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etween an individual and the community。 No society has ever admitted that it could not sacrifice individual welfare to its own existence。 If conscripts are necessary for its army； it seizes them； and marches them； with bayonets in their rear； to death。 It runs highways and railroads through old family places in spite of the owner's protest； paying in this instance the market value； to be sure； because no civilized government sacrifices the citizen more than it can help； but still sacrificing his will and his welfare to that of the rest。 /3/
If it were necessary to trench further upon the field of morals； it might be suggested that the dogma of equality applied even to individuals only within the limits of ordinary dealings in the common run of affairs。 You cannot argue with your neighbor； except on the admission for the ＇44＇ moment that he is as wise as you； although you may by no means believe it。 In the same way； you cannot deal with him； where both are free to choose； except on the footing of equal treatment； and the same rules for both。 The ever…growing value set upon peace and the social relations tends to give the law of social being the appearance of the law of all being。 But it seems to me clear that the ultima ratio； not only regum； but of private persons； is force； and that at the bottom of all private relations； however tempered by sympathy and all the social feelings； is a justifiable self…preference。 If a man is on a plank in the deep sea which will only float one； and a stranger lays hold of it； he will thrust him off if he can。 When the state finds itself in a similar position； it does the same thing。
The considerations which answer the argument of equal rights also answer the objections to treating man as a thing； and the like。 If a man lives in society； he is liable to find himself so treated。 The degree of civilization which a people has reached； no doubt； is marked by their anxiety to do as they would be done by。 It may be the destiny of man that the social instincts shall grow to control his actions absolutely； even in anti…social situations。 But they have not yet done so； and as the rules of law are or should be based upon a morality which is generally accepted； no rule founded on a theory of absolute unselfishness can be laid down without a breach between law and working beliefs。
If it be true； as I shall presently try to show； that the general principles of criminal and civil liability are the same； it will follow from that alone that theory and fact agree in frequently punishing those who have been guilty ＇45＇ of no moral wrong； and who could not be condemned by any standard that did not avowedly disregard the personal peculiarities of the individuals concerned。 If punishment stood on the moral grounds which are proposed for it； the first thing to be considered would be those limitations in the capacity for choosing rightly which arise from abnormal instincts； want of education； lack of intelligence； and all the other defects which are most marked in the criminal classes。 I do not say that they should not be； or at least I do not need to for my argument。 I do not say that the criminal law does more good than harm。 I only say that it is not enacted or administered on that theory。
There remains to be mentioned the affirmative argument in favor of the theory of retribution； to the effect that the fitness of punishment following wrong…doing is axiomatic； and is instinctively recognized by unperverted minds。 I think that it will be seen； on self…inspection； that this feeling of fitness is absolute and unconditional only in the case of our neighbors。 It docs not seem to me that any one who has satisfied himself that an act of his was wrong； and that he will never do it again； would feel the least need or propriety； as between himself and an earthly punishing power alone； of his being made to suffer for what he had done； although； when third persons were introduced； he might； as a philosopher； admit the necessity of hurting him to frighten others。 But when our neighbors do wrong； we sometimes feel the fitness of making them smart for it； whether they have repented or not。 The feeling of fitness seems to me to be only vengeance in disguise； and I have already admitted that vengeance was an element； though not the chief element； of punishment。
＇46＇ But； again； the supposed intuition of fitness does not seem to me to be coextensive with the thing to be accounted for。 The lesser punishments are just as fit for the lesser crimes as the greater for the greater。 The demand that crime should be followed by its punishment should therefore be equal and absolute in both。 Again； a malum prohibitum is just as much a crime as a malum in se。 If there is any general ground for punishment； it must apply to one case as much as to the other。 But it will hardly be said that； if the wrong in the case just supposed consisted of a breach of the revenue laws； and the government had been indemnified for the loss； we should feel any internal necessity that a man who had thoroughly repented of his wrong should be punished for it； except on the ground that his act was known to others。 If it was known； the law would have to verify its threats in order that others might believe and tremble。 But if the fact was a secret between the sovereign and the subject； the sovereign； if wholly free from passion； would undoubtedly see that punishment in such a case was wholly without justification。
On the other hand； there can be no case in which the law…maker makes certain conduct criminal without his thereby showing a wish and purpose to prevent that conduct。 Prevention would accordingly seem to be the chief and only universal purpose of punishment。 The law threatens certain pains if you do certain things； intending thereby to give you a new motive for not doing them。 If you persist in doing them； it has to inflict the pains in order that its threats may continue to be believed。
If this is a true account of the law as it stands； the law does undoubtedly treat the individual as a means to an ＇47＇ end； and uses him as a tool to increase the general welfare at his own expense。 It has been suggested above； that this course is perfectly proper； but even if it is wrong； our criminal law follows it； and the theory of our criminal law must be shaped accordingly。
Further evidence that our law exceeds the limits of retribution； and subordinates consideration of the individual to that of the public well…being； will be found in some doctrines which cannot be satisfactorily explained on any other ground。
The first of these is； that even the deliberate taking of life will not be punished when it is the only way of saving one's own。 This principle is not so clearly established as that next to be mentioned； but it has the support of very great authority。 /1/ If that is the law； it must go on one of two grounds； either that self…preference is proper in the case supposed； or that； even if it is improper； the law cannot prevent it by punishment； because a threat of death at some future time can never be a sufficiently powerful motive to make a man choose death now in order to avoid the threat。 If the former ground is adopted； it admits that a single person may sacrifice another to himself； and a fortiori that a people may。 If the latter view is taken； by abandoning punishment when it can no longer be expected to prevent an act； the law abandons the retributive and adopts the preventive theory。
The next doctrine leads to still clearer conclusions。 Ignorance of the law is no excuse for breaking it。 This substantive principle is sometimes put in the form of a rule of evidence； that every one is presumed to know the ＇48＇ law。 It has accordingly been defended by Austin and others； on the ground of difficulty of proof。 If justice requires the fact to be ascertained； the difficulty of doing so is no ground for refusing to try。 But every one must feel that ignorance of the law could never be admitted as an excuse； even if the fact could be proved by sight and hearing in every case。 Furthermore； now that parties can testify； it may be doubted whether a man's knowledge of the law is any harder to investigate than many questions which are gone into。 The difficulty； such as it is； would be met by throwing the burden of proving ignorance on the lawbreaker。
The principle cannot be explained by saying that we are not only commanded to abstain from certain acts； but also to find out that we are commanded。 For if there were such a second command； it is very clear that the guilt of failing to obey it would bear no proportion to that of disobeying the principal command if known； yet the failure to know would receive the same punishment as the failure to obey the principal law。
The true explanation of the rule is the same as that which accounts for the law's indifference to a man's particular temperament； faculties； and so forth。 Public policy sacrifices the individual to the general good。 It is desirable that the burden of all should be equal； but it is still more desirable to put an end to robbery and murder。 It is no doubt true that there are many cases in which the criminal could not have known that he was breaking the law； but to admit the excuse at all would