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does not understand or suppose it to have them； surely the
questioner here has directed his argument against his thought！ Or
how else ought he to put his question except by suggesting a
distinction…suppose one's question to be speaking of the silent
possible or not？'…as follows； 'Is the answer 〃No〃 in one sense； but
〃Yes〃 in another？' If； then； any one were to answer that it was not
possible in any sense and the other were to argue that it was； has not
his argument been directed against the thought of the answerer？ Yet
his argument is supposed to be one of those that depend on the
expression。 There is not； then； any definite kind of arguments that is
directed against the thought。 Some arguments are； indeed； directed
against the expression： but these are not all even apparent
refutations； let alone all refutations。 For there are also apparent
refutations which do not depend upon language； e。g。 those that
depend upon accident； and others。
If； however； any one claims that one should actually draw the
distinction； and say； 'By 〃speaking of the silent〃 I mean； in one
sense this and in the other sense that'； surely to claim this is in
the first place absurd （for sometimes the questioner does not see
the ambiguity of his question； and he cannot possibly draw a
distinction which he does not think to be there）： in the second place；
what else but this will didactic argument be？ For it will make
manifest the state of the case to one who has never considered； and
does not know or suppose that there is any other meaning but one。
For what is there to prevent the same thing also happening to us in
cases where there is no double meaning？ 'Are the units in four equal
to the twos？ Observe that the twos are contained in four in one
sense in this way； in another sense in that'。 Also； 'Is the
knowledge of contraries one or not？ Observe that some contraries are
known； while others are unknown'。 Thus the man who makes this claim
seems to be unaware of the difference between didactic and dialectical
argument； and of the fact that while he who argues didactically should
not ask questions but make things clear himself； the other should
merely ask questions。
11
Moreover； to claim a 'Yes' or 'No' answer is the business not of a
man who is showing something； but of one who is holding an
examination。 For the art of examining is a branch of dialectic and has
in view not the man who has knowledge； but the ignorant pretender。 He；
then； is a dialectician who regards the common principles with their
application to the particular matter in hand； while he who only
appears to do this is a sophist。 Now for contentious and sophistical
reasoning： （1） one such is a merely apparent reasoning； on subjects on
which dialectical reasoning is the proper method of examination；
even though its conclusion be true： for it misleads us in regard to
the cause： also （2） there are those misreasonings which do not conform
to the line of inquiry proper to the particular subject； but are
generally thought to conform to the art in question。 For false
diagrams of geometrical figures are not contentious （for the resulting
fallacies conform to the subject of the art）…any more than is any
false diagram that may be offered in proof of a truth…e。g。
Hippocrates' figure or the squaring of the circle by means of the
lunules。 But Bryson's method of squaring the circle； even if the
circle is thereby squared； is still sophistical because it does not
conform to the subject in hand。 So； then； any merely apparent
reasoning about these things is a contentious argument； and any
reasoning that merely appears to conform to the subject in hand；
even though it be genuine reasoning； is a contentious argument： for it
is merely apparent in its conformity to the subject…matter； so that it
is deceptive and plays foul。 For just as a foul in a race is a
definite type of fault； and is a kind of foul fighting； so the art
of contentious reasoning is foul fighting in disputation： for in the
former case those who are resolved to win at all costs snatch at
everything； and so in the latter case do contentious reasoners。 Those；
then； who do this in order to win the mere victory are generally
considered to be contentious and quarrelsome persons； while those
who do it to win a reputation with a view to making money are
sophistical。 For the art of sophistry is； as we said；' a kind of art
of money…making from a merely apparent wisdom； and this is why they
aim at a merely apparent demonstration： and quarrelsome persons and
sophists both employ the same arguments； but not with the same
motives： and the same argument will be sophistical and contentious；
but not in the same respect； rather； it will be contentious in so
far as its aim is an apparent victory； while in so far as its aim is
an apparent wisdom； it will be sophistical： for the art of sophistry
is a certain appearance of wisdom without the reality。 The contentious
argument stands in somewhat the same relation to the dialectical as
the drawer of false diagrams to the geometrician； for it beguiles by
misreasoning from the same principles as dialectic uses； just as the
drawer of a false diagram beguiles the geometrician。 But whereas the
latter is not a contentious reasoner； because he bases his false
diagram on the principles and conclusions that fall under the art of
geometry； the argument which is subordinate to the principles of
dialectic will yet clearly be contentious as regards other subjects。
Thus； e。g。 though the squaring of the circle by means of the lunules
is not contentious； Bryson's solution is contentious： and the former
argument cannot be adapted to any subject except geometry； because
it proceeds from principles that are peculiar to geometry； whereas the
latter can be adapted as an argument against all the number of
people who do not know what is or is not possible in each particular
context： for it will apply to them all。 Or there is the method whereby
Antiphon squared the circle。 Or again； an argument which denied that
it was better to take a walk after dinner； because of Zeno's argument；
would not be a proper argument for a doctor； because Zeno's argument
is of general application。 If； then； the relation of the contentious
argument to the dialectical were exactly like that of the drawer of
false diagrams to the geometrician； a contentious argument upon the
aforesaid subjects could not have existed。 But； as it is； the
dialectical argument is not concerned with any definite kind of being；
nor does it show anything； nor is it even an argument such as we
find in the general philosophy of being。 For all beings are not
contained in any one kind； nor； if they were； could they possibly fall
under the same principles。 Accordingly； no art that is a method of
showing the nature of anything proceeds by asking questions： for it
does not permit a man to grant whichever he likes of the two
alternatives in the question： for they will not both of them yield a
proof。 Dialectic； on the other hand； does proceed by questioning；
whereas if it were concerned to show things； it would have refrained
from putting questions； even if not about everything； at least about
the first principles and the special principles that apply to the
particular subject in hand。 For suppose the answerer not to grant
these； it would then no longer have had any grounds from which to
argue any longer against the objection。 Dialectic is at the same
time a mode of examination as well。 For neither is the art of
examination an accomplishment of the same kind as geometry； but one
which a man may possess； even though he has not knowledge。 For it is
possible even for one without knowledge to hold an examination of
one who is without knowledge； if also the latter grants him points
taken not from thing that he knows or from the special principles of
the subject under discussion but from all that range of consequences
attaching to the subject which a man may indeed know without knowing
the theory of the subject； but which if he do not know； he is bound to
be ignorant of the theory。 So then clearly the art of examining does
not consist in knowledge of any definite subject。 For this reason；
too； it deals with everything： for every 'theory' of anything
employs also certain common principles。 Hence everybody； including
even amateurs； makes use in a way of dialectic and the practice of
examining： for all undertake to some extent a rough trial of those who
profess to know things。 What serves them here is the general
principles： for they know these of themselves just as well as the
scientist； even if in what they say they seem to the latter t