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reason become docile； more enlightened； and more capable of uniting
the speculative interest with the practical。 But if you do not take
care at the outset； or at least midway； to make men good； you will
never force them into an honest belief。
But； it will be said； is this all that pure reason can effect； in
opening up prospects beyond the limits of experience？ Nothing more
than two articles of belief？ Common sense could have done as much as
this； without taking the philosophers to counsel in the matter！
I shall not here eulogize philosophy for the benefits which the
laborious efforts of its criticism have conferred on human reason…
even granting that its merit should turn out in the end to be only
negative… for on this point something more will be said in the next
section。 But； I ask； do you require that that knowledge which concerns
all men； should transcend the common understanding； and should only be
revealed to you by philosophers？ The very circumstance which has
called forth your censure； is the best confirmation of the correctness
of our previous assertions； since it discloses； what could not have
been foreseen； that Nature is not chargeable with any partial
distribution of her gifts in those matters which concern all men
without distinction and that； in respect to the essential ends of
human nature； we cannot advance further with the help of the highest
philosophy； than under the guidance which nature has vouchsafed to the
meanest understanding。
CHAPTER III。 The Architectonic of Pure Reason。
By the term architectonic I mean the art of constructing a system。
Without systematic unity； our knowledge cannot become science； it will
be an aggregate； and not a system。 Thus architectonic is the
doctrine of the scientific in cognition； and therefore necessarily
forms part of our methodology。
Reason cannot permit our knowledge to remain in an unconnected and
rhapsodistic state； but requires that the sum of our cognitions should
constitute a system。 It is thus alone that they can advance the ends
of reason。 By a system I mean the unity of various cognitions under
one idea。 This idea is the conception… given by reason… of the form of
a whole； in so far as the conception determines a priori not only
the limits of its content； but the place which each of its parts is to
occupy。 The scientific idea contains； therefore； the end and the
form of the whole which is in accordance with that end。 The unity of
the end； to which all the parts of the system relate； and through
which all have a relation to each other； communicates unity to the
whole system； so that the absence of any part can be immediately
detected from our knowledge of the rest； and it determines a priori
the limits of the system； thus excluding all contingent or arbitrary
additions。 The whole is thus an organism （articulatio）； and not an
aggregate （coacervatio）； it may grow from within （per
intussusceptionem）； but it cannot increase by external additions
（per appositionem）。 It is； thus； like an animal body； the growth of
which does not add any limb； but； without changing their
proportions； makes each in its sphere stronger and more active。
We require； for the execution of the idea of a system； a schema；
that is； a content and an arrangement of parts determined a priori
by the principle which the aim of the system prescribes。 A schema
which is not projected in accordance with an idea； that is； from the
standpoint of the highest aim of reason； but merely empirically； in
accordance with accidental aims and purposes （the number of which
cannot be predetermined）； can give us nothing more than technical
unity。 But the schema which is originated from an idea （in which
case reason presents us with aims a priori； and does not look for them
to experience）； forms the basis of architectonical unity。 A science；
in the proper acceptation of that term。 cannot be formed
technically； that is； from observation of the similarity existing
between different objects； and the purely contingent use we make of
our knowledge in concreto with reference to all kinds of arbitrary
external aims； its constitution must be framed on architectonical
principles； that is； its parts must be shown to possess an essential
affinity； and be capable of being deduced from one supreme and
internal aim or end； which forms the condition of the possibility of
the scientific whole。 The schema of a science must give a priori the
plan of it （monogramma）； and the division of the whole into parts；
in conformity with the idea of the science； and it must also
distinguish this whole from all others； according to certain
understood principles。
No one will attempt to construct a science； unless he have some idea
to rest on as a proper basis。 But； in the elaboration of the
science； he finds that the schema； nay； even the definition which he
at first gave of the science； rarely corresponds with his idea； for
this idea lies； like a germ； in our reason； its parts undeveloped
and hid even from microscopical observation。 For this reason； we ought
to explain and define sciences； not according to the description which
the originator gives of them； but according to the idea which we
find based in reason itself； and which is suggested by the natural
unity of the parts of the science already accumulated。 For it will
of ten be found that the originator of a science and even his latest
successors remain attached to an erroneous idea； which they cannot
render clear to themselves； and that they thus fail in determining the
true content； the articulation or systematic unity； and the limits
of their science。
It is unfortunate that； only after having occupied ourselves for a
long time in the collection of materials； under the guidance of an
idea which lies undeveloped in the mind； but not according to any
definite plan of arrangement… nay； only after we have spent much
time and labour in the technical disposition of our materials； does it
become possible to view the idea of a science in a clear light； and to
project； according to architectonical principles； a plan of the whole；
in accordance with the aims of reason。 Systems seem； like certain
worms； to be formed by a kind of generatio aequivoca… by the mere
confluence of conceptions； and to gain completeness only with the
progress of time。 But the schema or germ of all lies in reason； and
thus is not only every system organized according to its own idea； but
all are united into one grand system of human knowledge； of which they
form members。 For this reason； it is possible to frame an
architectonic of all human cognition； the formation of which； at the
present time； considering the immense materials collected or to be
found in the ruins of old systems； would not indeed be very difficult。
Our purpose at present is merely to sketch the plan of the
architectonic of all cognition given by pure reason； and we begin from
the point where the main root of human knowledge divides into two； one
of which is reason。 By reason I understand here the whole higher
faculty of cognition； the rational being placed in contradistinction
to the empirical。
If I make complete abstraction of the content of cognition；
objectively considered； all cognition is； from a subjective point of
view； either historical or rational。 Historical cognition is
cognitio ex datis； rational； cognitio ex principiis。 Whatever may be
the original source of a cognition； it is； in relation to the person
who possesses it； merely historical； if he knows only what has been
given him from another quarter； whether that knowledge was
communicated by direct experience or by instruction。 Thus the Person
who has learned a system of philosophy… say the Wolfian… although he
has a perfect knowledge of all the principles； definitions； and
arguments in that philosophy； as well as of the divisions that have
been made of the system； possesses really no more than an historical
knowledge of the Wolfian system； he knows only what has been told him；
his judgements are only those which he has received from his teachers。
Dispute the validity of a definition； and he is completely at a loss
to find another。 He has formed his mind on another's； but the
imitative faculty is not the productive。 His knowledge has not been
drawn from reason； and although； objectively considered； it is
rational knowledge； subjectively； it is merely historical。 He has
learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a
living man。 Rational cognitions which are objective； that is； which
have their source in reason； can be so termed from a subjective
point of view； only when they have been drawn by the individual
himself from the sources of reason； that is； from principles； and it
is in this way alone that criticism； or even the rejection of what has
been already learned； can spring up in the mind。
All rational cognition is； again； based either on conceptio