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discover its origin。
The cases in which this mode of trial was used appear from the early books and reports to have been almost wholly confined to claims arising out of a sale or loan。 And the question at once occurs； whether we are not upon traces of an institution which was already ancient when Glanvill wrote。 For centuries before the Conquest Anglo…Saxon law /1/ had required the election of a certain ＇256＇ number of official witnesses； two or three of whom were to be called in to every bargain of sale。 The object for which these witnesses were established is not commonly supposed to have been the proof of debts。 They go back to a time when theft and similar offences were the chief ground of litigation； and the purpose for which they were appointed was to afford a means of deciding whether a person charged with having stolen property had come by it rightfully or not。 A defendant could clear himself of the felony by their oath that he had bought or received the thing openly in the way appointed by law。
Having been present at the bargain； the witnesses were able to swear to what they had seen and heard； if any question arose between the parties。 Accordingly； their use was not confined to disposing of a charge of felony。 But that particular service identifies the transaction witnesses of the Saxon period。 Now we know that the use of these witnesses did not at once disappear under Norman influence。 They are found with their old function in the laws of William the Conqueror。 /1/ The language of Glanvill seems to prove that they were still known under Henry II。 He says that； if a purchaser cannot summon in the man from whom he bought； to warrant the property to him and defend the suit； （for if he does； the peril is shifted to the seller；） then if the purchaser has sufficient proof of his having lawfully bought the thing； de legittimo marcatu suo； it will clear him of felony。 But if he have not sufficient suit； he will be in danger。 /2/ This is the law of William over again。 It follows that purchasers still used the transaction witnesses。
But Glanvill also seems to admit the use of witness to establish debts。 /1/ As the transaction witnesses were formerly available for this purpose； I see no reason to doubt that they still were； and that he is speaking of them here also。 /2/ Moreover； for a long time after Henry II。； whenever an action was brought for a debt of which there was no written evidence； the plaintiff； when asked what he had to show for it； always answered 〃good suit；〃 and tendered his witnesses； who were sometimes examined by the court。 /3/ I think it is not straining the evidence to infer that the 〃good suit〃 of the later reports was the descendant of the Saxon transaction witnesses； as it has been shown that Glanvill's secta was。 /4/
Assuming this step in the argument to have been taken； it will be well to recall again for a moment the original nature of the witness oath。 It was confined to facts within the witnesses' knowledge by sight and hearing。 But as the purposes for which witnesses were provided only required their presence when property changed hands； the principal case in which they could be of service between the parties ＇258＇ to a bargain was when a debt was claimed by reason of the delivery of property。 The purpose did not extend to agreements which were executory on both sides； because there no question of theft could arise。 And Glanvill shows that in his time the King's Court did not enforce such agreements。 /1/ Now； if the oath of the secta could only be used to establish a debt where the transaction witnesses could have sworn； it will be seen； readily enough； how an accident of procedure may have led to a most important rule of substantive law。
The rule that witnesses could only swear to facts within their knowledge； coupled with the accident that these witnesses were not used in transactions which might create a debt； except for a particular fact； namely； the delivery of property； together with the further accident that this delivery was quid pro quo； was equivalent to the rule that； when a debt was proved by witnesses there must be quid pro quo。 But these debts proved by witnesses； instead of by deed are what we call simple contract debts； and thus beginning with debt； and subsequently extending itself to other contracts； is established our peculiar and most important doctrine that every simple contract must have a consideration。 This was never the law as to debts or contracts proved in the usual way by the defendant's seal； and the fact that it applied only to obligations which were formerly established by a procedure of limited use； ＇259＇ goes far to show that the connection with procedure was not accidental。
The mode of proof soon changed； but as late as the reign of Queen Elizabeth we find a trace of this original connection。 It is said； 〃But the common law requires that there should be a new cause （i。 e。 consideration）； whereof the country may have intelligence or knowledge for the trial of it； if need be； so that it is necessary for the Public…weal。〃 /1/ Lord Mansfield showed his intuition of the historical grounds of our law when he said； 〃I take it that the ancient notion about the want of consideration was for the sake of evidence only； for when it is reduced into writing； as in covenants； specialties； bonds； etc。； there was no objection to the want of consideration。〃 /2/
If it should be objected that the preceding argument is necessarily confined to debt； whereas the requirement of consideration applies equally to all simple contracts； the answer is； that in all probability the rule originated with debt； and spread from debt to other contracts。
But； again； it may be asked whether there were no other contracts proved by witness except those which have been mentioned。 Were there no contracts proved in that way to which the accidental consideration was wanting？ To this also there is an easy answer。 The contracts enforced by the civil courts； even as late as Henry II。； were few and simple。 The witness procedure was no doubt broad enough for all the contracts which were made in early times。 Besides those of sale； loan； and the like； which have been mentioned； I find but two contractual ＇260＇ obligations。 These were the warranties accompanying a sale and suretyship which was referred to at the beginning of the Lecture。 Of the former； warranty of title was rather regarded as an obligation raised by the law out of the relation of buyer and seller than as a contract。 Other express warranties were matters within the knowledge of the transaction witnesses； and were sworn to by them in Saxon times。 /1/
But in the Norman period warranty is very little heard of； except with regard to land； and then it was decided by the duel。 It so wholly disappeared； except where it was embodied in a deed； that it can have had no influence upon the law of consideration。 I shall therefore assume； without more detail； that it does not bear upon the case。
Then as to the pledge or surety。 He no longer paid with his body； unless in very exceptional cases； but his liability was translated into money； and enforced in an action of debt。 This time…honored contract； like the other debts of Glanvill's time； could be established by witness without a writing； /2/ and in this case there was not such a consideration； such a benefit to the promisor； as the law required when the doctrine was first enunciated。 But this also is unimportant； because his liability on the oath of witness came to an end； as well as that of the warrantor； before the foundations were laid for the rule which I am seeking to explain。 A writing soon came to be required； as will be seen in a moment。
The result so far is； that the only action of contract in Glanvill's time was debt； that the only debts recovered ＇261＇ without writing were those which have been described； and that the only one of these for which there was not quid pro quo ceased to be recoverable in that way by the reign of Edward III。
But great changes were beginning in the reign of Henry II。 More various and complex contracts soon came to be enforced。 It may be asked； Why was not the scope of the witness oath enlarged； or； if any better proof were forthcoming； why was not the secta done away with； and other oral testimony admitted？ In any event； what can the law of Henry II。's time have to do with consideration； which not heard of until centuries later？
It is manifest that a witness oath； which disposes of a case by the simple fact that it is sworn； is not a satisfactory mode of proof。 A written admission of debt produced in court； and sufficiently identified as issuing from the defendant； is obviously much better。 The only weak point about a writing is the means of identifying it as the defendant's； and this difficulty disappeared as soon as the use of seals became common。 This had more or less taken place in Glanvill's time； and then all that a party had to do was to produce the writing and satisfy the court by inspection that the impression on the wax fitted his opponent's seal。 /1/ The oath of the secta could always be successfully met by wager of law； /2/ that is； by a counter oath the part of the defendant； with the same or double the number of fellow…swearers produ