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at the witness's promise relates to an act to be done at once； while the member's would be a promise for all future time） would only be to the purpose； if it could be supposed that the swearer might forget the obligation he had entered into； or could possibly violate it unawares： contingencies which； in a case like the present； are out of the question。 A more substantial difficulty is that one of the forms most frequently assumed by election expenditure is that of subscriptions to local charities； or other local objects； and it would be a strong measure to enact that money should not be given in charity； within a place； by the member for it。 When such subscriptions are bona fide； the popularity which may be derived from them is an advantage which it seems hardly possible to deny to superior riches。 But the greatest part of the mischief consists in the fact that money so contributed is employed in bribery； under the euphemistic name of keeping up the member's interest。 To guard against this； it should be part of the member's promissory declaration； that all sums expended by him in the place； or for any purpose connected with it or with any of its inhabitants （with the exception perhaps of his own hotel expenses）； should pass through the hands of the election auditor； and be by him （and not by the member himself or his friends） applied to its declared purpose。 The principle of making all lawful expenses of a charge not upon the candidate； but upon the locality； was upheld by two of the best witnesses （pp。 20； 65…70； 277）。
There is scarcely any mode in which political institutions are more morally mischievous…work greater evil through their spirit…than by representing political functions as a favour to be conferred； a thing which the depositary is to ask for as desiring it for himself； and even pay for as if it were designed for his pecuniary benefit。 Men are not fond of paying large sums for leave to perform a laborious duty。 Plato had a much juster view of the conditions of good government when he asserted that the persons who should be sought out to be invested with political power are those who are personally most averse to it； and that the only motive which can be relied on for inducing the fittest men to take upon themselves the toils of government is the fear of being governed by worse men。 What must an elector think； when he sees three or four gentlemen； none of them previously observed to be lavish of their money on projects of disinterested beneficence； vying with one another in the sums they expend to be enabled to write M。P。 after their names？ Is it likely he will suppose that it is for his interest they incur all this cost？ And if he form an uncomplimentary opinion of their part in the affair； what moral obligation is he likely to feel as to his own？ Politicians are fond of treating it as the dream of enthusiasts that the electoral body will ever be uncorrupt： truly enough； until they are willing to become so themselves： for the electors； assuredly； will take their moral tone from the candidates。 So long as the elected member； in any shape or manner； pay for his seat； all endeavours； will fail to make the business of election anything but a selfish bargain on all sides。 〃So long as the candidate himself； and the customs of the world； seem to regard the function of a member of Parliament less as a duty to be discharged than a personal favour to be solicited； no effort will avail to implant in an ordinary voter the feeling that the election of a member of Parliament is also a matter of duty； and that he is not at liberty to bestow his vote on any other consideration than that of personal fitness。〃 The same principle which demands that no payment of money for election purposes should be either required or tolerated on the part of the person elected dictates another conclusion； apparently of contrary tendency； but really directed to the same object。 It negatives what has often been proposed as a means of rendering Parliament accessible to persons of all ranks and circumstances； the payment of members of Parliament。 If； as in some of our colonies； there are scarcely any fit persons who can afford to attend to an unpaid occupation； the payment should be an indemnity for loss of time or money； not a salary。 The greater latitude of choice which a salary would give is an illusory advantage。 No remuneration which any one would think of attaching to the post would attract to it those who were seriously engaged in other lucrative professions with a prospect of succeeding in them。 The business of a member of Parliament would therefore become an occupation in itself； carried on； like other professions； with a view chiefly to its pecuniary returns； and under the demoralising influences of an occupation essentially precarious。 It would become an object of desire to adventurers of a low class； and 658 persons in possession； with ten or twenty times as many in expectancy； would be incessantly bidding to attract or retain the suffrages of the electors； by promising all things； honest or dishonest； possible or impossible； and rivalling each other in pandering to the meanest feelings and most ignorant prejudices of the vulgarest part of the crowd。 The auction between Cleon and the sausage…seller in Aristophanes is a fair caricature of what would be always going on。 Such an institution would be a perpetual blister applied to the most peccant parts of human nature。 It amounts to offering 658 prizes for the most successful flatterer； the most adroit misleader； of a body of his fellow…countrymen。 Under no despotism has there been such an organised system of tillage for raising a rich crop of vicious courtiership。* When； by reason of pre…eminent qualifications （as may at any time happen to be the case）； it is desirable that a person entirely without independent means； either derived from property or from a trade or profession； should be brought into Parliament to render services which no other person accessible can render as well； there is the resource of a public subscription； he may be supported while in Parliament； like Andrew Marvell； by the contributions of his constituents。 This mode is unobjectionable for such an honour will never be paid to mere subserviency： bodies of men do not care so much for the difference between one sycophant and another as to go to the expense of his maintenance in order to be flattered by that particular individual。 Such a support will only be given in consideration of striking and impressive personal qualities； which； though no absolute proof of fitness to be a national representative； are some presumption of it； and； at all events； some guarantee for the possession of an independent opinion and will。
* 〃As Mr。 Lorimer remarks； by creating a pecuniary inducement to persons of the lowest class to devote themselves to public affairs； the calling of the demagogue would be formally inaugurated。 Nothing is more to be deprecated than making it the private interest of a number of active persons to urge the form of government in the direction of its natural perversion。 The indications which either a multitude or an individual can give； when merely left to their own weaknesses； afford but a faint idea of what those weaknesses would become when played upon by a thousand flatterers。 If there were 658 places of certain； however moderate； emolument； to be gained by persuading the multitude that ignorance is as good as knowledge； and better； it is terrible odds that they would believe and act upon the lesson。〃… （Article in Fraser's Magazine for April 1859； headed 〃Recent Writers on Reform。〃） Chapter 11 Of the Duration of Parliaments。
AFTER HOW long a term should members of Parliament be subject to re…election？ The principles involved are here very obvious； the difficulty lies in their application。 On the one hand； the member ought not to have so long a tenure of his seat as to make him forget his responsibility； take his duties easily； conduct them with a view to his own personal advantage； or neglect those free and public conferences with his constituents which； whether he agrees or differs with them； are one of the benefits of representative government。 On the other hand； he should have such a term of office to look forward to as will enable him to be judged； not by a single act； but by his course of action。 It is important that he should have the greatest latitude of individual opinion and discretion compatible with the popular control essential to free government； and for this purpose it is necessary that the control should be exercised； as in any case it is best exercised； after sufficient time has been given him to show all the qualities he possesses； and to prove that there is some other way than that of a mere obedient voter and advocate of their opinions； by which he can render himself in the eyes of his constituents a desirable and creditable representative。 It is impossible to fix； by any universal rule； the boundary between these principles。 Where the democratic power in the constitution is weak or over…passive； and requires stimulation； where the representative； on leaving his constituents； enters at once into a courtly or aristocratic atmosphere； whose