按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
last again being conditioned by others； and so on to infinity。
The duration of our body therefore depends on the common order of
nature； or the constitution of things。 Now； however a thing may
be constituted； the adequate knowledge of that thing is in God；
in so far as he has the ideas of all things； and not in so far as
he has the idea of the human body only （II。 ix。 Cor。）。
Wherefore the knowledge of the duration of our body is in God
very inadequate； in so far as he is only regarded as constituting
the nature of the human mind； that is （II。 xi。 Cor。）； this
knowledge is very inadequate to our mind。 Q。E。D。
XXXI。 We can only have a very inadequate knowledge of the
duration of particular things external to ourselves。
》》》》》ProofEvery particular thing； like the human body； must be
conditioned by another particular thing to exist and operate in
a fixed and definite relation； this other particular thing must
likewise be conditioned by a third； and so on to infinity （I。
xxviii。）。 As we have shown in the foregoing proposition； from
this common property of particular things； we have only a very
inadequate knowledge of the duration of our body； we must draw a
similar conclusion with regard to the duration of particular
things； namely； that we can only have a very inadequate
knowledge of the duration thereof。 Q。E。D。
ProofAll ideas which are in God agree in every respect
with their objects （II。 ii。 Cor。）； therefore （I。 Ax。 vi。） they
are all true。 Q。E。D。
XXXII。 There is nothing positive in ideas； which causes them to
be called false。
》》》》》ProofIf this be denied； conceive； if possible； a positive
mode of thinking； which should constitute the distinctive
quality of falsehood。 Such a mode of thinking cannot be in God
（II。 xxxii。）； external to God it cannot be or be conceived （I。
xv。）。 Therefore there is nothing positive in ideas which causes
them to be called false。 Q。E。D。
XXXIV。 Every idea； which in us is absolute or adequate and
perfect； is true。
》》》》》ProofWhen we say that an idea in us is adequate and
perfect； we say； in other words （II。 xi。 Cor。）； that the idea is
adequate and perfect in God； in so far as he constitutes the
essence of our mind； consequently （II。 xxxii。）； we say that such
an idea is true。 Q。E。D。
XXXV。 Falsity consists in the privation of knowledge； which
inadequate； fragmentary； or confused ideas involve。
》》》》》ProofThere is nothing positive in ideas； which causes them
to be called false （II。 xxxiii。）； but falsity cannot consist in
simple privation （for minds； not bodies； are said to err and to
be mistaken）； neither can it consist in absolute ignorance； for
ignorance and error are not identical； wherefore it consists in
the privation of knowledge； which inadequate； fragmentary； or
confused ideas involve。 Q。E。D。
*****NoteIn the note to II。 xvii。 I explained how error
consists in the privation of knowledge； but in order to throw
more light on the subject I will give an example。 For instance；
men are mistaken in thinking themselves free； their opinion is
made up of consciousness of their own actions； and ignorance of
the causes by which they are conditioned。 Their idea of
freedom； therefore； is simply their ignorance of any cause for
their actions。 As for their saying that human actions depend on
the will； this is a mere phrase without any idea to correspond
thereto。 What the will is； and how it moves the body； they none
of them know； those who boast of such knowledge； and feign
dwellings and habitations for the soul； are wont to provoke
either laughter or disgust。 So； again； when we look at the sun；
we imagine that it is distant from us about two hundred feet；
this error does not lie solely in this fancy； but in the fact
that； while we thus imagine； we do not know the sun's true
distance or the cause of the fancy。 For although we afterwards
learn； that the sun is distant from us more than six hundred of
the earth's diameters； we none the less shall fancy it to be
near； for we do not imagine the sun as near us； because we are
ignorant of its true distance； but because the modification of
our body involves the essence of the sun； in so far as our said
body is affected thereby。
XXXVI。 Inadequate and confused ideas follow by the same
necessity； as adequate or clear and distinct ideas。
》》》》》ProofAll ideas are in God （I。 xv。）； and in so far as they
are referred to God are true （II。 xxxii。） and （II。 vii。 Cor。）
adequate； therefore there are no ideas confused or inadequate；
except in respect to a particular mind （cf。 II。 xxiv。 and
xxviii。）； therefore all ideas； whether adequate or inadequate；
follow by the same necessity （II。 vi。）。 Q。E。D。
XXXVII。 That which is common to all （cf。 Lemma II； above）； and
which is equally in a part and in the whole； does not constitute
the essence of any particular thing。
》》》》》ProofIf this be denied； conceive； if possible； that it
constitutes the essence of some particular thing； for instance；
the essence of B。 Then （II。 Def。 ii。） it cannot without B
either exist or be conceived； but this is against our hypothesis。
Therefore it does not appertain to B's essence； nor does it
constitute the essence of any particular thing。 Q。E。D。
XXXVIII。 Those things； which are common to all； and which are
equally in a part and in the whole； cannot be conceived except
adequately。
》》》》》ProofLet A be something； which is common to all bodies；
and which is equally present in the part of any given body and
in the whole。 I say A cannot be conceived except adequately。
For the idea thereof in God will necessarily be adequate （II。
vii。 Cor。）； both in so far as God has the idea of the human
body； and also in so far as he has the idea of the modifications
of the human body； which （II。 xvi。； xxv。； xxvii。） involve in part
the nature of the human body and the nature of external bodies；
that is （II。 xii。； xiii。）； the idea in God will necessarily be
adequate； both in so far as he constitutes the human mind； and in
so far as he has the ideas； which are in the human mind。
Therefore the mind （II。 xi。 Cor。） necessarily perceives A
adequately； and has this adequate perception； both in so far as
it perceives itself； and in so far as it perceives its own or
any external body； nor can A be conceived in any other manner。
Q。E。D。
ProofIf A be that； which is common to and a property of
the human body and external bodies； and equally present in the
human body and in the said external bodies； in each part of each
external body and in the whole； there will be an adequate idea of
A in God （II。 vii。 Cor。）； both in so far as he has the idea of
the human body； and in so far as he has the ideas of the given
external bodies。 Let it now be granted； that the human body is
affected by an external body through that； which it has in common
therewith； namely； A； the idea of this modification will involve
the property A （II。 xvi。）； and therefore （II。 vii。 Cor。） the
idea of this modification； in so far as it involves the property
A； will be adequate in God； in so far as God is affected by the
idea of the human body； that is （II。 xiii。）； in so far as he
constitutes the nature of the human mind； therefore （II。 xi。
Cor。） this idea is also adequate in the human mind。 Q。E。D。