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this law； they are obliged to marry their children at eight； nine； or ten years of age； and sometimes younger； to the end that they may not be a wretched part of the father's succession。
In countries where there are no fundamental laws； the succession to the empire cannot be fixed。 The crown is then elective； and the right of electing is in the prince； who names a successor either of his own or of some other family。 In vain would it be to establish here the succession of the eldest son； the prince might always choose another。 The successor is declared by the prince himself； or by a civil war。 Hence a despotic state is； upon another account； more liable than a monarchical government to dissolution。
As every prince of the royal family is held equally capable of being chosen； hence it follows that the prince who ascends the throne immediately strangles his brothers； as in Turkey； or puts out their eyes； as in Persia； or bereaves them of their understanding； as in the Mogul's country； or if these precautions are not used； as in Morocco； the vacancy of the throne is always attended with the horrors of a civil war。
By the constitution of Russia＇41＇ the Czar may choose whom he has a mind for his successor； whether of his own or of a strange family。 Such a settlement produces a thousand revolutions； and renders the throne as tottering as the succession is arbitrary。 The right of succession being one of those things which are of most importance to the people to know； the best is that which most sensibly strikes them。 Such as a certain order of birth。 A settlement of this kind puts a stop to intrigues； and stifles ambition； the mind of a weak prince is no longer enslaved； nor is he made to speak his will as he is just expiring。
When the succession is established by a fundamental law； only one prince is the successor； and his brothers have neither a real nor apparent right to dispute the crown with him。 They can neither pretend to nor take any advantage of the will of a father。 There is then no more occasion to confine or kill the king's brother than any other subject。
But in despotic governments； where the prince's brothers are equally his slaves and his rivals； prudence requires that their persons be secured； especially in Mahomedan countries； where religion considers victory or success as a divine decision in their favour； so that they have no such thing as a monarch de jure； but only de facto。
There is a far greater incentive to ambition in countries where the princes of the blood are sensible that if they do not ascend the throne they must be either imprisoned or put to death； than among us； where they are placed in such a station as may satisfy； if not their ambition； at least their moderate desires。
The princes of despotic governments have ever perverted the use of marriage。 They generally take a great many wives； especially in that part of the world where absolute power is in some measure naturalised； namely； Asia。 Hence they come to have such a multitude of children that they can hardly have any great affection for them； nor the children for one another。
The reigning family resembles the state； it is too weak itself； and its head too powerful； it seems very numerous and extensive； and yet is suddenly extinct。 Artaxerxes＇42＇ put all his children to death for conspiring against him。
It is not at all probable that fifty children would conspire against their father； and much less that this conspiracy would be owing to his having refused to resign his concubine to his eldest son。 It is more natural to believe that the whole was an intrigue of those oriental seraglios； where fraud； treachery； and deceit reign in silence and darkness； and where an old prince； grown every day more infirm； is the first prisoner of the palace。
After what has been said； one would imagine that human nature should perpetually rise up against despotism。 But notwithstanding the love of liberty； so natural to mankind； notwithstanding their innate detestation of force and violence； most nations are subject to this very government。 This is easily accounted for。 To form a moderate government； it is necessary to combine the several powers； to regulate； temper； and set them in motion； to give； as it were； ballast to one； in order to enable it to counterpoise the other。 This is a masterpiece of legislation； rarely produced by hazard； and seldom attained by prudence。 On the contrary； a despotic government offers itself； as it were； at first sight； it is uniform throughout； and as passions only are requisite to establish it； this is what every capacity may reach。
15。 The same Subject continued。 In warm climates； where despotic power generally prevails； the passions disclose themselves earlier； and are sooner extinguished；＇43＇ the understanding is sooner ripened； they are less in danger of squandering their fortunes； there is less facility of distinguishing themselves in the world； less communication between young people； who are confined at home； they marry much earlier； and consequently may be sooner of age than in our European climates。 In Turkey they are of age at fifteen。＇44＇
They have no such thing as a cession of goods； in a government where there is no fixed property； people depend rather on the person than on his estate。
The cession of goods is naturally admitted in moderate governments；＇45＇ but especially in republics； because of the greater confidence usually placed in the probity of the citizens； and the lenity and moderation arising from a form of government which every subject seems to nave preferred to all others。
Had the legislators of the Roman republic established the cession of goods；＇46＇ they never would have been exposed to so many seditions and civil discords； neither would they have experienced the danger of the evils； nor the inconvenience of the remedies。
Poverty and the precariousness of property in a despotic state render usury natural； each person raising the value of his money in proportion to the danger he sees in lending it。 Misery therefore pours from all parts into those unhappy countries； they are bereft of everything； even of the resource of borrowing。
Hence it is that a merchant under this government is unable to carry on an extensive commerce； he lives from hand to mouth； and were he to encumber himself with a large quantity of merchandise； he would lose more by the exorbitant interest he must give for money than he could possibly get by the goods。 Hence they have no laws here relating to commerce； they are all reduced to what is called the bare police。
A government cannot be unjust without having hands to exercise its injustice。 Now； it is impossible but that these hands will be grasping for themselves。 The embezzling of the public money is therefore natural in despotic states。
As this is a common crime under such a government； confiscations are very useful。 By these the people are eased； the money drawn by this method being a considerable tribute which could hardly be raised on the exhausted subject： neither is there in those countries any one family which the prince would be glad to preserve。
In moderate governments it is quite a different thing。 Confiscations would render property uncertain； would strip innocent children； would destroy a whole family； instead of punishing a single criminal。 In republics they would be attended with the mischief of subverting equality； which is the very soul of this government； by depriving a citizen of his necessary subsistence。＇47＇
There is a Roman law＇48＇ against confiscations； except in the case of crimen majestatis； or high treason of the most heinous nature。 It would be a prudent thing to follow the spirit of this law； and to limit confiscations to particular crimes。 In countries where a local custom has rendered real estates alienable； Bodin very justly observes that confiscations should extend only to such as are purchased or acquired。＇49＇
16。 Of the Communication of Power。 In a despotic government the power is communicated entire to the person entrusted with it。 The vizir himself is the despotic prince； and each particular officer is the vizir。 In monarchies the power is less immediately applied； being tempered by the monarch as he gives it。＇50＇ He makes such a distribution of his authority as never to communicate a part of it without reserving a greater share to himself。
Hence in monarchies the governors of towns are not so dependent on the governor of the province as not to be still more so on the prince； and the private officers or military bodies are not so far subject to their general as not to owe still a greater subjection to their sovereign。
In most monarchies it has been wisely regulated that those who have an extensive command should not belong to any military corps； so that as they have no authority but through the prince's pleasure； and as they may be employed or not； they are in some measure in the service； and in some measure out of it。
This is incompatible with a despotic government。 For if those who are not actually employed were still invested with privileges and titles； the consequence must be that there would be men in the state who might be said to be great of themselves； a thing directly opposite to the nature