友情提示:如果本网页打开太慢或显示不完整,请尝试鼠标右键“刷新”本网页!阅读过程发现任何错误请告诉我们,谢谢!! 报告错误
九色书籍 返回本书目录 我的书架 我的书签 TXT全本下载 进入书吧 加入书签

the critique of pure reason-第44章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页,按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页,按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部!
————未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!




must then have a point of time in which it was not。 But how and by

what can we fix and determine this point of time; unless by that which

already exists? For a void time… preceding… is not an object of

perception; but if we connect this beginning with objects which

existed previously; and which continue to exist till the object in

question in question begins to be; then the latter can only be a

determination of the former as the permanent。 The same holds good of

the notion of extinction; for this presupposes the empirical

representation of a time; in which a phenomenon no longer exists。

  Substances (in the world of phenomena) are the substratum of all

determinations of time。 The beginning of some; and the ceasing to be

of other substances; would utterly do away with the only condition

of the empirical unity of time; and in that case phenomena would

relate to two different times; in which; side by side; existence would

pass; which is absurd。 For there is only one time in which all

different times must be placed; not as coexistent; but as successive。

  Accordingly; permanence is a necessary condition under which alone

phenomena; as things or objects; are determinable in a possible

experience。 But as regards the empirical criterion of this necessary

permanence; and with it of the substantiality of phenomena; we shall

find sufficient opportunity to speak in the sequel。



                   B。 SECOND ANALOGY。



      Principle of the Succession of Time According

                to the Law of Causality。



     All changes take place according to the law of the

              connection of Cause and Effect。



                         PROOF。



  (That all phenomena in the succession of time are only changes; that

is; a successive being and non…being of the determinations of

substance; which is permanent; consequently that a being of

substance itself which follows on the non…being thereof; or a

non…being of substance which follows on the being thereof; in other

words; that the origin or extinction of substance itself; is

impossible… all this has been fully established in treating of the

foregoing principle。 This principle might have been expressed as

follows: 〃All alteration (succession) of phenomena is merely

change〃; for the changes of substance are not origin or extinction;

because the conception of change presupposes the same subject as

existing with two opposite determinations; and consequently as

permanent。 After this premonition; we shall proceed to the proof。)

  I perceive that phenomena succeed one another; that is to say; a

state of things exists at one time; the opposite of which existed in a

former state。 In this case; then; I really connect together two

perceptions in time。 Now connection is not an operation of mere

sense and intuition; but is the product of a synthetical faculty of

imagination; which determines the internal sense in respect of a

relation of time。 But imagination can connect these two states in

two ways; so that either the one or the other may antecede in time;

for time in itself cannot be an object of perception; and what in an

object precedes and what follows cannot be empirically determined in

relation to it。 I am only conscious; then; that my imagination

places one state before and the other after; not that the one state

antecedes the other in the object。 In other words; the objective

relation of the successive phenomena remains quite undetermined by

means of mere perception。 Now in order that this relation may be

cognized as determined; the relation between the two states must be so

cogitated that it is thereby determined as necessary; which of them

must be placed before and which after; and not conversely。 But the

conception which carries with it a necessity of synthetical unity; can

be none other than a pure conception of the understanding which does

not lie in mere perception; and in this case it is the conception of

〃the relation of cause and effect;〃 the former of which determines the

latter in time; as its necessary consequence; and not as something

which might possibly antecede (or which might in some cases not be

perceived to follow)。 It follows that it is only because we subject

the sequence of phenomena; and consequently all change; to the law

of causality; that experience itself; that is; empirical cognition

of phenomena; becomes possible; and consequently; that phenomena

themselves; as objects of experience; are possible only by virtue of

this law。

  Our apprehension of the manifold of phenomena is always

successive。 The representations of parts succeed one another。

Whether they succeed one another in the object also; is a second point

for reflection; which was not contained in the former。 Now we may

certainly give the name of object to everything; even to every

representation; so far as we are conscious thereof; but what this word

may mean in the case of phenomena; not merely in so far as they (as

representations) are objects; but only in so far as they indicate an

object; is a question requiring deeper consideration。 In so far as

they; regarded merely as representations; are at the same time objects

of consciousness; they are not to be distinguished from

apprehension; that is; reception into the synthesis of imagination;

and we must therefore say: 〃The manifold of phenomena is always

produced successively in the mind。〃 If phenomena were things in

themselves; no man would be able to conjecture from the succession

of our representations how this manifold is connected in the object;

for we have to do only with our representations。 How things may be

in themselves; without regard to the representations through which

they affect us; is utterly beyond the sphere of our cognition。 Now

although phenomena are not things in themselves; and are

nevertheless the only thing given to us to be cognized; it is my

duty to show what sort of connection in time belongs to the manifold

in phenomena themselves; while the representation of this manifold

in apprehension is always successive。 For example; the apprehension of

the manifold in the phenomenon of a house which stands before me; is

successive。 Now comes the question whether the manifold of this

house is in itself successive… which no one will be at all willing

to grant。 But; so soon as I raise my conception of an object to the

transcendental signification thereof; I find that the house is not a

thing in itself; but only a phenomenon; that is; a representation; the

transcendental object of which remains utterly unknown。 What then am I

to understand by the question: 〃How can the manifold be connected in

the phenomenon itself… not considered as a thing in itself; but merely

as a phenomenon?〃 Here that which lies in my successive apprehension

is regarded as representation; whilst the phenomenon which is given

me; notwithstanding that it is nothing more than a complex of these

representations; is regarded as the object thereof; with which my

conception; drawn from the representations of apprehension; must

harmonize。 It is very soon seen that; as accordance of the cognition

with its object constitutes truth; the question now before us can only

relate to the formal conditions of empirical truth; and that the

phenomenon; in opposition to the representations of apprehension;

can only be distinguished therefrom as the object of them; if it is

subject to a rule which distinguishes it from every other

apprehension; and which renders necessary a mode of connection of

the manifold。 That in the phenomenon which contains the condition of

this necessary rule of apprehension; is the object。

  Let us now proceed to our task。 That something happens; that is to

say; that something or some state exists which before was not;

cannot be empirically perceived; unless a phenomenon precedes; which

does not contain in itself this state。 For a reality which should

follow upon a void time; in other words; a beginning; which no state

of things precedes; can just as little be apprehended as the void time

itself。 Every apprehension of an event is therefore a perception which

follows upon another perception。 But as this is the case with all

synthesis of apprehension; as I have shown above in the example of a

house; my apprehension of an event is not yet sufficiently

distinguished from other apprehensions。 But I remark also that if in a

phenomenon which contains an occurrence; I call the antecedent state

of my perception; A; and the following state; B; the perception B

can only follow A in apprehension; and the perception A cannot

follow B; but only precede it。 For example; I see a ship float down

the stream of a river。 My perception of its place lower down follows

upon my perception of its place higher up the course of the river; and

it is impossible that; in the apprehension of this phenomenon; the

vessel should be perceived first below and afterwards higher up the

stream。 Here; theref
返回目录 上一页 下一页 回到顶部 0 1
未阅读完?加入书签已便下次继续阅读!
温馨提示: 温看小说的同时发表评论,说出自己的看法和其它小伙伴们分享也不错哦!发表书评还可以获得积分和经验奖励,认真写原创书评 被采纳为精评可以获得大量金币、积分和经验奖励哦!