be established in the empire。
35。 See Lettres persanes； 210。
36。 See the order of Tsongtou for tilling the land； in the Edifying Letters； coll。 xxi。
Book IX。 Of Laws in the Relation They Bear to a Defensive Force
1。 In what Manner Republics provide for their Safety。 If a republic be small； it is destroyed by a foreign force； if it be large； it is ruined by an internal imperfection。
To this twofold inconvenience democracies and aristocracies are equally liable； whether they be good or bad。 The evil is in the very thing itself； and no form can redress it。
It is； therefore； very probable that mankind would have been； at length； obliged to live constantly under the government of a single person； had they not contrived a kind of constitution that has all the internal advantages of a republican； together with the external force of a monarchical； government。 I mean a confederate republic。
This form of government is a convention by which several petty states agree to become members of a larger one； which they intend to establish。 It is a kind of assemblage of societies； that constitute a new one； capable of increasing by means of further associations； till they arrive at such a degree of power as to be able to provide for the security of the whole body。
It was these associations that so long contributed to the prosperity of Greece。 By these the Romans attacked the whole globe； and by these alone the whole globe withstood them； for when Rome had arrived at her highest pitch of grandeur； it was the associations beyond the Danube and the Rhine associations formed by the terror of her arms that enabled the barbarians to resist her。
Hence it proceeds that Holland；＇1＇ Germany； and the Swiss cantons are considered in Europe as perpetual republics。
The associations of cities were formerly more necessary than in our times。 A weak； defenceless town was exposed to greater danger。 By conquest it was deprived not only of the executive and legislative power； as at present； but moreover of all human property。＇2＇
A republic of this kind； able to withstand an external force； may support itself without any internal corruption； the form of this society prevents all manner of inconveniences。
If a single member should attempt to usurp the supreme power； he could not be supposed to have an equal authority and credit in all the confederate states。 Were he to have too great an influence over one； this would alarm the rest； were he to subdue a part； that which would still remain free might oppose him with forces independent of those which he had usurped； and overpower him before he could be settled in his usurpation。
Should a popular insurrection happen in one of the confederate states； the others are able to quell it。 Should abuses creep into one part； they are reformed by those that remain sound。 The state may be destroyed on one side； and not on the other； the confederacy may be dissolved； and the confederates preserve their sovereignty。
As this government is composed of petty republics； it enjoys the internal happiness of each； and with regard to its external situation； by means of the association； it possesses all the advantages of large monarchies。
2。 That a confederate Government ought to be composed of States of the same Nature； especially of the republican Kind。 The Canaanites were destroyed by reason that they were petty monarchies； that had no union or confederacy for their common defence； and； indeed； a confederacy is not agreeable to the nature of petty monarchies。
As the confederate republic of Germany consists of free cities； and of petty states subject to different princes； experience shows us that it is much more imperfect than that of Holland and Switzerland。
The spirit of monarchy is war and enlargement of dominion： peace and moderation are the spirit of a republic。 These two kinds of government cannot naturally subsist in a confederate republic。
Thus we observe； in the Roman history； that when the Veientes had chosen a king； they were immediately abandoned by all the other petty republics of Tuscany。 Greece was undone as soon as the kings of Macedon obtained a seat among the Amphyktyons。
The confederate republic of Germany； composed of princes and free towns； subsists by means of a chief； who is； in some respects； the magistrate of the union； in others； the monarch。
3。 Other Requisites in a confederate Republic。 In the republic of Holland one province cannot conclude an alliance without the consent of the others。 This law； which is an excellent one； and even necessary in a confederate republic； is wanting in the Germanic constitution； where it would prevent the misfortunes that may happen to the whole confederacy； through the imprudence； ambition； or avarice of a single member。 A republic united by a political confederacy has given itself entirely up； and has nothing more to resign。
It is difficult for the united states to be all of equal power and extent。 The Lycian＇3＇ republic was an association of twenty…three towns； the large ones had three votes in the common council； the middling ones two； and the small towns one。 The Dutch republic consists of seven provinces of different extent of territory； which have each one voice。
The cities of Lycia＇4＇ contributed to the expenses of the state； according to the proportion of suffrages。 The provinces of the United Netherlands cannot follow this proportion； they must be directed by that of their power。
In Lycia＇5＇ the judges and town magistrates were elected by the common council； and according to the proportion already mentioned。 In the republic of Holland they are not chosen by the common council； but each town names its magistrates。 Were I to give a model of an excellent confederate republic； I should pitch upon that of Lycia。
4。 In what Manner despotic Governments provide for their Security。 As republics provide for their security by uniting； despotic governments do it by separating； and by keeping themselves； as it were； single。 They sacrifice a part of the country； and by ravaging and desolating the frontiers they render the heart of the empire inaccessible。
It is a received axiom in geometry that the greater the extent of bodies； the more their circumference is relatively small。 This practice； therefore； of laying the frontiers waste is more tolerable in large than in middling states。
A despotic government does all the mischief to itself that could be committed by a cruel enemy； whose arms it were unable to resist。
It preserves itself likewise by another kind of separation； which is by putting the most distant provinces into the hands of a great vassal。 The Mogul； the king of Persia； and the emperors of China have their feudatories； and the Turks have found their account in putting the Tartars； the Moldavians； the Wallachians； and formerly the Transylvanians； between themselves and their enemies。
5。 In what Manner a Monarchical Government provides for its Security。 A monarchy never destroys itself like a despotic government。 But a kingdom of a moderate extent is liable to sudden invasions： it must therefore have fortresses to defend its frontiers； and troops to garrison those fortresses。 The least spot of ground is disputed with military skill and resolution。 Despotic states make incursions against one another； it is monarchies only that wage war。
Fortresses are proper for monarchies； despotic governments are afraid of them。 They dare not entrust their officers with such a command； as none of them have any affection for the prince or his government。
6。 Of the defensive Force of States in general。 To preserve a state in its due force； it must have such an extent as to admit of a proportion between the celerity with which it may be invaded； and that with which it may defeat the invasion。 As an invader may appear on every side； it is requisite that the state should be able to make on every side its defence； consequently it should be of a moderate extent； proportioned to the degree of velocity that nature has given to man； to enable him to move from one place to another。
France and Spain are exactly of a proper extent。 They have so easy a communication for their forces as to be able to convey them immediately to what part they have a mind； the armies unite and pass with rapidity from one frontier to another； without any apprehension of such difficulties as require time t