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against our doctrine。 Lastly； in order to remove every scruple；
I have thought it worth while to point out some of the
advantages； which follow therefrom。 I say 〃some；〃 for they will
be better appreciated from what we shall set forth in the fifth
part。
I begin； then； with the first point； and warn my readers to make
an accurate distinction between an idea； or conception of the
mind； and the images of things which we imagine。 It is further
necessary that they should distinguish between idea and words；
whereby we signify things。 These threenamely； images； words；
and ideasare by many persons either entirely confused
together； or not distinguished with sufficient accuracy or care；
and hence people are generally in ignorance； how absolutely
necessary is a knowledge of this doctrine of the will； both for
philosophic purposes and for the wise ordering of life。 Those
who think that ideas consist in images which are formed in us by
contact with external bodies； persuade themselves that the ideas
of those things； whereof we can form no mental picture； are not
ideas； but only figments； which we invent by the free decree of
our will； they thus regard ideas as though they were inanimate
pictures on a panel； and； filled with this misconception； do not
see that an idea； inasmuch as it is an idea； involves an
affirmation or negation。 Again； those who confuse words with
ideas； or with the affirmation which an idea involves； think
that they can wish something contrary to what they feel； affirm；
or deny。 This misconception will easily be laid aside by one；
who reflects on the nature of knowledge； and seeing that it in
no wise involves the conception of extension； will therefore
clearly understand； that an idea （being a mode of thinking） does
not consist in the image of anything； nor in words。 The essence
of words and images is put together by bodily motions； which in
no wise involve the conception of thought。
These few words on this subject will suffice： I will therefore
pass on to consider the objections； which may be raised against
our doctrine。 Of these； the first is advanced by those； who
think that the will has a wider scope than the understanding； and
that therefore it is different therefrom。 The reason for their
holding the belief； that the will has wider scope than the
understanding； is that they assert； that they have no need of an
increase in their faculty of assent； that is of affirmation or
negation； in order to assent to an infinity of things which we
do not perceive； but that they have need of an increase in their
faculty of understanding。 The will is thus distinguished from
the intellect； the latter being finite and the former infinite。
Secondly； it may be objected that experience seems to teach us
especially clearly； that we are able to suspend our judgment
before assenting to things which we perceive； this is confirmed
by the fact that no one is said to be deceived； in so far as he
perceives anything； but only in so far as he assents or
dissents。
For instance； he who feigns a winged horse； does not therefore
admit that a winged horse exists； that is； he is not deceived；
unless he admits in addition that a winged horse does exist。
Nothing therefore seems to be taught more clearly by experience；
than that the will or faculty of assent is free and different
from the faculty of understanding。 Thirdly； it may be objected
that one affirmation does not apparently contain more reality
than another； in other words； that we do not seem to need for
affirming； that what is true is true； any greater power than for
affirming； that what is false is true。 We have； however； seen
that one idea has more reality or perfection than another； for
as objects are some more excellent than others； so also are the
ideas of them some more excellent than others； this also seems
to point to a difference between the understanding and the will。
Fourthly； it may be objected； if man does not act from free
will； what will happen if the incentives to action are equally
balanced； as in the case of Buridan's ass？ Will he perish of
hunger and thirst？ If I say that he would not； he would then
determine his own action； and would consequently possess the
faculty of going and doing whatever he liked。 Other objections
might also be raised； but； as I am not bound to put in evidence
everything that anyone may dream； I will only set myself to the
task of refuting those I have mentioned； and that as briefly as
possible。
To the first objection I answer； that I admit that the will has a
wider scope than the understanding； if by the understanding be
meant only clear and distinct ideas； but I deny that the will
has a wider scope than the perceptions； and the faculty of
forming conceptions； nor do I see why the faculty of volition
should be called infinite； any more than the faculty of feeling：
for； as we are able by the same faculty of volition to affirm an
infinite number of things （one after the other； for we cannot
affirm an infinite number simultaneously）； so also can we； by
the same faculty of feeling； feel or perceive （in succession） an
infinite number of bodies。 If it be said that there is an
infinite number of things which we cannot perceive； I answer；
that we cannot attain to such things by any thinking； nor；
consequently； by any faculty of volition。 But； it may still be
urged； if God wished to bring it about that we should perceive
them； he would be obliged to endow us with a greater faculty of
perception； but not a greater faculty of volition than we have
already。 This is the same as to say that； if God wished to bring
it about that we should understand an infinite number of other
entities； it would be necessary for him to give us a greater
understanding； but not a more universal idea of entity than that
which we have already； in order to grasp such infinite entities。
We have shown that will is a universal entity or idea； whereby
we explain all particular volitionsin other words； that which
is common to all such volitions。
As； then； our opponents maintain that this idea； common or
universal to all volitions； is a faculty； it is little to be
wondered at that they assert； that such a faculty extends itself
into the infinite； beyond the limits of the understanding： for
what is universal is predicated alike of one； of many； and of an
infinite number of individuals。
To the second objection I reply by denying； that we have a free
power of suspending our judgment： for； when we say that anyone
suspends his judgment； we merely mean that he sees； that he does
not perceive the matter in question adequately。 Suspension of
judgment is； therefore； strictly speaking； a perception； and not
free will。 In order to illustrate the point； let us suppose a
boy imagining a horse； and perceive nothing else。 Inasmuch as
this imagination involves the existence of the horse （II。 xvii。
Cor。）； and the boy does not perceive anything which would
exclude the existence of the horse； he will necessarily regard
the horse as present： he will not be able to doubt of its
existence； although he be not certain thereof。 We have daily
experience of such a state of things in dreams； and I do not
suppose that there is anyone； who would maintain that； while he
is dreaming； he has the free power of suspending his judgment
concerning the things in his dream； and bringing it about that
he should not dream those things； which he dreams that he sees；
yet it happens； notwithstanding； that even in dreams we suspend
our judgment； namely； when we dream that we are dreaming。
Further； I grant that no one can be deceived； so far as actual
perception extendsthat is； I grant that the mind's
imaginations； regarded in themselves； do not involve error （II。
xvii。 note）； but I deny； that a man does not； in the act of
perception； make any affirmation。 For what is the perception of
a winged horse； save affirming that a horse has wings？ If the
mind could perceive nothing else but the winged horse； it would
regard the same as present to itself： it would have no reasons
for doubting its existence； nor any faculty of dissent； unless
the imagination of a winged horse be joined to an idea which
precludes the existence of the said horse； or unless the m