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ed having the benefit of the time during which the testator had been in possession for the purpose of acquiring a title； the legatee was in a certain sense quasi an heir。 /1/ Yet a legatarius was not a universal successor； and for most purposes stood in marked contrast with such successors。 /2/
Thus the strict law of inheritance had made the notion familiar that one man might have the advantage of a position filled by another； although it was not filled； or was only partially filled； by himself； and the second fiction； by which the privileges of a legal heir in this respect as well as others had been extended to other persons； broke down the walls which might otherwise have confined those privileges to a single case。 A new conception was introduced into the law； and there was nothing to hinder its further application。 As has been shown； it was applied in terms to a sale of the universitas for business purposes； and to at least one case where the succession was confined to a single specific thing。 Why； then； might not every gift or sale be regarded as a succession； so far as to insure the same advantages？
＇363＇ The joinder of times to make out a title was soon allowed between buyer and seller； and I have no doubt； from the language always used by the Roman lawyers； that it was arrived at in the way I have suggested。 A passage from Scaevola （B。 C。 30） will furnish sufficient proof。 Joinder of possessions； he says； that is； the right to add the time of one's predecessor's holding to one's own； clearly belongs to those who succeed to the place of others； whether by contract or by will： for heirs and those who are treated as holding the place of successors are allowed to add their testator's possession to their own。 Accordingly； if you sell me a slave I shall have the benefit of your holding。 /1/
The joinder of times is given to those who succeed to the place of another。 Ulpian cites a like phrase from a jurisconsult of the time of the Antonines； 〃to whose place I have succeeded by inheritance； or purchase； or any other right。〃 /2/ Succedere in locum aliorum； like sustinere personam； is an expression of the Roman lawyers for those continuations of one man's legal position by another of which the type was the succession of heir to ancestor。 Suecedere alone is used in the sense of inherit； /3/ and successio in that of 〃inheritance。〃 /4/ The succession par excellence was the inheritance； and it is believed that scarcely any instance will be found in the Roman sources where 〃succession〃 does not convey that analogy； and indicate the partial ＇364＇ assumption； at least； of a persona formerly sustained by another。 It clearly does so in the passage before us。
But the succession which admits a joinder of times is not hereditary succession alone。 In the passage which has been cited Scaevola says that it may be by contract or purchase； as well as by inheritance or will。 It may be singular； as well as universal。 The jurists often mention antithetically universal successions and those confined to a single specific thing。 Ulpian says that a man succeeds to another's place； whether his succession be universal or to the single object。 /1/
If further evidence were wanting for the present argument； it would be found in another expression of Ulpian's。 He speaks of the benefit of joinder as derived from the persona of the grantor。 〃He to whom a thing is granted shall have the benefit of joinder from the persona of his grantor。〃 /2/ A benefit cannot be derived from a persona except by sustaining it。
It farther appears pretty plainly from Justinian's Institutes and the Digest； that the benefit was not extended to purchasers in all cases until a pretty late period。 /3/
Savigny very nearly expressed the truth when he said； somewhat broadly； that 〃every accessio； for whatever purpose； presupposes nothing else than a relation of juridical ＇365＇ succession between the previous and present possessor。 For succession does not apply to possession by itself。〃 /1/ And I may add； by way of further explanation； that every relation of juridical succession presupposes either an inheritance or a relation to which； so far as it extends； the analogies of the inheritance may be applied。
The way of thinking which led to the accessio or joinder of times is equally visible in other cases。 The time during which a former owner did not use an casement was imputed to the person who had succeeded to his place。 /2/ The defence that the plaintiff had sold and delivered the thing in controversy was available not only to the purchaser； but to his heirs or to a second purchaser； even before delivery to him； against the successors of the seller； whether universal or only to the thing in question。 /3/ If one used a way wrongfully as against the predecessor in title； it was wrongful as against the successor； whether by inheritance； purchase； or any other right。 /4/ The formal oath of a party to an action was conclusive in favor of his successors； universal or singular。 /5/ Successors by purchase or gift had the ＇366＇ benefit of agreements made with the vendor。 /1/ A multitude of general expressions show that for most purposes； whether of action or defence； the buyer stood in the shoes of the seller； to use the metaphor of our own law。 /2/ And what is more important than the result； which often might have been reached by other ways； the language and analogies are drawn throughout from the succession to the inheritance。
Thus understood； there could not have been a succession between a person dispossessed of a thing against his will and the wrongful possessor。 Without the element of consent there is no room for the analogy just explained。 Accordingly； it is laid down that there is no joinder of times when the possession is wrongful； /3/ and the only enumerated means of succeeding in rem are by will； sale； gift； or some other right。
The argument now returns to the English law； fortified with some general conclusions。 It has been shown that in both the systems from whose union our law arose the rules governing conveyance； or the transfer of specific ＇367＇ objects between living persons； were deeply affected by notions drawn from inheritance。 It had been shown previously that in England the principles of inheritance applied directly to the singular succession of the heir to a specific fee； as well as to the universal succession of the executor。 It would be remarkable； considering their history； if the same principles had not affected other singular successions also。 It will soon appear that they have。 And not to be too careful about the order of proof； I will first take up the joinder of times in prescription； as that has just been so fully discussed。 The English law of the subject is found on examination to be the same as the Roman in extent； reason； and expression。 It is indeed largely copied from that source。 For servitudes； such as rights of way； light； and the like； form the chief class of prescriptive rights； and our law of servitudes is mainly Roman。 Prescriptions； it is said； 〃are properly personal； and therefore are always alleged in the person of him who prescribes； viz。 that he and all those whose estate he hath； &c。； therefore； a bishop or a parson may prescribe； 。。。 for there is a perpetual estate； and a perpetual succession and the successor hath the very same estate which his predecessor had； for that continues； though the person alters； like the case of the ancestor and the heir。〃 /1/ So in a modern case； where by statute twenty years' dispossession extinguished the owner's title； the Court of Queen's Bench said that probably the right would be transferred to the possessor 〃if the same person； or several persons； claiming one from the other by descent； will ＇368＇ or conveyance； had been in possession for the twenty years。〃 〃But 。。。。 such twenty years' possession must be either by the same person； or several persons claiming one from the other； which is not the case here。〃 /1/
In a word； it is equally clear that the continuous possession of privies in title； or； in Roman phrase； successors； has all the effect of the continuous possession of one； and that such an effect is not attributed to the continuous possession of different persons who are not in the same chain of title。 One who dispossesses another of land cannot add the time during which his disseisee has used a way to the period of his own use； while one who purchased can。 /2/
The authorities which have been quoted make it plain that the English law proceeds on the same theory as the Roman。 One who buys land of another gets the very same estate which his seller had。 He is in of the same fee； or hereditas； which means； as I have shown； that he sustains the same persona。 On the other hand； one who wrongfully dispossesses another；a disseisor；gets a different estate； is in of a new fee； although the land is the same； and much technical reasoning is based upon this doctrine。
In the matter of prescription； therefore； buyer and seller were identified； like heir and ancestor。 But the question ＇369＇ remains whether this identification bore fruit in other parts of the law also； or whether it was confined to one particular branch； where the Roman law was grafted upon the English stock。
There can be no d