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firing a gun； or making a chemical mixture； or piling up oiled rags； or twenty other things； might be manifestly dangerous in the highest degree and actually lead to a conflagration。 If； in such cases； the crime is held to have been committed； an external standard is reached； and the analysis which has been made of murder applies here。
There is another class of cases in which intent plays an important part； for quite different reasons from those which have been offered to account for the law of malicious mischief。 The most obvious examples of this class are criminal attempts。 Attempt and intent； of course； are two distinct things。 Intent to commit a crime is not itself criminal。 There is no law against a man's intending to commit a murder the day after tomorrow。 The law only deals with conduct。 An attempt is an overt act。 It differs from the attempted crime in this； that the act has failed to bring about the result which would have given it the character of the principal crime。 If an attempt to murder results in death within a year and a day； it is murder。 If an attempt to steal results in carrying off the owner's goods； it is larceny。
If an act is done of which the natural and probable ＇66＇ effect under the circumstances is the accomplishment of a substantive crime； the criminal law； while it may properly enough moderate the severity of punishment if the act has not that effect in the particular case； can hardly abstain altogether from punishing it； on any theory。 It has been argued that an actual intent is all that can give the act a criminal character in such instances。 /1/ But if the views which I have advanced as to murder and manslaughter are sound； the same principles ought logically to determine the criminality of acts in general。 Acts should be judged by their tendency under the known circumstances； not by the actual intent which accompanies them。
It may be true that in the region of attempts； as elsewhere； the law began with cases of actual intent； as those cases are the most obvious ones。 But it cannot stop with them； unless it attaches more importance to the etymological meaning of the word attempt than to the general principles of punishment。 Accordingly there is at least color of authority for the proposition that an act is punishable as an attempt； if； supposing it to have produced its natural and probable effect； it would have amounted to a substantive crime。 /2/
But such acts are not the only punishable attempts。 There is another class in which actual intent is clearly necessary； and the existence of this class as well as the name （attempt） no doubt tends to affect the whole doctrine。 Some acts may be attempts or misdemeanors which ＇67＇ could not have effected the crime unless followed by other acts on the part of the wrong…doer。 For instance； lighting a match with intent to set fire to a haystack has been held to amount to a criminal attempt to burn it； although the defendant blew out the match on seeing that he was watched。 /1/ So the purchase of dies for making counterfeit coin is a misdemeanor； although of course the coin would not be counterfeited unless the dies were used。 /2/
In such cases the law goes on a new principle； different from that governing most substantive crimes。 The reason for punishing any act must generally be to prevent some harm which is foreseen as likely to follow that act under the circumstances in which it is done。 In most substantive crimes the ground on which that likelihood stands is the common working of natural causes as shown by experience。 But when an act is punished the natural effect of which is not harmful under the circumstances； that ground alone will not suffice。 The probability does not exist unless there are grounds for expecting that the act done will be followed by other acts in connection with which its effect will be harmful； although not so otherwise。 But as in fact no such acts have followed； it cannot； in general； be assumed； from the mere doing of what has been done； that they would have followed if the actor had not been interrupted。 They would not have followed it unless the actor had chosen； and the only way generally available to show that he would have chosen to do them is by showing that he intended to do them when he did what he did。 The accompanying intent in that case renders the otherwise ＇68＇ innocent act harmful； because it raises a probability that it will be followed by such other acts and events as will all together result in harm。 The importance of the intent is not to show that the act was wicked； but to show that it was likely to be followed by hurtful consequences。
It will be readily seen that there are limits to this kind of liability。 The law does not punish every act which is done with the intent to bring about a crime。 If a man starts from Boston to Cambridge for the purpose of committing a murder when he gets there； but is stopped by the draw and goes home； he is no more punishable than if he had sat in his chair and resolved to shoot somebody； but on second thoughts had given up the notion。 On the other hand； a slave who ran after a white woman； but desisted before he caught her； has been convicted of an attempt to commit rape。 /1/ We have seen what amounts to an attempt to burn a haystack； but it was said in the same case； that； if the defendant had gone no further than to buy a box of matches for the purpose； he would not have been liable。
Eminent judges have been puzzled where to draw the line； or even to state the principle on which it should be drawn； between the two sets of cases。 But the principle is believed to be similar to that on which all other lines are drawn by the law。 Public policy； that is to say； legislative considerations； are at the bottom of the matter； the considerations being； in this case； the nearness of the danger； the greatness of the harm； and the degree of apprehension felt。 When a man buys matches to fire a haystack； or starts on a journey meaning to murder at the end of it； there is still a considerable chance that he will ＇69＇ change his mind before he comes to the point。 But when he has struck the match； or cocked and aimed the pistol； there is very little chance that he will not persist to the end； and the danger becomes so great that the law steps in。 With an object which could not be used innocently； the point of intervention might be put further back； as in the case of the purchase of a die for coining。
The degree of apprehension may affect the decision； as well as the degree of probability that the crime will be accomplished。 No doubt the fears peculiar to a slaveowning community had their share in the conviction which has just been mentioned。
There is one doubtful point which should not be passed over。 It has been thought that to shoot at a block of wood thinking it to be a man is not an attempt to murder； /1/ and that to put a hand into an empty pocket； intending to pick it； is not an attempt to commit larceny； although on the latter question there is a difference of opinion。 /2/ The reason given is； that an act which could not have effected the crime if the actor had been allowed to follow it up to all results to which in the nature of things it could have led； cannot be an attempt to commit that crime when interrupted。 At some point or other； of course； the law must adopt this conclusion； unless it goes on the theory of retribution for guilt； and not of prevention of harm。
But even to prevent harm effectually it will not do to be too exact。 I do not suppose that firing a pistol at a man with intent to kill him is any the less an attempt to murder because the bullet misses its aim。 Yet there the act has produced the whole effect possible to it in the ＇7O＇ course of nature。 It is just as impossible that that bullet under those circumstances should hit that man； as to pick an empty pocket。 But there is no difficulty in saying that such an act under such circumstances is so dangerous； so far as the possibility of human foresight is concerned； that it should be punished。 No one can absolutely know； though many would be pretty sure； exactly where the bullet will strike； and if the harm is done； it is a very great harm。 If a man fires at a block； no harm can possibly ensue； and no theft can be committed in an empty pocket； besides that the harm of successful theft is less than that of murder。 Yet it might be said that even such things as these should be punished； in order to make discouragement broad enough and easy to understand。
There remain to be considered certain substantive crimes； which differ in very important ways from murder and the like； and for the explanation of which the foregoing analysis of intent in criminal attempts and analogous misdemeanors will be found of service。
The type of these is larceny。 Under this name acts are punished which of themselves would not be sufficient to accomplish the evil which the law seeks to prevent； and which are treated as equally criminal； whether the evil has been accomplished or not。 Murder； manslaughter； and arson； on the other hand； are not committed unless the evil is accomplished； and they all consist of acts the tendency of which under the surrounding circumstances is to hurt or destroy person or property by the mere work